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*

During the American Revolution, the Penobscot,

Passamaquoddy-Malecite and Micmac Indian tribes were, a

potentially powerful force in Maine and Nova Scotia.

The

white population of the region was small and scattered,
and colonial leaders feared that the tribes would repeat

their actions of the past wars, during which they had
seriously harassed the frontiers.

The officials of Nova

Scotia and Massachusetts accordingly embarked upon a pro

gram to win the support of the Indians and to spare coloI

niaL settlements from attack.

Both governments were sure

that their opponents were trying to promote Indian warfare,
and the resulting rivalry fed upon itself as each side se

cured minor victories.

Both efforts were handicapped by

serious problems, and neither side was able to defeat the

other.

The tribes were dependent upon.goods and supplies

secured from both sides and were forced to maintain rela
tions with both contending parties.
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INTRODUCTION

During the War of the American Revolution, the
competition for the friendship and assistance of the

Indian tribes was a major factor in the struggle for the
northeastern corner of the North American continent.
British and American leaders believed that the Indians of

the area held the balance of power.

Convinced that their

enemies would seek alliances with the tribes, these
leaders plunged into frenzied efforts to woo the Indians

and to save their people from the horror of Indian war
fare.

Reacting defensively, each side tried to gain

Indian support for itself.

The failure of Nova Scotia to join the American

Revolution prompted the struggle for Indian support.

A

number of authors have analyzed that colony’s adherence

to the British cause and stirred up a controversy.

'^For collected assessments of Nova Scotia’s role in
the American Revolution, see George A. Rawlyk, Revolution
Rejected, 1775-1776
(Scarborough, Ontario; Prentice-Hall
of Canada, 1968). For other accounts, see John Bartlet
Brebner, The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia, A Marginal
Colony During the Revolutionary War (Toronto: McClelland
and Stewart, 1969); Maurice W. Armstrong, The Great Awak
ening in Nova Scotia, 1776-1809 (Hartford: The American
Society of Church History, 1948); J. M. Bumsted, Henry
Alline, 1748-1784 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1971); Gordon Stewart and George A. Rawlyk, A People Highly
Favored of God,. The Nova Scotia Yankees and ihe American
Revolution (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1972).
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J. B. Brebner focused on the isolation of Nova Scotia.

The Yankees who had settled there were outside the main
stream of revolutionary thought, and the geography of’the

colony forced them into attempted neutrality, as it had
their Acadian predecessors.

According to Brebner, they

were cut off from the power of the American colonies by
the rough terrain of Maine and New Brunswick and by the

sea.

They could not stand alone against either power and

sought to remain on good terms with both.
Another writer, D. C. Harvey, ascribed Nova

Scotia’s loyalty to the power of the British navy and the
success of the Halifax government in suppressing the

demand for town government on the New England model on the

Bay of Fundy.

Had the French navy been available to the

Americans earlier, Harvey felt the colony might have

fallen to the rebellion.

The strong control of appointed

town officials further gave the colonial government a

check on the people and kept down revolution.
Other authors have seen religious revivalism as
the primary reason for Nova Scotia’s failure to rally to

the American cause.

Maurice W. Armstrong wrote that Nova

Scotians were so engrossed in “other worldly” concerns that
they simply ignored the conflict around them.

S. D. Clark

took this theory one step further., He thought that the

religious movement represented a breakdown of traditional
authority in the Yankee towns.

The “New Lights,” as the

participants in the revival were called, represented a new

8

type of social revolution that tended to displace the
political goals of the American Revolution.

In his biography of Henry Alline, leader of the

revival in Nova Scotia, J. M. Bumsted also offered opinions

on Nova Scotian loyalty.

He noted Alline
s
*

spurning of the

secular •world and Quaker-like rejection of war and turmoil
and concluded that Alline and the Great Awakening offered

the colony an alternative to revolution and a safety valve
for discontent.

The New Lights left the world of politics

and retreated to metaphysical realms.

Gordon Stewart, with the assistance of George
Rawlyk, has produced something of a synthesis of the above

views.

He wrote that Nova Scotia’s special circumstances

of settlement and relative isolation removed its Yankee
settlers from the turmoil in the colonies from which they
had come.

Nova Scotians were fighting for rights that were

taken for granted in New England, and their position was

weak, because of the power of the Halifax government, with
its garrison and authoritarian traditions.

Political

opinion in Nova Scotia was ten years behind New England

and, according to Stewart, never caught up.

Conditions in

Nova Scotia were not the same as those across the Bay of
Fundy.
Stewart argued that what Brebner saw as innate
neutrality was, in fact, moral confusion.

Preoccupied by

the religious revival, the Yankees of Nova Scotia doubted
the morality of the Revolution.

Basically friendly to the

9
Americans, they suspected that the violence of the rebel
war effort damned its participants
*

Halifax, with its

corruption and violence, was also evil, and the Yankees of

Nova Scotia thus felt obliged to remain above the battle.
Such aloofness was the path to salvation.
Stewart did not preclude the possibility of Nova
Scotian participation in the American Revolution but felt

that an American army would have been necessary to initiate

the process.

Nova Scotia was too far behind the Americans

ideologically and too consumed with private concerns to

break into revolution by herself.
Modern assessments of Nova Scotia’s loyalty to

Britain do not assign a critical role to the Indians.

While no significant evidence exists indicating that fear
of Indian attack played any part in the development of Nova
Scotian loyalism, a number of authors feel that Indian

support preserved their region from conquest.

Writers in

Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Maine have expressed this

thought.

Although they have also claimed victory in the

struggle for Indian support, both sides could not have
decisively won this competition, and the mutual claims of

victory indicate something of stalemate.
American commentators tended to evaluate the sit

uation in much the same way as W. H. Kilby did in his
Bastport and Passamaquoddy.

Kilby wrote that during the

American Revolution, ’’the friendliness of the Indians was

held to be the means of saving the eastern settlements and

10
giving our nation the important point of possession when

the war closed and the treaty was to be made."

2

Kilby

also asserted that, "had not the neutrality of the Penob

scot, Passamaquoddy, St. John and Micmac Indians been

secured, the settlers of Eastern Maine could hardly have
•5
maintained their existence."^
Other American writers expressed views similar to

those of Kilby.Marion Jacques Smith wrote that the

American effort among the Indians was a defensive measure
5
to prevent attacks instigated by the British.
G. W.

Drisko thought that this work among the tribes saved the
region for the United States.

s
*
Drisko

opinion was

shared by two other writers, M. E. C. Smith and J. D.
Weston, both of whom were sure that with Indian help, the

2

William H. Kilby, Eastport and Passamaquoddy
(Eastport: E. E. Sheath and Co., 1888), p. 485.
3Ibid., p. 437.

^Many American authors of local histories and other
works dealing with eastern Maine do not mention Indian
participation in the Revolution.
In some cases, the author
felt that such participation was irrelevant to his effort
because the town with which he was dealing was settled after
the Revolution.
Others ignored the whole question when they
might legitimately have dealt with it. See the Bibliography
for local histories examined.

^A History of Maine: From Wilderness to Statehood
/T497-18207 (Portland: Falmouth Publishing House, 1949)>
p. 227.

^Narrative of the Town of Machias (Machias: no
publisher, 1904). p. 65. Mr. Drisko evidently saw the
capture of the Margaretta and the battle of Machias as
the entire Revolution in the town. He wrote almost
nothing about John Allan.

11

British could have swept through much of eastern. Maine.

7

Canadian authors have, felt much the same way and
have been much more likely to mention the struggle for

Indian support during the Revolution.

Most felt that the

British won the competition for Indian goodwill after

initial American successes, but that American control of
the Indians would not necessarily have led to the fall of

Nova Scotia to the Americans.
The older Canadian opinion was expressed by James

Hannay, who felt that John Allan, whose career as American
Indian Superintendant will be discussed in later chapters,

constantly attempted to incite the Indians to mischief.

The Americans treated the Indians so badly, however, that
few would aid the rebels.

W. Stewart MacNutt expressed a

similar view in a later treatment of the subject, although

he did not state that the Americans actively mistreated
the Indians.

Other Canadian writers simply asserted that

the Indians supported the British during the war and were

7

M. E. C. Smith, ’’Machias in the American. Revo*,
lution and Afterward,” New England Magazine, August, 1895>
p. 682; J. D. Weston, History of Eastport and Vicinity: A
Lecture April 1834» before the Eastport Lyceum (Boston: No
publisher, 1854), pp." 31-2.
q

James Hannay, History of New Brunswick (St. John:
Bowes, 1909), pp. 110, 121; W. Stewart MacNutt, New
Brunswick, A History: 1784-1867 (Toronto: Macmillan of
Canada, 19 6 3)» p. 8 •
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an important consideration to settlers within Nova
Scotia.

Several authors stressed early American dominance
among the Indians.

They felt that Michael Prancklin, Nova

Scotian Indian Superintendent, won the Indians back to the
British and kept them from doing serious damage to the

colony.

The most significant of these writers was

J. B. Brebner, who wrote of the ’’uncertain'1 business of

seeking Indian support.

He felt that Prancklin finally

beat Allan, the American agent, secured the St. John
valley and loosened Allan’s hold over the Indians in the
territory dominated by the Americans.

Brebner attributed

Prancklin’s victory to an excellent talent for Indian

relations and the greater supply of trade goods available
to him.

The American agent held an orphan command,

according to Brebner, constantly shunted between the

Continental Congress and the General Court of Massachusetts.
He was never properly supplied and therefore could not hold

^WiJLliam 0. Raymond, The River St. John (Sackville,
New Brunswick: The Tribune Press, 1945)> P
* 211; G. C.
Campbell, The History of Nova.Scotia (Toronto: The Ryerson
Press, 1948), p. 159; Wilson Dallam Wallis and Ruth
Sawtelle Wallis, The Malecite Indians of New Brunswick
(Ottawa: National'Museum of Canada, 1957), P
* 14.
The
Wallis book was not very useful;, the authors were concerned
more with tribal origin and legends than with the history
and traditions springing from the .latter periods of
Malecite history.

13
the support of the-Indian tribes.^

Canadian authors who mention Indian participation
in the Revolution thus tend to agree in substance.

11 •

They

may disagree on the details,, such as when the British
became dominant among the Indians, but they agree that

Halifax dominated the Indians throughout most of the war.
They were less likely to stress the danger to Nova Scotia

had the Indians gone completely over to the Americans, but

a number of them mentioned such possibilities.

A few felt

that the colony might have fallen under such attack, but
most were more confident.

Canadian and American writers thus tended to see
the struggle for Indian support on different levels.

The

Americans felt that loss in the competition would have

Brebner, The Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia,
pp. 322, 324-7. Other writers voicing similar.opinions
included W. Stewart MacNutt, who on pages- 83-4 of his The
Atlantic Provinces, The Emergence of Colonial Society,
1712-1837 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965) gave a
different but non-contradictory view of the struggle from
the account in his History of New Brunswick (see note 11).
George Frederick Clark agreed that Francklin won the
Indians back, although he said very little about the Revo
lution. His book, Someone Before Us (Fredericton, New
Brunswick: Brunswick Press, 1970), was mainly concerned
with archaeology. Harold B. Davis, an American writer,
also agreed with Brebner on this point.
In his An Inter
national Community on the St. Croix, University of Maine
Studies, 2nd ser., No. 64 (Orono: tJniversity of Maine Press,
1950), p. 13, he wrote that the Indians“were finally won
away by Michael Francklin." The Passamaquoddies remained
loyal, but their devotion weakened.
number of Canadian authors who dealt with the
Revolution did not mention the Indians at all.
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delivered much of Maine into British hands.

The Canadians

felt that Nova Scotia would probably have survived Indian

hostility.

They were so sure that Halifax was the

’

decisive victor in the struggle that most did not analyze
the possibilities of defeat.

Authors on both sides felt

that their people would have sustained heavy damage from

Indian hostility, but the Americans seemed more aware of
the possibility of total defeat.
The claims of victory by both sides in the compe

tition for the Indians present an interesting aspect of
this problem.

The American commentators were aware of

weakness in the closing years of the war, and the Canadian

writers admitted an initial weakness, but both adamantly

claim overall victory.
fied in their claims.

Both sides were partially justi
Each of the contending parties were

successful enough in their efforts with the Indians to

achieve many of their war aims.

This becomes evident when

their basic goals among the Indians are examined.

When the war broke out, both sides feared the

Indians.

Although the ability and willingness of the

Indians to harm either side was questionable, the govern
ments of Massachusetts and Nova Scotia believed that the
tribes of the region could do them great damage.

Both

immediately set forth a policy of winning Indian friend
ship.

Massachusetts was totally successful in this; her

settlements in the disputed area downeast suffered no

Indian assaults.

Nova Scotia was slightly less successful
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and underwent several minor assaults and alarms; she did

not, however, suffer any serious harm at the hands of the
Indians.

The Halifax government therefore could also •

claim victory in this struggle.

Thus, in their initial

aim, that of preventing Indian assaults upon themselves,

both sides were successful and could claim victory.
The greater assurance of victory among Canadian
writers may have sprung from the modest goals Halifax set

for Indian work.

The government’s agent, Michael Francklin,

was merely to recall the Indians to their allegiance to

King George.

The Indians were willing to give such

assurances of loyalty in return for trade goods.

The Nova

Scotian leaders gave little thought to recruiting the
Indians to fight the Americans, and the Indians accordingly
had few obligations as a consequence of the professed

allegiance to the Crown.

The Nova Scotians did not trust

the Indians enough to raise them militarily against the

rebels.

They felt it better to leave the tribes peacefully

in the woods.

Once the Halifax government got pledges of

allegiance from the tribes and ended the minor assaults,

their goals were accomplished, and their victory was com
plete.

The Americans had other goals beyond the mere

winning of friendship, and these account for the reluctance

of the American

authors to claim total victory.

Massa

chusetts and General Washington unsuccessfully sought
Indian troops for the Continental army in the early part
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of the war.

Furthermore, Colonel John Allan, the American

Indian agent, hoped to use the tribes in the conquest of

Nova Scotia, the ultimate American goal.

Although he

caused some difficulty for the British, he was rarely able

to use the Indians offensively.

He and the Americans thus

failed to achieve all their ambitions.

For this reason,

American writers have tended to stress the successful
defense of eastern Maine and to claim victory on that
basis; they play down the failure to achieve their other

goals•
Both sides thus achieved at least partial success

in their war aims among the tribes of Maine and Nova Scotia.

These goals were set because the governments of Massachu
setts and Nova Scotia were sure that their enemies would

use the Indians against the settlements downeast.

The war

aims of the two governments were determined by what their

leaders believed, not by the actual situation.

In this

case, these leaders believed that the Indians could do

their interests grave damage.

The early moves of both

sides reinforced the conviction that mischief was intended
among the Indians.

The struggle for Indian friendship was

thus self-intensifying, growing in bitterness and desper
ation as each

side won minor victories.

Once begun, it

had a life of its own, at times almost unrelated to the

realities of the situation.
In this work, the growth of this competition for

Indian support will be explored, and the relative strengths
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and weaknesses of each side will be examined.

In the face

of existing claims and counter-claims of victory, it will

be necessary to arrive at a judgement regarding the appar

ent successes of each effort.

Who was directing these

efforts, to what degree were they tied into the British

and American war measures, and why did they succeed or
fail?

These questions must be answered before a balanced

view of the events can be achieved.

The study will also

provide information on the methods and flavor of day-today operations among the men who dealt with the Indians.
Perhaps in this way it will be possible to arrive at true

appreciation and interpretation of. the work of the major

participants.
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Chapter 1

PRE-WAR CONDITIONS DOWNEAST
The American Revolution thrust Massachusetts and
Nova Scotia into the first hostilities since the expulsion

of French power from North America.

Once again, opposing

forces, faced each other across the Bay of Fundy and in the
wilderness of eastern Maine and the St. John valley, but

this time, the conflict was between Englishmen, subjects
of King George III.

The style and progress of that con

flict were largely determined by the conditions existing

when the war broke out.

These conditions, which had been

developing since the European race first appeared in North

America, are a vital prelude to the more detailed study of
the competition for the support of the Indians of Maine
and Nova Scotia.
Qj One of the necessary conditions for the development

of this contest for Indian friendship was the continued loy
alty of Nova Scotia to the British Empire, which was dis
cussed above.

® A second condition shaping the competition in east
ern Maine and Nova Scotia was the active support of the
rebellion by Machias, which immediately made it a focus

of action for the American cause.
to(explain Machias
*

Little has been written

devotion to the rebellion.

Earlier
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authors tended to see it as a normal, ’’patriotic” response

and accepted it without further investigation,

The only-

later historian to deal with this subject has been John

Howard Ahlin, in his Maine Rubicon; Downeast Settlers

during the American Revolution,

He attributed Machias
*

revolutionary zeal to frustration over repeated failure to
win royal recognition of land titles, neglect by the Mass

achusetts government, unsettled governmental conditions

downeast, traditional rebellion against the laws governing
the harvest of mast trees and the natural "anti-authority”

tendencies of frontier people.

These conditions created a

situation in which a break with established authority came

rather easily.

Ahlin also noted that the lumber industry

of Machias was strongly tied to the Boston area and that

any measures of government that harmed the economy of

Boston also affected the rather fragile economic condition

of Machias.

Ahlin thus felt that the Machias region was

susceptible to rebellion, and rather naturally followed the
2
colony of Massachusetts into the Revolution.

\ Calais: Calais Advertiser Press, 1966) pp. 5-11.

2Ahlin also noted that there was little agricul
tural activity at Machias; much food and hay came from Nova
Scotia or Boston. As the war progressed and as shortages
developed due to Nova Scotian loyalism and the British navy
on the Maine coast, many people downeast may have regretted
their initial rush to rebellion.
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The third, and most important, circumstance in

Maine and Nova Scotia was the presence of the Indian tribes.
Their economic and political status, which shaped the' thrust

of the programs to win their support, had been determined by

developments stretching back into their history beyond even
their first contacts with European culture..

The tribes that were to play a role in the Revo
lution were the remants of a broad band of culturallysimilar, associated tribes that had once stretched from the

Nipmucks of New Hampshire to the Malecites on the St. John
River.

The Micmacs, who lived along the eastern coast of

present day New Brunswick and in Nova Scotia proper, were

associated with the tribes to the west but were never mem
bers of the Abnaki Confederacy, to- which their neighbors

belonged.

They may have aided the Confederacy in war, but

remained outside at other times.
The Abnaki Confederacy maintained a considerable

number of cultural contacts, aided by the mutually intelli 
gible dialects spoken throughout the region.
three major dialectal groups.

There were

The tribes of New Hampshire

and the Saco valley used the first of these.

The second,

•^Fannie Hardy Eckstorm, ’’Indians of Maine,” in
Louis C. Hatch, Maine, A History, Vol. I (New York: Amer
ican Historical Society, 1919), PP
*
43-4, 55; Andrea
Jeanne Bear, ’’The Concept of Unity among Indian Tribes of
Maine, New Hampshire and New Brunswick” (unpublished Senior
Scholar thesis, Colby College, 1966), pp. 100, 1Q5.
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spoken by the Androscoggin, Kennebec and Penobscot tribes,

outlasted its ■western counterpart, but is now virtually
extinct as a spoken language.

The third has survived

among the Passamaquoddies and Malecites.^

This al mil a-rj ty

of language, along with the geography of the region, was a
key factor in maintaining cultural homogeneity throughout
5
the Confederacy.
The Indians of the Abnaki Confederacy were migra

tory, seeking the most abundant sources of food.

Their

villages were little more than ’’base camps” for winter

living.

After planting their crops in the villages each

spring, they left their inland settlements for the coast

and a summer of fishing.

They returned to the villages in

the fall, harvested and stored their crops, and prepared

for a winter of hunting and trapping.

fered slightly from tribe to tribe.

The practices dif
Among the Indians

studied in this work, the Malecites were the most active
agriculturally.

The Micmacs did very little planting de-

pending almost entirely upon game for sustenance.

^Eckstorm, ’’Indians of Maine,” p. 44.
^Bear, ’’Concept of Unity,” p. 65.

^Diamond Jenness, Indians of Canada (Ottawa: E.

Cloutier, 1955), pp• 267-70; James Phinney Baxter, "The
Abnakis and their Ethnic Relations, ” Collections of the
Maine Historical Society, 2nd ser., ill, 13-40; Prank G.
Speck, and W. S. Hadlock, ’’Report on the Tribal Bound
aries and Hunting Areas of the Malecite Indians of New
Brunswick,” American Anthropologist, XLVIII (June, 1946),
355-74; Eckstorm, “Indians of Maine," pp. 56-8.
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Abnaki and M'icmac chiefs traditionally had very

little authority.

Among the Penobscots, for example, a

chief was very weak, more a leader than a ruler.

He repre

sented the group in extra-tribal affairs and provided
advice and leadership in time of war.

Although sons occa

sionally succeeded fathers, the chieftainship was not
7
hereditary. Micmac chiefs were evidently weaker than their

Abnaki counterparts.

Their main duty was the assigning of

hunting areas to the family bands.

They frequently did not

lead the tribe in war but surrendered that duty to war
leaders, men skilled in war.

The position of the chiefs

improved somewhat as the tribes came into increasing con
tact with Europeans.

They became commercial leaders in

th? trading that followed the new contacts.

Their new;.eco

nomic status buttressed the chiefs’ positions and weakened

the more democratic forms that had previously prevailed.

9

^Frank’ .G. Speck, Penobscot Man, The Life History of
a Forest Tribe in Maine (New York; Octagon Books, 1970),
pp. 203-4.

o
Jenness, Indians of Canada, p. 268.

(rnl dsworth Hailev. The Conflict of European
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The Indian culture that spread across Maine and
Nova Scotia received devastating blows from the European

civilization that appeared with the first exploring ships

along.the North American coast.

When confronted with the

results of European technology, ancient skills soon disap
peared, and traditional patterns of life faded into a

growing dependency upon European goods obtained through

trade.

The French, with their thirst for furs and zeal to

Christianize, weakened the tribal structure and life styles.

The English, with their need for land and growing contempt
of the Indian, destroyed several tribes and drove the sur
vivors from

the lands where they had lived for genera

tions. Both were enemies of Indian tradition and contrib
uted to the decline of the tribes.

The root of the conflict between the English and

the Indians lay in the conflicting systems of land tenure.
When the Indians made a grant to whites, they intended,

merely to allow the purchaser to take up traditional
Indian uses of the land.

The French understood this and

made no attempt to dispossess the Indians; with their small
population they had no need to do so.

The English, however,

under the pressure of a rapidly growing population, took
active and exclusive possession of the lands they purchased.

Furthermore, the English mode of settlement which placed
them squarely astride traditional Indian routes to the sea,

24

sowed seeds of almost constant conflict.^
The small conflicts in Maine were part of the
massive English-French struggle for control of the conti

nent, but the basic causes had little to do with the
larger conflict.

The Indians were fighting for their lands

and way of life; for them, no compromise was possible.

11

The several wars were too numerous to detail here, but,
beginning in 1675 and continuing until the end of the.

French and Indian War in 1765, English forces slowly, and
with many reverses, destroyed the tribes of western Maine
and reduced the other tribes of Nova Scotia and Maine to

exhaustion and peace.

Under the stress, the Abnaki Confed

eracy broke down, and self-interest dominated.

The tribes

were never able to strike a decisive blow against the

English, and one by one, the tribes of western Maine were

broken into tiny, dispirited remnants, some of who simply

vanished.*
12
11

By 1765, only the Penobscot, Malecite-Passamaquoddy
and Micmac tribes maintained

their tribal structures with t

^Sister Mary Celeste Leger, The Catholic Indian
Missions in Maine (Washington: Catholic University of
America, 1929), p. 65; Kenneth M. Morrison, "Sebastien
Rale vs. New England; A Case Study in Frontier Conflict”
(unpublished Master’s thesis, University of Maine at Orono,
1970), p. 18.
11

Clark Wissler, Indians of the United States
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 19^6), p. 81.

12Bear, "Concept of Unity,” p. 106.
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any strength.

13

The Malecites and Passamac[uoddies had not

been touched by the expansionist English movements, and

the light settlement of Nova Scotia left the Micmacs '
virtually intact.^

The expulsion of the French from North America
deprived the Indians of more than a mere ally.

They no

longer had two sources of supply for manufactured goods.
All goods henceforth would have to come from the English.
After the fall of New France, therefore, the Indians were ’

prisoners of their need for certain goods, and the British
colonial governments now used this need to control the
tribes.

small group of Indians also remained on the
Androscoggin River and eventually sought some assistance
from Massachusetts during the Revolution.
Other Indians
remained throughout western and central Maine. Arnold’s
expedition met a number of them as they ascended;the
Kennebec River.
They were too few to figure significantly ' (
in the war. For the references to Indians during the
Arnold expedition, see Kenneth Roberts, March to Quebec,
Journals of the Members of Arnold’s Expedition (Garden
City, New' York: Doubleday, 1958). The references occur in
the following journals: Lieutenant John Montresor, pp. 7,
19; Doctor Isaac Senter, p. 215; John Joseph Henry,
PP. 513-5, 317, 344.

' ^No modern definitive work on the Indian wars in
New England has been published, but a number of works are
available. These are: Charles E. Clark, The Eastern
Colonial Frontier, The Settlement of Northern New" England,
1600-1765 (New York: Knopf, 1970): Sister Mary Anna Joseph
(Mary Genevieve Hennessey), “French and English Pressures
on the Indians of Acadia and New England, 1667-1727" (un
published Master’s thesis, University of New Brunswick,
1968); Douglas E. Leach, The Northern Colonial Frontier,
1607-1765 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1966);
Robert E. Moody, “The Maine Frontier, 1607 to 1765"
(unpublished Doctor’s dissertation, Yale University, 1953).

26

The Indians
*

need for manufactured goods had been

developing for many years.

They had obtained these goods

through trade with Europeans since the first explorers
dropped anchor along the coasts of New England and the
Maritimes.

When settlers followed explorers, opportunities

to gain manufactured goods were greatly increased.

The new

items the Indians got in return for their furs were far

superior to the traditional implements; the standard of

living among the tribes shot up, but the traditional way
of life was lost in the process.

Iron, steel and copper

goods replaced the older stone implements, and handicrafts

practiced for centuries disappeared in a very few gener
ations.

The metal kettle or axe became essential as the

Indians forgot how to live without them.

So great was the

need for the newer articles that the tribal way of life
shifted, and the acquisition of iron became its main
focus.

15

By the outbreak of the American Revolution, this

process had been going on for over 150 years, and Indian

dependence upon manufactured goods was established.

The dependence upon manufactured goods changed the
Indian style of life in

other ways.. To get the necessary

goods, the tribes had to trade with the whites and needed

commodities for exchange.

Wampum was lised occasionally,

• •

^Bailey, Conflict of Culture, pp. 10-2, 46-7 w

27
but the basic medium was furs.

16

As the need for furs increased, the Indians soon

realized the usefulness of firearms and sought them. Once
the Indians got guns, the new weapons had a greater effect

upon them than

any other manufactured item brought to

America by the Europeans.

In spite of abusive use of

individual weapons, guns revolutionized hunting and war
fare.

Indian

Poor gun management and maintenance increased the
need for guns, and when the supply of furs

decreased due to overhunting, the Indians, with nothing to
trade, were often unable to obtain replacement weapons.

17

Guns led the Indians to overhunt their lands and

further harmed the traditional way of life.

When animals

were killed chiefly for fur and not for food, the kill was
much larger.

Utilization of the whole carcass declined,

and eventually a shortage of food and furs developed.

The

increased time spent hunting also caused the decline of
agriculture and greater dependence upon white sources of

food.

The Micmacs, who never practiced much agriculture,

were particularly hard hit as the game animals became

scarce.

The search for hunting territories and markets for

1^Ibid., p. 49.

.
Carl Parcher Russell, Guns on the Early
Frontier, A History of Firearms from Colonial Times
through the Years of the Western Fur Trade (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1957), pp. vii-viii;
Bailey, Conflict of Culture, p. 53.

j
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furs increased the desperation of war.

Conflict, made

more deadly by firearms, replaced the old blood feud, and

casualties were greater.

Old behavioral norms broke down

under the pressure of the search for furs.

The result was

often the failure of food supplies, drunkenness, disease
ip

and depopulation.

Elizabeth Ann Hutton detailed the process of de
*
cline in her study of the Micmacs.

As game declined due

to overhunting, the Indians had to travel further to find

enough for their needs.

The increased time Bpent in

travel lessened the time available to provide the basic

needs of life.

The same shortage of game reduced the food

supplies available, and the Indians had to purchase provi

sions.

They finally became so dependent upon white sup

plies that charity was necessary.
The Indians of Nova Scotia had become dependent

upon manufactured goods and foods produced by whites
during the wars.between the English and French.

This made

them submissive to the whites when they needed goods.
J. B. Brebner stated that the Nova Scotia Indians had to
make peace in 1760 because they needed supplies that they

Bailey, Conflict of Culture, pp. 13, 57-8, 97-8,
114-5.

O^’The Micmac Indians of Nova Scotia to 1834”
Jinpublished Master’s thesis, Dalhousie University, 1961),
pp. 80, 82, 88-9, 101-2, 181.

29
could get no other way.

Their survival depended upon it.

20

After the war, the Indians attempted to re-establish dual
sources of supply by trading with the French on the islands
of St. Pierre and Miquelon, but the Nova Scotian authorities

moved quickly to interdict these supply lines.

They

wanted no repetition of the situation before the fall of

New France, when the Indians played the warring parties
against each other.

21

The Indian dependence upon manufactured goods and

English provisions did not lessen before the American
Revolution.

In 1764, Governor Wilmot of Nova Scotia wrote

. the Board of Trade that ’’The custom of giving them provi
sions and cloathing has been too long established to be

broke with Safety.”

make them hostile.

22

To refuse more supplies would simply

Subsequent reports from Nova Scotia

noted similar demands from the Indians.

The government

attempted to introduce methods by which the Indians could
support themselves; the new colony of Nova Scotia could ill

_________ __
20
Brebner, Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia, xpp. 22-3,
70; Hutton, “Micmacs of Nova Scotia,” p. 135
*
Letter, Lord Shelburne, Secretary of State to
Lord William Campbell, Governor of Nova Scotia, Feb. 19,1767,
Public Archives of Canada, Noya Scotia A, Colonial Corre
spondence of Nova Scotia, 1
603-1867 , LXXIX, 17-8, (this work
*
will be cited hereafter as Nova Scotia A); Hutton, ’’Micmacs
of Nova Scotia,” p. 135
*
22]jetter, June 24, 1764, Nova Scotia A, LXXIV,
124-9

\
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afford the expense of maintaining large numbers of

Indians. J
Once the Indian dependence upon the English became
apparent, the colonial governments attempted to take con
trol of the tribes by exploiting their needs.

In Maine in

the early 1700’s, Massachusetts attempted a policy of

peace through trade and truck houses, or trading posts, at
Saco and on Casco Bay.

In 1726,

the General Court took

control of the operation and fixed the prices of furs.

The

system thus established lasted with only minor changes
until the Revolution.

Three basic posts served until the close of the

French and Indian War.

These were at St. George’s, at

Richmond on the Kennebec River and at Union Falls on the
Saco River.

When peace came after the fall of Quebec, two

new posts were added at Fort Halifax in Winslow and Fort
Pownall in Prospect on the Penobscot River.Massachu
*
setts

system seemed popular with the Indians and was used

substantially, but, of course, they had an alternative
until 1760.25

^Letters:, Board-of Trade to Wilmot, July 13» 1764,
Benjamin Green to Lords Commissioners of Trade and Planta
tions, Aug. 24, 1766, Lieutenant Governor William Francklin
to Lord Hillsborough, Secretary of State, July 20, 1768,
Nova Scotia A, LXXV, 26, LXXVII, 217-8, LXXXIII, 28-9.
^^Robert

e.

Moody, "The Maine Frontier," pp. 505-7,

350-4.

25
pp. 147-9.

Douglas Leach, Northern Colonial Frontier,
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Nova Scotia did not adopt the truck house system

as "whole-heartedly as did Massachusetts.

The colonial

authorities encouraged the Indians to trade at Halifax
after the colony fell to Britain but did not set up a sys

tem of truck houses until 1760—1761, when six trading

stations were established under Benjamin Gerrish, the new
Agent of Indian Affairs.

The government appointed and

supervised the truck masters and provided the trade goods,
but the Nova Scotian system never worked.

s
*
Gerrish

method of obtaining trade goods at great profit to himself

and his friends created a scandal and discredited the sys

tem.

The truck houses also ran into debt because of the

large numbers of gifts that they were forced to give to
the Indians.

After an unsuccessful attempt at reform, the

government abandoned the system in 1764.

no longer bear the expense.

The colony could

To protect.the Indians, trade

was then opened at certain locations supervised by the
government.26
By 1775, the process of decline, growing dependence
and control by colonial governments had reduced the Indians

to three tribes, the Benobscots, the Malecite-

^Hutton, "I'licmacs of Nova Scotia,” pp. 163-4,
166—7, 169-71 ; Elisabeth Ann Hutton, ’’Indian Affairs in
Nova Scotia, 1760-1834” Collections of the Nova Scotia
Historical Society, XXXIV (1963), 34-40
*

\
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Passamaquoddies and the Micmacs.

27

These three groups were

the remnants.of the Abnaki Confederacy and the most faith
ful to the old spirit of the alliance.

The tribes easily

maintained close and friendly relations among themselves
because of the similarity of culture discussed above.

28

The relative strength of the three tribes is very
difficult to determine..

Alden Vaughn estimated that there

were only 16,000 to 18,000 Indians in all New England
after the great epidemic of 1616-1617.

He further noted

that most of these lived in southern New England where the

Indian population was always denser than that in the

27
'Writers have disagreed over the relationship
between the Malecites and the Passamaquoddies. Most
writers have seen them as one tribe or two subdivisions
of the same tribe. F. G.
Speck and W. S. Hadlock, in
their ’’Report on Tribal Boundaries and Hunting Areas of
the Malecite Indians,” p. 574, wrote that without an
exhaustive study of the dialects of both groups, one
could not determine their relationship. For the purposes
of this thesis, the Malecite-Passamaquoddies were
regarded as essentially two groups within one tribe.
The
distinction made was mostly geographical, between groups
around Passamaquoddy Bay and on the St. John.River.
According to Speck and Hadlock, "Tribal Boundaries," p. 555, the Penobscots were linguistically closer
to the Abnakis, and the Malecites had a similar relation
ship with the Micmacs.
They all were separate parts of
the Wabanaki culture and dialectic group. For references
to the Abnaki Confederacy and relations among these three
tribes, see Speck and Hadlock, "Tribal Boundaries," p. 559;
Davis, International Community, p. 3; F.
Speck,
"Eastern Algonkian Confederacy," pp. 493, 497.

\
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north.29
According to the Wendall Estimate, in 1690 there

were 1,480 Indian men in Maine and 2,740 in Nova Scotia.

This is the earliest figure available for the Indian popu
lation of Maine and Nova Scotia and seems quite high.

If

each of these warriors had two or three dependents, the
Indian population of Maine would have been between 5>000
and 5>000 souls.

According to the same calculations, at

the same time between 5,000 and 8,500 Indians were living

Alden Vaughn, The New England Frontier, Puritans
and Indians, 1620-1765 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965)>
p.28. Two estimates of Indian population were made in
1726, one of which also gave figures for the relative
strength of the tribes in 1690. Both evaluations are val
uable but of limited usefulness because of the precipitate
decline of the Indian population in the middle years of
the eighteenth century.
These two sources were "An Esti
mate of the Inhabitants, English and Indian, in the North
American Colonies, also their Extent in Miles-1726,"New
England Historical and Genealogical Register, XX. 1 (1966),
pp. 7-9 (cited hereafter as the Wendall Estimate), and
"John Gyles
*
Statement on the Number of Indians,” Collec
tions of the Maine Historical Society, III (1852), 5$ 5-8
(cited hereafter as Gyles’ Statement;. Little is known
about the Wendall Estimate save that it was preserved in
the papers of the Wendall family. Gyles
*
Statement was the
work of one John Gyles, who served the government of Massa
chusetts for many years on the Maine frontier. He com
manded several military posts and was a captive among the
Indians for eight years, a unique, if unwelcome, opportu
nity to study the tribes of Maine. See also "Narrative of
Captivity among the Indians, of Cap’t John Gyles, 1689-1698,".
Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 4th
ser., V (1861), 449-454. Both Gyles
*
Statement and the
Wendall Estimate are reproduced in the Appendices 1 and 2.
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Wendall Estimate, p. 9.
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in Nova Scotia.

These figures nay have suffered from a

common problem experienced by early estimates of Indian

population.

They were inflated by men who could not be

lieve that so few Indians could do so much damage.

A

truer assessment of Indian strength would probably be

about one-half the numbers given by the Wendall Estimate.
With a rough idea of the earlier Indian population,

estimates of Indian numbers during the Revolution can be

approached more realistically.

Kost of the tribes noted

in the earlier assessments had virtually disappeared by
then, and those who remained were much reduced in power.

The Penobscots were the westernmost surviving tribe

with a role in the struggle for Indian support between the
British and American forces in Maine and Nova Scotia.

Gyles estimated their strength at 130 men, and the Wendall
Estimate gave them forty men less.^

By 1776, however,

their numbers were still smaller, and they claimed only

31

Hutton gives estimates that substantiate the
inflation of the Wendall figures.
She cites an appraisal
of Indian strength made by Gargas in 1687-1688, which
placed the Indian population of Nova Scotia at about 2,000
people. A second and smaller estimate indicated a male
population of about 4,00, or a total population of 800 to
1,200 souls. See her "Micmac Indians of Nova Scotia,”
pp. 231, 134.
32

William L. Lucey, The Catholic Church in Maine
(Francestown, New Hampshire: M. Jones Co., 1957), p. 22.

■^Gyles’ Statement, p. 357; Wendall Estimate, p. 9.

\
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fifty fighting men.

34-

The whole tribe then numbered

between 150 and 250 souls.

>

The size of the Passamaquoddy ^.nd Malecite tribe
by 1775 was more difficult to determine.

In 1726, Gyles

numbered them at 140 men at Machias, Passamaquoddy Bay and
on the St. John River.The Wendall Estimate gave a total

of 115 nen in the same three locations.

36

These two fig-

\

ures would indicate a total population of between two
hundred and four hundred people.

In 1776, Chief Ambrose

St. Aubin told the government of Massachusetts in Watertown
that there were sixty men in his village on the St. John

River.

Government documents showed that 126 men, excluding

Penobscots and Micmacs, served the United States in some
way before 1780; fifteen of these lived at Passamaquoddy.

se men

dependents, of whom 58 were living at

37
Passamaquoddy.‘

Since all the men of the Malecite-

*Slinutes

of a conference between Chief Orono of
the Penobscots and Benjamin Greenleaf, July 20, 1776,
Massachusetts Archives, XXIX, 530.

*
-^Gyles
36

Statement, p. 557.

Wendall Estimate, p. 9.

37
^ Return of Indians in or who have been in United
States Service, July 28, 1780, by Frederick Belesdernier,
aid to Colonel John Allan at Machias, in Frederick Kidder,
Military Operations in Eastern Maine and Nova Scotia during
the Revolution, Chiefly Compiled from the Journals and
Letters of Colonel John Allan (Albany: J. Munsell, C1867),
p. 284-5.
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Passamaquoddy tribe were unlikely to have served the

American cause, one may assume that the tribe had more

members than the 579 listed in Delesdernier
s
*

return. ‘

These figures, incomplete as they are, seem to indicate
that the Malecites and their kinsmen at Passamaquoddy,
isolated from the wars that weakened other tribes, main
tained a steady level of population at least until the

Revolution.

They probably still had the 400 to 600 people

that Gyles reported in 1726.^
The Micmacs to the east of the St. John River were
the largest of the tribes involved in the American Revo

lution in Maine and Nova Scotia.

As seen above, their

numbers were estimated at about two thousand almost a cen-

tury before the Revolution.

In 1776, representatives of

the tribe told officials of Massachusetts at Watertown that
there were over ten villages of Micmacs.

The five villages

^Reports of the various conferences held during

the war tend to substantiate this estimate. The Nova
Scotian Superintendant of Indian Affairs, Michael Prancklin,
held a conference on the St. John in 1781 that 581 Indians
attended.
In 1777, when Francklin’s American counterpart,
John Allan, removed most of the Indians from the St. John
valley to Machias, he reported that about 500 Indians made
the trip. One conference under Francklin on the St. John
reportedly drew 500 Indian men and 600 dependents, but this
particular affair was set up to include significant numbers
of Micmac and Canadian Indians as well.
See Nova Scotia A,
C, 194-5, CI, 265-6; Kidder, Military Operations, p. 513.
^^See note 51 above.
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represented at the conference had a total of 280 men.^Q
Counting

dependents, these villages would probably have

held between 800 and 1,100 persons, and the whole tribe
conceivably could have had as many as 2,500 members.
Lieutenant Governor Francklin suggested a more plausible

figure in 1768, however, when he wrote that 500 Indian

warriors lived m Nova Scotia.
probably Micmacs.

41

Most of these men were

With about 500 men, the tribe would

presumably have had between 1,500 and 2,000 members.
As one can see from the above figures, the number

of Indians for which the British and Americans were com
peting was not large.

At the very most, there were prob

ably no more than three thousand Indians in the whole

region, and the actual figure was probably little more
than two thousand.

There were no more than eight hundred

warriors, most of whom were Micmacs.

The tribe that prof

ited most from the competition, the Malecites, at the
center of the disputed area, probably had no more than

one hundred and fifty warriors.

^Minutes of Watertown Conference, July 10, 1776,
in James Phinney Baxter (ed.), Baxter Manuscripts, Documen
tary History of the State of Maine, XXIV (Portland: Maine
Historical Society, 1916), 72; cited hereafter as Baxter
MSS.
41

Letter, Prancklin to Lord Hillsborough, July 20,
1768, Nova Scotia A, LXXXIII, 248.
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The numbers and 'distribution of the white popu
lation of Nova Scotia.and Maine was as significant a
factor in the region as was the size and distribution of

the Indian tribes
*

The small and widely scattered popu

lation of the territory strongly influenced the tactics
of both sides.

Had the area been securely settled by

large numbers of whites, the Indians would have been much
less significant.
The authorities of both colonies were well aware

Of the damage that relatively small numbers of Indians

could inflict upon small and isolated settlements.

Most

remembered the previous Indian wars and the terrors of
surprise attack from the forest.

These memories stimu

lated the struggle and imparted a certain desperation to

it, particularly on the American side, where the settle
ments were especially scattered.

Unfortunately, accurate population statistics for

Maine and Nova Scotia in this era are not available.

Sources for Maine are especially rare.
John Ahlin was able to find no firm statistics for

the immediate area with which he was dealing.

He used a

description of the entire District of Maine by John Calef.

^5^or Calef’s account, see John Calef, "The Siege
of Penobscot by the Rebels containing a Journal of the
Proceedings,’’ The Magazine of History, III, 11 (1910).
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Calef, a Loyalist from the Penobscot, stated that the
total population of Maine was 15,190 people.

On the basis

I

of this figure and other information on the settlements

east of the Penobscot, Ahlin arrived at a figure of 4>000

settlers for eastern Maine in 1776.
In the absence of other data, the 1790 census of
the United States can shed some light on downeast popula

tion distribution during the Revolution.

Fifteen years

elapsed between the opening of the war and the taking of
the census, but seven of them were war years during which

the area lost population as men fled to safer regions. The
census showed an increase of only five hundred people over

Ahiin’s estimate for 1775
*

Some areas vacant in 1775 had

been settled by 1790, but overall growth in the area was
slow.

All Maine east of Camden held only 12,508 souls,

and seven years after the end of the war, a small band of
Indians could have done great damage in this region.

44

A comparison of the population in individual towns

is even more instructive.

Machias, the largest town in

Washington County in 1790, had only 818 people, of whom

177 were men above the age of sixteen.

The only other

^Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, p. 7.

^^United States, Bureau of the Census, Heads of
Families at the First Census of the United States taken in
the Year 1790, Maine (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1908), p. 9. All subsequent statistics on the 1790
population of Maine come from the same source.
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incorporated town in the county, Buck
s
*

Harbor, had 62

people, of ■whom twelve, were men of sixteen or older.

The

largest plantation east of Machias, Number Eight (present
day Eastport and Lubec), had 244 people.

There were only

98 people between Passamaquoddy Bay and Machias.
largest

The

Washington County plantation, west of Machias was

Number Four (incorporated as Steuben) with 71 men of six

teen or older in a population of 233•

Total population in

the area was 792 with 203 males above the age of sixteen.

45

Coastal settlement in Hancock County was more

substantial than in Washington County

and probably had

grown significantly between 1783 and 1790.

The largest

town was Penobscot (now Penobscot, Castine and Brooksville)
with 1,048 inhabitants.

The second largest town, Mount

Desert, encompassing that whole island, had a population

of 744 people.

The rest of the district east of the

Penobscot had slightly over 4,000 people.

Eastern Maine was thus weak and open to attack

when the Revolution began.

The population was centered

at Machias, Jonesboro, Addison, the Narraguagus valley and
G-ouldsboro.

4.6

None of these settlements was secure from

^other plantations with settlement in 1790 lay

in a line immediately north of the coastal townships and
probably had little significant population during the war.
They were: Number 11 (Cherryfield), Numbers 12 and 13
(Columbia and Columbia Falls).
^Memorial of the Centennial Anniversary of the
Settlement of Machias, p. 39-
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iridian attack, and memories of such assaults spurred the

Massachusetts government and the people of Maine to seek

with considerable urgency the friendship of the downeast

Indians.
The distribution and size of the white population

of Nova Scotia rendered much of that colony as vulnerable

to Indian attack as eastern Maine.

Centered in clusters

of villages along the coast, the population was open to
raids from the virtually unsettled interior of the province.

While Indian attacks probably would not have brought down
the colony, assaults on the isolated areas of the St. John

valley and the outlying districts on the peninsula would

have caused heavy damage and great suffering.

Like their

Massachusetts counterparts, the Nova Scotian authorities

set out to woo the Indians and prevent such hostilities.

The population of Nova Scotia varied during the
war.

Thomas C. Haliburton estimated that the colony had

about 13,000 inhabitants in 1764.

By 1772, it had risen

to 19,100, including 2,100 Acadians, of whom 800 lived on
Cape Breton.

The numbers decreased to 12,000 by 1781, but

by 1784, after the influx of Loyalists, the population had
climbed to 20,400.47

Most of this population lived within the borders of

47Thomas C. Haliburton, An

Historical and Statis

tical Account of Nova Scotia, II (Halifax, Nova Scotia:
Howe, 1929), I, 243, 2657 ii, 250, 261, 275.
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the present-day province.

A few did not, however, and were

particularly exposed to Indian and American attack.

About

thirty families had settled on Passamaquoddy Bay at the
very borders of Massachusetts.

Behind them, 1,200 to 1,500

British and 400 Acadians inhabited the St. John valley.

48

In 1764 Halifax was the largest settlement on the

peninsula, holding 3>000 people.

49

East of the capital, to

Canso and beyond, the coast was occupied by only 581

people.

The South Shore to the west of Halifax had 2,300

people, of whom 1,600 lived around Lunenburg.

50

The Cape Sable Shore was very sparsely populated.

Barrington, behind Cape Sable Island, had three hundred
inhabitants, and Yarmouth had only 150.

The most thickly settled area of Nova Scotia was
the shore of the Bay of Fundy, with its transplanted New.

England Yankees.

Annapolis County had 1,000 settlers.

Other towns, mostly around Minas Basin, were Cornwallis
with 518 people, Horton with 670, Falmouth with 278, New

port with 251 and the Cobequid region with 400 settlers.

^Brebner, Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia, p. 117;
Raymond, River St. John, p. 187.
s
*
^Haliburton

estimates for 1764 are the best

available guide to Nova Scotian population distribution.
It should be remembered that many of the figures given
are probably smaller than the actual population in that
area during the Revolution.
All information on the population of Nova Scotia
in 1764 comes from Haliburton, Account of Nova Scotia, II,
275.
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Nova Scotia, with her sparse and scattered popu
lation, thus seemed as vulnerable to Indian attack as did

Maine,

Any settlement with less than five hundred people

was threatened.

If isolated, it could be damaged severely

by the Indians present in the colony.

Remote farms, even

those around the larger settlements, were even more ex

posed.

War parties could roam the wild and vacant interior

of the colony and strike at will.

pletely secure.

Pew towns could be com

Nova Scotia thus had no less interest in

securing Indian friendship then Massachusetts.
The adherence of the Indians to the Roman Catholic

faith was another of the factors affecting the struggle for

their friendship.

A Massachusetts law forbidding priests

to settle within the colony kept Catholic religious leaders
away from the Maine Indians.

Before the war, the Penobscots

had asked for priests, but the authorities refused per

mission.

The British did provide priests for the tribes

when the situation warranted it, but they would have pre

ferred to convert the Indians to Protestantism.

A new

priest, Mathurin Bourg, arrived in Nova Scotia from Canada
in the summer of 1773 to replace Father Bailly as Indian

missionary under the auspices of the British government.

When the Revolution began, the Malecites were afraid of

joining the Americans lest they lose Bourg’s services.

The

Americans in Boston promised them a replacement but could
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not find one.

51

-The Indian desire for religious personnel

remained a factor throughout the war and caused frantic
American efforts to secure priests to counter the influ

ences of British sponsored missionaries, who, as will be

seen, never hesitated to use their priestly powers to sway
the tribes into the British sphere of influence.

Thus, conditions in the disputed area determined

the shape of the competition for Indian friendship.

Loyal

Nova Scotia and fervently rebellious Machias forced a

confrontation downeast.

Within the area of that confront 

ation lived the Penobscot, Passamaquoddy-Malecite and
Micmac tribes of Indians.

The colonial governments of Nova

Scotia and Massachusetts opened a campaign to win the
friendship of these tribes and prevent assaults upon their
scattered settlements in the area.

Once in motion, the

efforts among the Indians flowed along courses set by the
long history of Indian and white contact throughout the

region, and the conflicts of the Revolution followed many
of the old patterns.

51

Robert H. Lord, John E. Sexton and Edward T.
Harrington, History of the Archdiocese of Boston In the
Various Stages of its Development, I (New York: Sheed and
Ward, 1944), 251 , 281-2.
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Chapter 2

OPENING MOVES: 1775-1776

When the American Revolution broke out around

Boston early in 1775, the leaders of Massachusetts and
Nova Scotia faced radically different circumstances.

The

rebel government of Massachusetts was challenging a great
empire that had recently won a considerable victory over
its traditional enemy, France.

Even if the other colo

nies in North America followed her lead, Massachusetts was

still embarking upon a struggle in which there appeared to
be little chance of success.

Nova Scotia, on the other

hand was controlled by a tight but unsteady oligarchy in

Halifax.

Governor Francis Legge, appointed in 1775, had.'

challenged its rule and had sought to expel its corrupt

members from the government.

The oligarchy's initial •

reaction was to employ the Revolution to get rid of Legge,

who was accused of fomenting unrest.

With the spread of

sedition in the other colonies, the Crown dared not call

the oligarchy's bluff and removed Legge from office.

Only

then did the Nova Scotian government apply itself seriously
to the problems of the Revolution.
The different positions in which the Nova Scotian
and Massachusetts governments found themselves produced

different reactions to the problem of the Indians at the
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beginning of the war.

Nova Scotia, with its divided gov

ernment, made few attempts to court the tribes.

The con

tacts consisted mainly of warnings to the Indians to avoid
the treason of the Americans.

Few organized sttempts to

gain the support of the Malecites and Micmacs were made.

Massachusetts, on the other hand, was much more attentive

to all the tribes of Maine and Nova Scotia.

The, leaders

of the colony sought all the help they could enlist.

Des

peration drove them to strive to win (or neutralize) the
potential power groups around them.

Deeply conscious of

their weakness, they well knew that they could afford no

additional enemies; they were already hard-pressed to de
fend their outlying territories.

Faced with such insecu

rity, they naturally made great efforts to secure the

friendship and military assistance of the Indians, efforts
much greater than those made by Nova Scotia.

In the early years of the war, the Massachusetts
authorities had some definite advantages in their dealings

with the Indians on their eastern borders.

They had a

good understanding of the Indian mind and knew how to
impress it.

They were able to translate their conflict

with Britain into terms that moved the tribes to their

side.

They had an established policy of Indian trade and

4

The Penobscots lived too far from the Nova Scotian
sphere of influence to be of concern to the government in
Halifax at this time.
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a system to implement it.
fear on their side.

They also had the element of

The natives were familiar with the

colonial methods of Indian warfare, which they had seen
destroy their neighbors to the west.

The shattered remnants

of the western tribes were a constant reminder of the folly
of armed opposition to Massachusetts.

Skillful utilization

of these advantages permitted Massachusetts to retain her
eastern lands when the war ended.

Massachusetts made her first move to secure tribal
goodwill on May 15, 1775, when the Massachusetts Provincial
Congress, or General Court, dispatched a letter to its

’’Friends and good Brothers,” the Eastern Indians of Maine
and Nova Scotia, warning of the “great wickedness of such

as should be our friends but are our enemies.”

These evil

men wanted to enslave and impoverish both Americans and
Indians and take away all guns, so that neither colonists

nor natives could hunt.

2

The Congress then wrote of other

British transgressions and asked the tribes to do what they

could to dissuade the Canadian Indians from joining the

British.

The Congregationalists of Massachusetts then

called the blessing of God down on the Catholic Indians
( an

indication of colonial desperation), and promised to

supply them with anything they wanted or needed.
The letter to the Indians had tangible results for

^Baxter MSS., XIV (1910), 244-5; see also Kidder,
Military Operations, pp. 51-2.
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Massachusetts.

Joseph Orono, chief of the Penobscots,

journeyed to Watertown, where the government was meeting
because of the British occupation of Boston.

On

June 21, 1775, he pledged conditional support to the

colonies.

”In behalf of the whole Penobscot tribe," he

said, "I hereby declare to you, if the grievances, under
which our people labor were removed, they would aid, with

their whole force, to defend the country."

3

The griev

ances mentioned by Orono were dishonest traders, trespass
upon their timberlands by whites and the absence of a
priest among them.

Anxious to gain every possible adherent,

the Massachusetts Congress moved with unusual speed to cor
rect the Penobscots
*

problems.

They were not willing to

give written permission for a priest, although they made it

plain that they had no objection to a priest among the
Penobscots.

This was a direct violation of a Massachusetts

law that prohibited priests within the colony.

Action was

also taken to provide trade goods for the Indians and to
pay the expense of their trip home.

4

Other Indian chiefs also came to Massachusetts
during the Rummer of 1775
*

Chief Swashan and four others

Quoted in Bangor Daily Commercial, October 13>1911>

as clipped and preserved in Eckstorm Manuscripts, Bangor
Public Library.
. Slbid .; Lord, et al., Archdiocese of Boston, I,
280-1 ; Kiclder, Military Operations. pp. 53-4; Baxter MSS.,
XIV, 286.
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from St. Francis appeared in Watertown and told the Massa
chusetts government that four or five tribes with two

thousand men were ready to aid the colonies.

Swashan'

reported that both the French and Indians of Canada sup

ported the colonies, but the French were afraid to take up
5
arms.
Lewis, a chief of the Caughnawaga Mohawks, was
also in town in August.
The Malecite chiefs of the St. John River did not

visit Massachusetts during the summer of 1775 but sent a
*

letter of friendship to the colony.

When head chief

Ambrose and second chief Pierre Toma heard of the war,
they went to the Penobscot truck house and sent a message

to Boston promising to stand firm with the Penobscots in
resisting British encroachments upon American liberties.

They also demanded a truck house on the St. John River and
and a Catholic priest from the Americans.

They had a

^Nova Scotia Gazette /Halifax/, October 17, 1775,
quoting an unspecified Boston newspaper; Massachusetts,
House of Representatives, Journal, August 17, 1775, p. 81.
St. Francis was an Indian center in Canada, northwest of
Maine, south of the St. Lawrence River.
The term '’Canada,"
is used in this thesis to designate the St. Lawrence colony;
it does not include Nova Scotia.

^Massachusetts, House of Representatives, Journal,

August 2, 1775, PP- 54-5.
51
®Tbid.. October 11 , 1775, p. 148; Lord., et el.,_'rKJ
Archdiocese of Boston, I, 281-2.
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The Massachusetts reply to the letter from the
Malecites followed a form that was rapidly becoming stand
ard.

It espressed love and brotherhood for the tribes and

it also contained little concrete

vilified the British;

response to the Indian demands.

The government ignored the

request for a truck house on the St. John but promised to

send supplies for the Malecites to the existing truck house

at Penobscot.

Massachusetts did not object to a priest

among the tribe but made no promise to help obtain one.
The government urged the Indians to send down all future

request and complaints, hoping in this way to prevent Indian
o

contact with the British.
In response to the Malecites
*

letter, Massachusetts

drew up a policy statement for their conduct of the compe
tition for Indian support.

On October 11, 1775, a commit

tee of the government reported that it would be of great
advantage "to cultivate a good Harmony with the Tribes of
Q

Indians near the Settlements in North America”
prevent them from trading with the enemy.

and to

The members of

the committee, therefore, recommended that the government
send ammunition, provisions and clothing to the Penobscot

truck house to be traded for furs.

They also suggested

Massachusetts, House of Representatives, Journal,

October 16, 1775, p
*

166.

^Ibid., p. 155.
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that the Indians be

sent gifts and letters of friendship

to insure their good will towards the colony.

For the remainder of the war, Massachusetts fol- "'i
lowed the policy of supplying goods to the Indians, al

though the process underwent very basic changes.

The

committee recommended that the native's be allowed to trade

furs for provisions, but as the number of dependent Indians
grew, this policy was abandoned.

given supplies to

The Indians were then

prevent them from returning to British-

held areas.The basic policy of attempting to hold tribal

allegiance through the native dependence upon manufactured

goods did not change, however.

The committee also recommended that letters of

friendship be sent to all the tribes.

This device was very

effectively used by the Massachusetts government in the
early war years.

Such letters flattered the Indians by

stressing their importance and interpreted the conflict in

terms that appealed to them.

The first letter the colony

sent to the “Eastern Indians” on May 15, 1775 used this
approach.

It warned the natives that the British were

trying to take away guns and goods, while stressing that

the colonists had no quarrel with the British and merely

^Allan’s journal for August through Decern er of
1777 spoke of “giving" the Indians their “allowance." See
Kidder, Military Operations, pp. 131• 134, 136, 138. 140-2,
145, 147, 148-50, 153-4, 1$6, 158-60.
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sought peace.

11

by the Indians.

These points were readily understandable

After years of war, the tribes merely

wanted to.be left in peace.

If the colonists were being

harrassed by the British, the Indians could sympathize
The natives could also understand what depri

with them.

vation of manufactured goods would mean.

Dependent upon

them, but unable to obtain enough of them to live com

fortably, the tribes had lived for years in a state of
economic depression.

The Indians thus had personal expe

rience with the problems faced by the colonists and were

bound to sympathize with them.
A basic Indian fear of the Americans aided colo

nial propaganda.

The last conflict between English

colonists and. the natives had ended little more than ten
years before the American Revolution.

During the Indian-

colonial wars, the tribes on the east of the Penobscot had
seen the tribes of western Maine virtually destroyed, and

the survivors driven from
nial forces.

their ancestral lands by colo

The Indians outside Nova Scotia had had

little contact with British regulars, but they were well

aware of the ruthless and bloody exploits of the colonial
troops.

After the previous war, the Indians were inter

ested mainly in preserving tribal lands and life styles;
a conflict with the colonies would endanger these aims.

Baxter MSS.

XIV, 254-5
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The Indians preferred to avoid the known evil of American

hostility rather than to submit to the unknown benefit of
British protection.

12

With its Indian policies set, during the remainder
of 1775, Massachusetts occupied itself with the mechanics
of supplying the tribes.

Jedediah Preble was chosen truck

master for Penobscot on October 14 and was given £5Q0 for

the purchase of "provisions, ammunition and goods."

The

government later ordered quick payment of the money and

immediate transportation of the goods downeast because of
1X

(

the lateness of the season.
While Massachusetts was inaugurating a basically

sound policy toward the Indians in the spring and fall of

1775, the Nova Scotian colonial government was following a
less effective course of action.

After years of virtually

ignoring the tribes because of lack of money and incli

nation, the government was unsure of their loyalty.

The

situation worsened in the summer of 1775 when the Nova

12

William L. Lucey felt that the tribes of eastern
Maine and Nova Scotia held a mere shadow of their former
strength, knew it, and were in no mood to fight.
Their
wooing by Massachusetts merely reflected colonial desper
ation (see his Catholic Church in Maine, p. 22). His com
ments were not entirely true, however, as one can see from
the relative population figures for the area where the
conflict occurred.
Even in their weakened state, the
Indians of Nova Scotia and Maine could have done great .
damage if they had conducted a traditional war against
either side.

1

^Massachusetts, House of Representatives ,-Journal,
October 14 and 17, 1775, PP
*
165-4, 171-2.
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Scotian Assembly prohibited the coastal trade in gunpowder
without special license.

Gunpowder immediately became very

scarce, and the Indians were enraged.

When Governor Legge

learned of this, he called the tribal chiefs to Halifax for

a conference and gave them many gifts but could not win

them to his side.

The Indians left with the conviction

that the British were indeed seeking to deprive them of
their firearms, as the Americans had told them.4
Aside from this heavy-handed attempt to repair an

initial blunder, the governor and council of Nova Scotia
did nothing else to secure Indian support until prodded to

do so by General Thomas Gage, governor of Massachusetts and

commander-in-chief of British forces in North America. "If
you can fall upon the means to secure the Indians to our

Side,” he wrote from Boston June 7, 1775, "it will be of
great use and I may possibly have occasion for them, in

these parts.”

15

In response to Gage’s letter, the Council proposed
that Joseph Goreham, commander at Fort Cumberland on the

Isthmus of Chignecto, raise several companies of Indians
and Acadians and thus secure them to the government of Nova

^/■Report from John Allan to the government of

Massachusetts, November 21, 1776, in Kidder, Military
Operations, pp. 167-8.

15

Letter, Gage to Legge, enclosed in a letter from
Legge to the Earl of Dartmouth, a Secretary of State in the
British government, in Nova Scotia A, XCIV, 133.
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Scotia.

The attempt failed, however, and Governor Legge

suggested that it be dropped.

16

Nova Scotia was even having problems maintaining

contacts with the tribes around the Bay of Fundy.

Joseph

Goreham at Fort Cumberland was their source of intelligence
about the activities of the tribe, and the information he

was sending to Halifax was not encouraging.

He reported

that the Indians were suffering from a severe shortage of

ammunition and provisions and begged the Council to take
17
action to improve the situation.

By late 1775, the government of Nova Scotia was
becoming concerned with conditions among the Indians and

increasingly aware of the importance of the tribes in the
growing conflict.

Governor Legge reported to Lord Dart

mouth that:
as the Americans are trying every means to gain
/the Indians/ over to their party, we shall not
only lose the benefit of them for our own defense,
but should they gain them to take up arms against
us, they wou’d be more formidable to the Settlers
here than an army of Americans.

In response to the American threat, Legge sent Cap
tain John Stanton to the St. John River to contact the

,DLetter, Joseph Goreham to Legge, November 2, 1775,
in Nova Scotia A, XCIV, 231.
Goreham was asking that the
Council rescind its action directing him to recruit Indians
and Acadians. He wanted no responsibility for carrying out
orders that were contrary to Governor Legge’s wishes.

^Nova Scotia A, XCIV, 231-2.
1R

Letter, Legge to Dartmouth, November 4, 1775,
Nova Scotia A, XCIV, 235-6.
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Indians there.

s
*
Stanton

mission failed, however, when he

was unable to reach the St. John after being delayed at
Annapolis for seventeen days by foul weather.

When the-

people there told him that the unusually cold weather would
have frozen the river and made passage to the Indian vil
lages difficult, he gave up the attempt to cross the Bay

of Pundy and turned back-without any effort to determine
personally conditions on the St. John.

19

Legge dutifully

reported this failure to Dartmouth and promised a new at
tempt to reach the St. John Indians as soon as weather
permitted.20

Thus, by the end of 1775, Nova Scotian authorities
had failed to establish contact with the St. John Indians,
the tribe most likely to harm the colony.

This failure

must be viewed in light of the promises of Massachusetts to
provide this tribe with provisions and ammunition.

Nova

Scotia had also failed to formulate a policy for Indian

Informed of Indian distress, the Nova Scotian

affairs.

Council made no move, to relieve it.

Their idea of winning

Indian loyalty was the dispatch of a captain of infantry to

the villages, where the Indians were to rally to the crown
out of sheer devotion.

Great adjustments in thinking would

19
^Letter, Captain Stanton to Legge, December 4, 1775,
Nova Scotia A, XCIV, 272-3.

20

Letter, Legge to Dartmouth, December 26, 1775,
Nova Scotia A, XCIV, 342-3.

57
have had to occur before Nova Scotia could have made any
headway among the Indians.

The actions of Nova Scotia and Massachusetts during

1775 reflected vast differences in practical experience in
Indian relations and a very different strategic outlook.
The men running the rebel government of Massachusetts were

following an established pattern.

*
Massachusetts

old

policy of controlling the frontier through trade and diplo

macy gave its leaders a basic knowledge of the tribes.

The

leaders of Nova Scotia, on the other hand, British

appointees of Halifax merchants, usually knew little about
the Indians.

They presumed the basic loyalty of the tribes

and expected that a mere summons in the name of the King

would bring the Indians to obedience.

They completely

failed to understand the severe economic depression under

which the Indians lived and which was driving them into the
supply-laden arms of Massachusetts.

During 1775, the two colonies showed great differ
ences in motivation as well as experience.
could afford no more enemies.

Massachusetts

Faced with the necessity of

defending a large and thinly populated area, supported by
an uncertain coalition of rebellious colonies, and unsettled
by the British occupation of her capital, the colony was

desperate for allies.

Anxious to defend Maine, her tradi

tional buffer to the north, but with few troops to do so,

Massachusetts looked to the Indians for assistance.
Nova Scotia, on the other hand, complacently passed
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the first year of the war.

Her government was involved in

internal feuding, and her leaders expected an early end to

the revolt.

Halifax was slow to realize the potential

damage the Indians could do and distinctly sluggish in
assembling the apparatus to counter Massachusetts’ early

moves.

Nova Scotian leaders were undisturbed when half

hearted efforts to win tribal support failed, and urgent

warnings of Indian dissatisfaction went unheeded.
The year 1776, which would see increased effort

among the Indians by both sides, opened with a flood of

problems in Massachusetts’ Indian operation.

In February,

the Provincial Congress received a petition from the inhab
itants of eastern Maine seeking more support for the Indi

ans.

Rumors downeast told of a big Nova Scotian effort to

win the Indians to the British side, although the Nova
Scotian government had done very little in this regard.

The petition from eastern Maine, however, commented on the

lack of clothing and ammunition among the Indians and
stated ’’That the Government of Nova Scotia have offered to

support them with all necessary’s provided they will join
the enemies of the United Colonies.”

21

The Indians had

--------------------------------- -----------------------------------

(21
V/Kidder, Military Operations, pp. 55-6. Rumors
were flying around the two colonies. Reports made in the
meetings of the Nova Scotia Council were fantastic.
One
report on August 15, 1775, spoke of a'projected invasion of
Nova Scotia by two thousand men, who were supposedly waiting
in Machias for orders to move out.
See Public Archives of
Canada, Nova Scotia B, Executive Council Minutes, 1720-1785>
XVI, 148-50.
It was not beyond the realm of possibility
that the Indians started
the rumor about massive Nova Scotian
I

refused the offer, according to the petition,

preferring to

support the colonies, but they would have to have goods to

trade for their furs.

The petitioners accordingly asked

for the establishment of a truck house at Machias to meet

Indian needs.

22

The colony immediately agreed to the re

quest; £400 was appropriated for goods for the truck house.

Stephen Smith was unanimously elected truck master by the
Provincial Congress.

23

The Massachusetts government soon learned, however,

that Indian policy was not just the establishment of trading

centers for the Indians.

Complaints poured in.

The Penob

scots protested that their wishes in regard to the appoint
ment of a truckmaster had not been followed and strongly
implied that colonial promises were worthless.

The General

Court replied that the changes in truck house personnel had
been made at the request of twp Indians in Boston, whom the

authorities assumed were representatives of the tribe.

The

Indians eventually accepted a compromise and a Massachusetts
promise to fulfill previous agreements.

The government

asked the Indians to sign all future letters carefully to

prevent further'deceptions of the colony by imposters.

Complaints came in from the white settlers on the St. John.

aid in order to gain their goal of a Massachusetts truck
house on the St. John or in adjacent parts of Maine.
pp
Kidder, Military Operations, pp. 55-6.

2^Massachusetts, House of Representatives, Journal,
Pebruary 12 and 14, 1776, pp. 276, 289.
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The Indians there had become unruly in the American cause,

partially as a result of a letter from George Washington,
who had urged them to support the colonies.

Anyone sus

pected of being a Tory was being plundered, and order had

completely broken down.

Stephen Smith, the new truck

master at Machias, was also unhappy,.

He complained about

dishonest white traders, Indians with exaggerated ideas of

their own importance and the general lack of money for his

establishment.

Smith got some relief in the form of £1,000

for more goods.

He also got increased duties among the

Micmacs and Malecites.

24

In an effort to deal with the complaints and diffi

culties that had arisen, Massachusetts held a conference
with a number of Micmacs and Malecites who were in Water
town in response to letters from the Massachusetts Council

and George Washington.

The conference was held in the

Watertown meeting house where the House of Representatives
had been sitting.

James Bowdoin, President of the Council

and head of the government, presided.

The Malecites from

the St. John attended, including Ambrose St. Aubin, their

head chief, along with two Micmacs from Windsor, two from
Miramichi and Richibucto, one from Beausejour in Cumberland,

!
(J^Letter, General Court to Penobscot chiefs, Baxter
MSS., XIV, 541-2; letters, people on the St. John River to
Mass, govt., May 21, 1776, and Stephen Smith to Mass, govt.,
June 22, 1776, in Kidder, Military Operations, pp. 65, 60;
Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, pp. 55-6.
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one from Le Heve and one from the Qaspe.

Five of the

eleven Micmac villages sent representatives; the rest had
not been reached in time to make the trip but favored the
colonial cause.

Unfortunately, unknown to the colonial

authorities, a number of the Indians present had no author
ity to make agreements in the name of their tribes.

For

this reason, the Micmacs of Nova Scotia would not honor the
25
final treaty. v

Chief Ambrose of the Malecites spoke for the assem
bled Indians on July 12, 1776.

He proclaimed the unity of

the Malecite and Micmac tribes and the oneness of purpose
betweeh colonists and Indians in fighting the British.

The

tribes promised to ignore all British entreaties for aid
and to "worship or obey /only/ Jesus Christ, and General

Washington."

Ambrose then presented material demands.

He

wanted Massachusetts to help the Indians obtain a priest.

The Indians also wanted a truck house closer to their lands

than Machias and sought to have a number of Acadians

removed from their lands.

26

v^axter Mss., XXIV, 166-8, 179; Kidder, Military
Operations, pp. 172-5. In his first report to the Massa
chusetts government, Allan described the consternation
among the Micmac chiefs when their -delegation returned from
Watertown.
They finally decided not to accept the treaty,
although they remained friendly to the rebel cause. For
other accounts of the Watertown Conference, see Lord, et al.,
Archdiocese of Boston, I, 288-90, and Ahlin, Maine Rubicon,
pp. 56-7.
@$iinutes of the Watertown Conference, Baxter MSS.,

XXIV, 168-70.
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Council President Bowdoin answered Ambrose.

27

He

spoke for the other colonies as well, for Massachusetts had
been designated Continental agent for relations with these

tribes.

Bowdoin reserved replies to specific Indian demands

until the government could deliberate on them but set forth

the general colonial line of propaganda.

He told the chiefs

that the government was very impressed with the devotion of
the tribes to the American cause.

The English, he said,

were making war on the Americans to satisfy British greed.

The English had once been respected by the Americans as older
brothers, according to Bowdoin, but when they had wasted

their own money, they had to steal American wealth to sup

port their luxury.
the colonists.

The British were even trying to enslave

The Americans bore this patiently at first

and petitioned for relief.

Finally, however, the colonists

could take no more and resisted the demands.

The British

retaliated by seizing the colonial towns into which they had
been freely admitted and by marching about the countryside,

killing, stealing and burning.

A great Congress in Phila

delphia had chosen ’’That Great Warrior General Washington”
/

to fight the enemy, and he had driven the British from
Boston and would soon free all America, some small American

27

Bowdoin spoke as agent for all the .American
colonies.
The Continental Congress had designated Massachu
setts as its agent for matters concerning the Eastern Indians.

&
reverses in Canada notwithstanding.

28

Having provided, for the American victory, Bowdoin

turned to the colonial relationship with the Indians.

He

had given them the facts, he said, so that they would not

be deluded by what they heard from Halifax.

He, promised

that Massachusetts would do everything possible to protect

the tribes and to be their brothers.

He was not asking the

Indians to go to war but would be happy to have them fight
if they so desired.

Bowdoin, however, hardened the rhet

oric of brotherhood with a direct threat.

The government

of Nova Scotia was likely to try to turn them against the

United Colonies, but the Indians must not be deceived.

"If

they should engage you in a War against us,” Bowdoin warned,

“you will be undone, and will be a ruened people.”

29

Bow

doin mentioned this as friendly advice, but the Indians
were sufficiently familiar with New England Indian warfare

to be sobered by it.
Bowdoin replied to specific Indian demands the fol
lowing day, July 15, after consultation with the rest of the

government.

The Americans were most anxious for the Indians

to have a priest but could not get one.

Massachusetts would

be happy to furnish a Protestant minister if the Indians

28

Minutes of the Watertown Conference, Baxter MSS.,
.XXIV, 171-2.
29Ibid., pp. 172-4.
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wanted one, which, of course, they did not.

The government

again refused to establish a truck house on the St. John,

because an installation would be beyond the colony"s

borders.

They did promise to send more goods to Machias

and to offer better prices for the Indian furs.

30

Following Bowdoin’s answer to their demands, the

Indians announced that they would join the colonies in war.
Their love for Boston prevented them from standing by while
In making the announcement, however,

she was abused.

Ambrose again demanded a trading station on the St. John,
in spite of Bowdoin’s refusal.

Three Indians were willing

to enlist immediately, Ambrose continued, and the minutes
of the conference recorded that "Upon this tree of them
went from their seats into the Isle and manifested' a great

desire to go."

31

Upon hearing of the Indian desire to go to war,

Bowdoin informed Ambrose and the other Indians that the

colony proposed to raise a special regiment, composed of
five hundred Indians and two hundred fifty colonists; field

officers were to be colonists, the other officers were to
be evenly divided between Indians and colonials.
receive the same pay and provisions.

The Indians expressed

pleasure with the proposed arrangement.

•

> PP* 174-5.
^^Ibid., pp. 180-1.

All would

32

j1Ibid., pp. 177-8.
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The Indians •were perfectly willing to talk about

eternal friendship and regimental organization, but when

the Council wanted to discuss the number of men each vil
lage would provide and when they would enter military
service, the Indians1 fervor evaporated.

In spite of

previous promises, the Indians began to realize that they

could not guarantee enlistments.

The Council was planning

to send the new regiment to the Continental Army by fall,

but the Indians now suddenly discovered that they could not

possibly get any men to Boston before spring.

President

Bowdoin was unyielding but could get no firm commitment.

As most Indian villages without their men would have been
short of winter provisions, the Indians had legitimate
reasons for not wanting to serve during winter; they were

quiet about them, however, in hope of gaining more conces
sions from Massachusetts.
/
The conference closed on July 17, 1776 with the

signing of a treaty.

In this ’’Treaty of Alliance and

Friendship,” the Indians recognized the independence of
’’the United States of America in General Congress Assem-.
bled.’’

Massachusetts (and through her, the other colonies)

and the Indians agreed to be peaceful friends and brothers
and to set up machinery for the- settlement of disputes.

The Indians also agreedr despite their previous objections,
to provide without delay six hundred men to serve with

•^Ibid., pp. 183-5
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Washington for terms not exceeding three years.

The Indian

delegates were to use their influence to persuade other
Indians to enlist.

Massachusetts agreed to provide provi

sions at her truck house at Machias.

Both sides repudiated

any previous agreements repugnant to this one, and the
Indians agreed not to give assistance to adherents of the

The colony then provided passage home for the

King.^4

delegates.
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The efforts of the Massachusetts government to
recruit Indians sprang from pressure by Washington, who had

become interested in gaining Indian service in July of 1776.

He wrote a letter to the Continental Congress suggesting
the use of the Eastern Indians to counteract British use of
the tribes on the western frontier.

He had information

that five or six hundred of ’’the St. Johns, Nova Scotia,

Penobscot &ca” might be enlisted.

Such enlistments would

I

tie the Indians to the colonial cause and provide a first
line of defense should the British try to penetrate New

England.

If Congress approved (and they did), Washington

proposed to allow the Massachusetts General Court to exe
cute the measure.

The Indian promise at Watertown of six.

•^Text of Watertown Treaty, July 17, 1776, Baxter

MSS., XXIV, 189-92. The Indians signed the agreement to
provide the men for the army with no idea of how to enforce
it.
They had no way of forcing men to enlist to fill the
quota.
They may have simply signed the treaty without
protest to keep the Americans feeling favorably towards them.
■^^Minutes of the Watertown Conference, Baxter MSS.,
XIV, 185-6.
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hundred men for the Continental Army was the result of
Washington’s interest..

The promises secured by Massachusetts at Watertown,

however, were nearly worthless.

The Indians had no way of

guaranteeing that men would come forward to enlist.
Furthermore, while there probably were six hundred men of
fighting age in the region, their enlistment would have

caused grave dislocations within the tribes.

The removal

of so many men would have left few in the villages, and

those remaining would have been unable to support the women
and children.

Under these conditions, few Indians enlisted, and

Washington became impatient.

On August 5, 1776, he sent a

letter to the Massachusetts government urging speed and
terming the effort a "Matter of the greatest consequence."
^
*

In response to this letter, the colony sent agents to the

Penobscots and Passamaquoddies.

Agent Thomas Fletcher got

a typical reaction among the Penobscots.

He read his in

structions and Washington’s request to the assembled
Indians, but, expressing regret, they refused to send a

contingent.

They had heard that many troops had arrived

in Canada and feared an attack.

■^6John C. Fitzpatrick (ed.), The Writings of
George Washington, V (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1952)7 221, 251, 565.
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Fletcher thus obtained nothing from the Indians but
promises to scout the area, to assist a force of rangers if

one was sent to the region, and to pass along any intelli

gence gained.

The Penobscots again used the occasion to

request the removal of white trespassers from their lands.
Under pressure to get troops, Fletcher promised action on

this demand.

He also attempted to buy Indian recruits with
•27
£50 in bribe money sent from Boston; this also failed.

The Micmacs also failed to honor the Watertown
treaty.

A conference of chiefs held in September of 1776

sent a letter to Boston informing the government that the
Micmacs at Watertown had had no right to speak for the

tribe and that no men could be spared for the Continental
army.

The tribe
s
*

natural inclination was for peace, and

the chiefs sent the treaty back to Massachusetts.^ 8
By October, Washington’s ardor for Indian troops
had cooled, and the pressure on Massachusetts slackened.

Facing a winter with few supplies, Washington feared that
any Indians in the Continental camps might become disil

lusioned and hostile.

He therefore urged Massachusetts to

retain any tribal recruits for future use at a central

37
^Letters, Fletcher to Mass. Council, Mass.
Council to Fletcher, Baxter MSS, XIV, 367-9,. 378.
38

Kidder, Military Operations, pp. 57-8. John Allan,
later to be Chief Continental Agent to the Eastern Indians,
made his debut in Indian-colonial affairs when he handdelivered this note from the Micmacs to the government in
Boston.
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location •within its borders.
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Washington’s fears were

unwarranted, however, because he was not about to be inun
dated with Indian volunteers.

The year 1776 closed in Eastern Maine with the
disastrous Eddy expedition, in which seventy-two men

attempted to capture Nova Scotia.

The failure of the

people of Cumberland to rise in support of the invaders
and the subsequent American defeat at Fort Cumberland'

brought the expedition to an inglorious end.

The defeat

dealt a real blow to colonial prestige among the Indians,
a number of whom were present at the defeat, among them
head chief Ambrose St. Aubin of the Malecites.
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Letters

from George Washington, which never failed to impress the

natives, were on the way, however, and would provide a
rallying point for American efforts among the tribes.

•Washington’s letters, dated "On the banks of the

great river Delaware, December 24, 1776,”’;were addressed
to the Passamaquoddy and St. John Indians.

41

The letter

•^Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings of Washington, VI
(1932), 235-6.
^Ofteturn of the Indians present during the attack

upon Fort Cumberland, no date, in Kidder, Military
Operations, p. 78. For a more complete account of the
Eddy expedition, see Chapter IV, ”0n to Fort Cumberland,”
in Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, pp. 42-60,.

41Washington wrote these letters on the day that he
and his army crossed the Delaware River and attacked Trenton.
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to the Malecites on the St. John expressed the ganeral’s

satisfaction with the tribe’s continued support of the
colonial cause.

He was also pleased to hear that they'
A

would soon have a truck house on the St. John River.

The

letter to the Passamaquoddies was less friendly in tone.

While acknowledging the continued friendship of the tribe,
Washington expressed disappointment in their refusal to

send warriors to him.

At first, he had taken this as a

sign of broken fellowship.

He later realized, according

to the letter, that the men were hunting and unavailable

for war, but he hoped that in the future they would send

warriors to him as the Renobscots and Malecites had.

The

general further warned against disloyalty to the Americans,

telling the tribe of Indian affairs in the South.

The King,

he wrote, had tried to incite all the tribes to war against
the colonies, but most had refused.

The Cherokees and

other southern tribes, however, had attacked white settle
ments.

Colonial troops then ’’went into their country,

burnt their houses, destroyed their corn, and obliged them

zL 2

Massachusetts was making plans for the truck
house on the St. John when Washington wrote his letter.
According to the General’s letter, Pierre Toma, the man
who presented the request for the truck house, had not
yet returned to the St. John. Washington’s letter may
therefore have been the first notification of the new
installation to reach the tribes.

71
to sue for peace, and give up hostages for their future

good behavior.”

Washington closed with an admonition never

to "let the King’s wicked counsellors turn your hearts *
43
against me and your brethren of this country.” '

Washington’s name was a major force among the
Indians.

He received every delegation from the east and

knew how to make a good impression.

He was a man of great

dignity and ease of manner with a certain complacency that
never failed to impress tribal visitors.

44

The Indians

singled' him out among the Americans and held him in rather
high esteem.

At the Watertown Conference, for example, the

Indians present promised to "worship or obey
Christ, and General Washington."

Jesus

45

The reasons for the Indians’ high regard for
Washington are hard to discern.

The traits of personality

noted above must have had great effect upon the Indians he

met.

Evidently Washington was the kind of grave, distant

leadership figure that the Indians respected.

Furthermore,

he was the most visible and one of the most important of
the American leaders.

The tribes, victims of official

neglect for many years, were greatly impressed when this

^Fitspatrick (ed.), Writings of Washington, VI,
434-6.
44]jord, et al., Archdiocese of Boston, I, 283.

^Speech by Chief Ambrose St. Aubin of the Malecites,

Minutes of the Watertown Conference, Baxter MSS., XIV,
268-70.
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great man deigned to. meet them or send letters.

Washington .

considered the Indians to be of great importance and spared
no effort to woo them.

The impact of his exertions among

the Indians was magnified by the lack of a similar effort

among the British.

To the Indians, Washington appeared to

be the leader of the Americans; his opposite number would
have been the King, who was above such propaganda efforts.
It seemed that the leader of the British was ignoring them,
while the great General Washington understood their "true’
worth" and was treating them accordingly.

Washington’s letters to the Malecite and Passamaquoddy tribe illustrated the very thinly veiled threat of

violence that underlay relations between Indians and colo
nials.

Washington's stern warnings, given in terms of

friendly advice, were typical of the admonitions dealt to

the Indians, who were never allowed to forget that should
they step out of line, American retaliation would be swift,
and terrible.

The tribes were very familiar with the

colonial methods of dealing with troublesome tribes' and
did not give the Americans any chance to employ them.

The Indians did not have to fear hostile action

from Nova Scotia during 1776.

In fact, they might have

wondered if the British authorities had forgotten their

existence.

While Massachusetts was setting up truck houses,

entertaining chiefs and attempting to recruit Indians into,
the Continental Army, Nova Scotia was embroiled in a

dispute between Governor Francis Legge and the local power

75
structure.

Only after Legge’s recall did the Nova

Scotian authorities begin a determined drive to prevent
the Massachusetts colonials from winning"the Indians to

the American cause.
The first reference to the struggle for Indian

support in Nova Scotia in 1776 occurred in a letter from
Michael Francklin to John Pownall, secretary to the Lords

Commissioners of Trade and Plantations.

The letter, writ

ten May 4-, after the removal of Legge, expressed regret:

that the Indians have been too much neglected ever
since Mr Legge’s Administration to the great con
cern of the King’s Servants here, and the frequent
uneasyness of the people; had they been cherished
and taken care of we should have found them useful
for intelligence and other Services, instead of
which it is possible and not unlikely ..• that they
may be seduced to act against us. '

4 Francis Legge became Governor of Nova Scotia in
1775 and opened his tenure with a campaign to reform and
streamline the colonial government. His reforms immedi
ately brought him into conflict with the governmental
methods of the ruling oligarchy, which, .at the very least,
bordered on the corrupt. With their positions threatened,
the leading figures of the colony sought to oust Legge,
who resisted fiercely and pressed his reform attempts. His
efforts to curtail smuggling activities further destroyed
his support outside.Halifax, where he might have looked for
support against the clique in the capital.
Finally, in
desperation, the opposition to his government threatened to
take Nova Scotia into the rebel camp if he were not removed.
The Crown dared not call their bluff and removed Legge in
1776.
Lieutenant Governor Arbuthnot then assumed the
government. Michael Francklin, who had served as Lieuten
ant. Governor under Legge, had been removed from that office
before Legge was recalled and thus lost a chance to assume
the top post, to which he had long aspired. For more
details of Legge’s tenure, see Viola F. Barnes, ’’Francis
Legge, Governor of Loyalist Nova Scotia, 1775-1776,”
New England Quarterly, IV, 5 (July 1951), 420-447.
47Nova Scotia A, XCV, 235-7.
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Francklin had just learned that he was not to be
■

Governor of Nova Scotia.

He was asking instead to be •

made Lieutenant Governor with a salary of £500 a year and

Superintendant of Indian Affairs with a salary of £200 a
year.

In these capacities he planned to reside in Cumber

land, where a dependable officer of the government was

needed.

He felt that he would be particularly effective

as Superintendant of Indian Affairs because his "having

been a Prisoner in the Lands of the Indians in my Younger
Days and my speaking French have always given me a very

considerable influence among the Savages."

49

Unfortunately

for British relations with the Indians, Francklin would not
receive the desired appointment during 1776.

The attempt to win Indian support for Nova Scotia,
carried out under the colonial government in the early

years, was usually hampered by lack of funds.

The assembly

was most unwilling to vote money to support the struggle,

maintaining that the British government should pay the cost.

Nova Scotia was a sparsely settled colony, dependent upon
Britain for a subsidy and could ill afford to assume any
new obligations.

The Assembly
s
*

reluctance in these matters

was shown in its treatment of a petition for payment of

^Michael Francklin was a long-time member of the

Halifax structure with a broad commercial and political
background.

49Nova Scotia A. XCV, 235-7.
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money advanced for relief of distressed Indians in Kings
and Windsor counties.

Governor William Campbell had

ordered Secretary Bulkeley to send some provisions to the

Indians, and Bulkeley, who had done so at his own expense,
was asking repayment of the money.

Although the sum was

small, a little over £9, the Assembly refused payment and

demanded that he be paid out of the contingency fund, which
was small and over burdened in these difficult times.

50

The Nova Scotian records and correspondence for the

rest of the year contain no mention of any efforts to win

the friendship of the Indians.

Francklin, displeased that

he had been given no position in the government, was not

using his influence among the Indians, and those on the
St. John and in other remote parts of the colony seemed

likely to be won over to the' American side. Furthermore,

inasmuch as some of these areas were controlled, they were
in American hands.

The settlements on the St. John River

had given their allegiance to Massachusetts in May of 1776,
placing the Malecite tribe primarily under American influ
^
*
ence.

Eddy’s assault on Fort Cumberland, while failing

disastrously, shook British power by providing a rallying
point for the Indians and American sympathizers in the
area.

This assault finally drove the Nova Scotian

50
■
Public Archives of Canada, Nova Scotia D,
Assembly Journals, 1758-1805> XII, 55-7.
51

Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, p. 48.
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authorities to begin a determined campaign for influence

on their northwestern frontier.

Puring'1776, Nova Scotia’s main responses to

American incursions, military and political, into her ter
ritory were defensive and often ineffective.

When some of

the ’’rebels" from Cumberland visited "Rebellious territory"

to encourage the invasion of Nova Scotia and then returned,
Governor Arbuthnot, who had replaced Legge, reported to

Secretary of State Lord George Germain on July 8, 1776 that
they had come to "corrupt" the St. John Indians.

Arbuthnot

had sent a message to the Indians to counteract the rebel

moves and had put a price of twenty guineas on the heads of

these traitors.

So far, he wrote, the Indians had merely

become insolent, stealing cattle and disrupting trade.

52

Similar steps were taken when the Eddy expedition arrived
in Nova Scotia.

Jonathan Eddy, William. Howe, Samuel Rogers

and John Allan, "who has been also deeply concerned in

.

exciting the said Rebellion," had prices of £200 put on
their heads.Putting prices on heads, while dramatic,
was not the way to secure Indian friendship or end the
rebellion.

By the end of 1776, Nova Scotian failure to deal

^Nova Scotia A, XCVI, 93-4.,
^Minutes of Nova Scotia Council, November 17, 1776,

Nova Scotia B, XVII, 80-1.
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with Indians was so pronounced that Sir George Collier,
who commanded the British Navy in Nova Scotian waters, was

complaining about it to Lord Germain.

He was concerned *

that Indians had participated in hostilities at Fort

Cumberland on the side of the Americans.

He felt that this

could have been avoided had any attention been paid to

their chiefs.

54

The years of 1775 and 1776 thus saw Massachusetts

jump into the lead in the struggle for the support of the
Indians.

Her active and effective programs of Indian

affairs enabled her to move quickly and to gain Indian

sympathy on her eastern frontier.

Nova Scotia, on the

other hand, by the end of the second year of the war had
failed to deal effectively with the Indians, and Massachu
setts was extending operations into Nova Scotian territory.

Countermeasures were not far in the future, however, as
Nova Scotia prepared to act in 1777.

^Letter, Collier to Germain, November 21, 1776,

Nova Scotia A, XCVI, 522.
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Chapter 3

GROWING CONFLICT: 1777

When 1777 dawned, Massachusetts was waging her
campaign for Indian support in the forests of Maine and

Nova Scotia and encountering little opposition from Halifax,
where the Nova Scotian government was still without an

effective counter-policy.

Increasingly fearful of unrest

as the British failed to quickly crush the rebellion,
Halifax was now beginning to respond to American advances
among the Indians.

By the end of the year, Nova Scotia

would have made good progress; for the moment, Massachusetts
retained the initiative.
While Halifax struggled to assemble a coherent

policy towards the Indians, Boston pushed resolutely for

ward in an effort to hold Indian support already won and to
overcome Eddy’s defeat at Fort Cumberland.

Encouraged by

the adherence of the Indians and settlers on the St. John
to the American cause, Massachusetts reversed an earlier

decision and moved to secure its hold over the Malecites
with a traditional ploy, the establishment of a truck house.
John Preble arrived at the mouth of the St. John on Janu

ary 13, 1777, with the necessary supplies.

The river was

frozen, and Preble had to send the provisions over the ice
for sixty miles.

The Indians were already complaining

about the prices, which were high because the government
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still expected truck houses to support themselves, and the

increased cost of transportation further raised the costs.
As a result, the Indians threatened to trade with the

enemy, despite their current poor relations with the Brit
ish.

Furthermore, those Indians who had served with Eddy

were unpaid, and the Indians were unhappy about that.1

*
Massachusetts

relations with the Indians, particularly on

the St. John, were at a low point for the early years of
the Revolution, but the imminent arrival of John Allan

would soon bring improvement.
John Allan, the son of a British veteran who
migrated to Nova Scotia in 1749, held the primary respon

sibility for the American operation among the Eastern

Indians through most of the war.

He may have been formally

educated in Boston, and probably gained his excellent
practical knowledge of the Indian culture around Fort

Cumberland where he grew up.

His first involvement in the

Revolution came in 1775 when the Micmacs were upset by the
■Nova Scotian prohibition of the shipping of gunpowder.

Allan, to whom the tribe often turned, for advice, promoted

the colonial cause among them until he fled Nova Scotia to
escape arrest in July of 1776, arriving in Machias on

1 Letter, John Preble to Mass, govt., January 27,1777,

Baxter MSS, XIV, 405-7.
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August 13
*

2

From Machias, Allan went to Boston and Philadelphia

to explain the situation in Nova Scotia.

He dined with

General Washington at Trenton and eventually returned to

Boston with Continental commissions designating him a
colonel in the infantry and superintendent of the Eastern

Indians.

In Boston he obtained funds for his work, and he

returned to Machias in May of 1777.

He planned a three

point program: the protection of eastern Maine, the iso
lation of Nova Scotia from Canada by closing the St. John
valley to British messengers, and the conquest (or liber-

ation) of Nova Scotia.

Allan carried on his work with the help of three

assistants: ’’Cap"
**

Preble, Mess1* Lewis Delesdernier & James

Avery, all of whom the Indians are much attached to.”

Delesdernier spoke perfect French and some Indian and was
of tremendous service.

Avery was very capable as well,

although his linguistic abilities were more limited than
Delesdernier1s.

2Robert E. Moody. ”John Allan,” Dictionary of
American Biography (1928), I, 183; George H<~Allan,
"Sketch of Colonel John Allan of Maine,” New England
Historical and Genealogical Register, XXX (1876), 353;
Kidder. Military Operations, pp. 168-173.
^Kidder, Military Operations, p. 13» Moody,

"John Allan," D.A.B., I, 183
*

^Allan’s report to Mass, govt., November 18, 1777»
Baxter MSS., XV, 1910, 298.
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Allan had received complaints from the Indians
before he left Boston and was anxious to meet the tribes

as soon as possible.

He therefore left Machias for the’

St. John River on June 1, 1777, and arrived at Aukpaqpe
four days later.

The Indians gave him a tumultuous welcome.

In the conference that followed, Allan attempted to gain a
strong alliance with the Indians and was somewhat success
He was given the same powers within the tribe former5
ly held by the agent of France.

ful.

Allan’s hard work came to nothing, however, The
arrival of a British vessel, the Vulture, in the mouth of

the St. John, heralded increased British activity on the
river.

After several months of congratulating themselves

on their victory at Cumberland and vying with each other

to claim credit for it, the Nova Scotian and British

authorities launched a determined campaign to regain the
St. John River and its Indians.Francklin was appointed

Nova Scotian Superintendent of Indian Affairs in early 1777

^Letter, Allan to Mass, govt., March 18, 1777,
Allan’s Journal, entries for June 1, 5 and 7, 1777,
Kidder, Military Operations,pp. 185, 92, 94-6.
r
Letter, Germain to Lt. Gov. Arbuthnot, January 14,
1777, in which Germain also congratulated Francklin and
the New Windsor militia for their prompt action, which the
King appreciated.
See also letters, General Massey, com
mander of troops in Nova Scotia, to Germain, January 30
and February 10, 1777, Nova Scotia A, XCVII, 84-6, 110, 119.

with a salary of £300 a year.?

For the first time Nova

Scotia had both a viable instrument and the desire to deal

effectively with the Indians.

The ship, Vulture, sent to the St. John River in
response to Allan’s arrival there, carried Colonel Arthur

Gould, member of the Council of Nova Scotia.

On his

arrival, Gould issued a proclamation to the Indians in a
sterling example of colonial French.

Je suis venu ... de reallumer cette ancienne amitie
que tousjours Subsiste entre vous et ... Le Roy les
plus juste et protexteur de son Peuple.
Nous oublieron tout le passe et attribueroh la
folie de Panne passe de une petit numbre de vos
enfants a la Consequence de agir san consideracion
et aux Impression fait par des mauvais conseille et
persuade vous mon frere que it n’a point de proteccion pour vous et votre just-et-puissant Roy.
Et pour le mieux reetablir cette Amitie notre
Indulgent Govemeur desire que vous laissera venir
avec moi a Halifax quatre de vos principaux Sauvages
pour Confirmer cette amitie, Ils seront retoume
Q
avec la plus grand soin et mauquera pour votre tribe.
Gould then spoke with the same chiefs that Allan

had recently met and promised to hire Father Bourg to pro
vide the Indians with the spiritual guidance they had
Q
sought for so long.
The chiefs were friendly, and a

?Letter, William Knox to Arbuthnot, March 5, 1777,

Nova Scotia A» XCVII, 130.
^Proclamation by Gould to the St. John Indians,

May 11, 1777, enclosed in a letter from Arbuthnot to
Germain, June 12, 1777, Nova Scotia A, XCVII, 190-1.
.

^Ibid., pp. 139-90; Lord, et al., Archdiocese of

Boston, I, 292.
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number of them took an oath of allegiance.

Second Chief

Pierre Toma now swung his support to the British, but many
of the others refused to follow his example.^

The confrontation between Gould and Allan on the
St. John demonstrated the difficulty of dealing with the
Indians.

While Gould was reporting the oaths of allegiance

taken by the chiefs, the tribe was harboring Allan, and
only Pierre Toma favored Britain, according to Allan’s
reports.

Such activities might be seen as double-dealing,

but the Indians were simply anxious to avoid hostilities

with anyone.

It was easy to be friends with both sides as

long as no concrete actions were demanded.

In this situ

ation, the Indians managed to promise both sides what they

wanted.
Some Indians, determined to adhere to the Americans,

were understandably uneasy when the British burned the

houses of persons who had aided Allan.

Por safety, Allan

persuaded them to return with him to Machias.

With the

British in pursuit, Allan, twenty-one of his men and many

of the Malecites retired up the St. John to Meductic and
portaged south into American territory.

The journey was a

difficult one; many elderly people among the Indians had

to be carried.

The monotony was occasionally broken,

---------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------

io

Letter, Arthur Gould to Arbuthnot, enclosed in
letter from Arbuthnot to Germain, June 12, 1777, Nova
Scotia A, XCVII, 209; Allan's Journal, June:11, 1777, in
Kidder, Military Operations, p. 109.
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however.

On the morning of July 20, "a large Moose passed

with great speed through /Allan’s/ camp, the Indians and

dogs in pursuit."Allan did not reach Machias with his
party until August 8, after traveling for nearly a month.
The British authorities were pleased with the
events on the St. John.

Arthur Gould reported that they

arrived at the mouth of the river at a fortunate time
because Allan and others had assembled there, hoping to

harass the borders of Nova Scotia.

Gould’s forces captured

Allan’s boat and two small schooners loaded with Indian
supplies and dispersed the Americans into the woods,.

12

Major Studholme learned that the retreating colonists had

gone up the river and pursued them with a small force.

He

failed to intercept them, however, because the captain of

the Vulture had no orders governing such a situation and
refused to act without them.

13

^Allan’s Journal, entries for June 11 and 19
July 6, 7, 11, 12 and 20, August 8, 1777, in Kidder,
Military Operations, pp. 99, 109, 113-4, 116, 119, 125
*
ihe number of Indians who came to Machias with Allan is
unknown. The journal entry for July 13 (Kidder, p. 117)
seemed to describe a large- group. Furthermore, groups of
Indians kept arriving in the camp as the party?neared
Machias. From this information, it would seem that Allan
-brought a substantial portion of the Malecite tribe back
. to Machias with him.
1?

Letter, Gould to Arbuthnot, enclosed in letter
Arbuthnot to Germain, June 12, 1777, Nova Scotia A, XCVII,
209-10.
^Letters, General Massey to Germain, July 12 and
August 20, 1777, Nova Scotia A, XCVII, 246, 279-81.
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While Allan was on the St. John, the Indians and

settlers on the upper reaches of most Maine rivers were

alarmed by reports of a large force marching toward them
from Canada.

The first such information, which came from

the truck house at Penobscot, disclosed that a force of

eighty Indians with some regulars under the command of
Monsieur Lunier was coming to destroy American settlements
on the Kennebec, Penobscot and St. John Rivers.

Alarmed,

the settlements east of the Penobscot hoped to intercept

this group with a message of surrender before it reached
them.

Norridgewock on the Kennebec was shaken by similar

fears.14

The reports of a British descent through the

northern forests added urgency to Allan’s work.

If any

portion of the tribes joined such a force, the damage to

^^letters, Joshua Brewer to the Mass, govt.,
May 27, 1777, Samuel Jordan to Mass, govt., June 7, 1777,
petition, inhabitants of Norridgewock to General Court,
June 8, 1777, Baxter MSS.. XIV, 115-4, 425, 110-1.
Monsieur Lunier was supposed by the Americans to be a
British agent on the upper Penobscot River. An elusive
figure of questionable efficacy, he loomed large in the
minds of men who feared British control of the Indians.
He was never mentioned in Nova Scotian records, and his
true role is more obscure. Ahlin was also unsuccessful
in pinning down the man and discovered him only through
the American sources. None of the Americans who reported
his existence ever saw him; all gained knowledge of him
from the Penobscots. Andrew Gilman, commander of a small
force on the Penobscot, first learned of him while at Old
Town and passed the word to Boston.
See Ahlin, Maine
Rubicon, pp. 106, 185
*
There is no evidence, however,
that the man, if he existed, was .a British agent; he
could have been a French trapper who worked the upper
Penobscot. Whatever he was, his influence over the Indians
was small, and he evidently did not seriously hurt the
American cause.
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Maine could be enormous.

When the British attacked, however, they came from
On August 15, 1777, less than a week after Allan’s

the sea.

return from the St. John, a small British fleet sailed to
Machias Harbor while he was conducting a conference with

the Penobscot, Passamaquoddy and Malecite Indians outside
the town.

Allan and the Indians rushed to the scene of the

fighting.

The raid failed.

After the battle, in his

report to the Massachusetts Council, Allan noted his satisfaction with the Indian participation .in the-combat.

"None

Deserves Greater Applause," he- wrote, "than our Indian
friends."

15

The officers commanding the defense have

assured him that none "Beheaved more Gallantly, Exposing
themselves openly to the fire of the Cannon and Small arms,

very diff^ then what has been Generely Practised by
Indians."

16

Jonathan Eddy also praised the Indians.

"It

happened extremely well for us," he wrote, "that Mr Allan
and Mr Preble had arrive here with about 40 Indians who

were of great service to us and assisted us greatly."

17

The highly praised Indian role did not involve any

'✓Report, Allan to Mass, govt., August 17, 1777,
Baster MSS.. XV, 14.
16Ibid.

1'Report, Eddy to Mass, govt., August 17, 1777,

Baxter MSS.. XV, 14.

.
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The Indians mostly ran about the area of
f
battle loosing hideous cries that intimidated the British.

heavy fighting.

The major action in which the warriors participated took
place on the morning of August 15, when about forty of

them under Captain Smith, took part in an action that pre

vented the British from moving up the river to attack the
town.

Once again, war cries and sharpshooting disconcerted

the attackers and foiled their plans.

18

The Battle of Machias was among the very few mili

tary actions in which the Americans got significant aid

from the Eastern-Indians, and the tribes were trapped into

helping.

Conferences such- as this one in progress usually

began with heavy rhetoric pledging undying support for the
colonialscause.

On this occasion, these words were hardly

spoken when the sound of guns echoed upriver from Machias.

The Indians had to fight or lose face.

Once committed they

were brave and determined fighters; they were too proud not

to be.
This battle strengthened the ties between the

Indians and colonists by adding the camaraderie of combat
to the previously rather weak bond of affection.

Machias

was the first British defeat the Indians, had seen; the

^8Smith, ’’Machias in the Revolution,” pp. 682-4.

For a more complete account of the Battle of Machias, see
Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, pp. 86-92. Unfortunately, this
account does not give details of the Indian participation.
Beyond the brief statement in the text, few other details
are available.
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memories of Fort Cumberland and the St• John were replaced

in many Indian minds by the victory at Machias, in which

they had participated,
British and lfova Scotian reactions to the unsuccess

ful raid on Machias were mixed.

Collier, who commanded the

attack, put the best interpretation on it in his reports to

superiors.

He said that his assault had dispersed the

rebels around Machias, destroyed their stores and forced
them to abandon plans for the invasion of Nova Scotia.

In

his proclamation to the people of Machias, Collier declared

that his raid upon the town was a reprisal for raids on
Nova Scotia and that he would burn Machias if the inhabit-

ants of that town continued their depredations.

General Massey was not pleased with Collier and his
i

assault on Machias.

1Q

Collier’s action had thoroughly alarmed

^Letter, Collier to Germain, October 11, 1777, and
provlamation, Collier to inhabitants, of Machias, October 11,
1777. Nova Scotia A, XCVII, 311-2, 320-5. Collier told
Machias in his proclamation that only his mercy had pre
vented him from burning the town.
This, seemed unlikely,
because during.-the attack, the British burned most of the
buildings that fell into their hands and because Collier’s
forces never got close enough to the town to put it to the
torch. Collier’s mercy thus appeared less formidable than
he would have had people think. After the attack on
Machias, Collier cruised down the coast, according to his
letter, to harass the enemy, to cut supply lines and to
keep the militia from joining the forces opposing Burgoyne.
If Collier really believed that the Maine militia was a
threat to Burgoyne, he had an exaggerated idea of American
mobility. He may, of course, simply have been seeking to
make a good impression upon Germain.
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all eastern Maine, forcing Major; Small, who was marching on
Machias, under Massey’s orders, to turn back at the St.

John.

Massey felt that, had he been informed of Collier’s

plans, he could have sent along a number of his own men,

who might have carried the day.

As it was, the opportunity

for a surprise strike at Machias was lost.

on

Collier’s action alarmed Machias and the government
in Boston.

On August 12, 1777, the expedition to regain

the St. John River was disbanded on orders from the General
04

All/.efforts were to be concentrated on strength

Court.

ening Machias as the forward American base, as the colony

went over to defense.
Once the excitement of the British attack died
down, Allan was left to cope with the problem of keeping

the Malecites supplied and content.

From the time he left

Aukpaque he had had doubts about bringing these Indians to •

Machias.

He reported to the government that "My coming to

Machias was a matter more of Necessity than Inclination.”

22

He feared that drunken quarrelling would be a problem and
that the expense of his operation would greatly increase.

Letter, Massey to "My Lord," probably Germain,
September 20, 1777, Nova Scotia A. XCVII, 501-3.
^Letter, Arbuthnot to Germain, September 14, 1777,
Nova Scotia A, XCVII, 295; Ahlin, Downeast Rubicon,p. 93.

^22Aeport, Allan to Mass, govt., August 17, 1777,
Baxter MS ., XV, 177.
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He had been forced to bring them along, he wrote, because

they were destitute; to have left them on the St. John

would have been to deliver them into British hands.

2’5

The presence of these new dependents greatly in
creased Allan’s supply problems.

From the time they

arrived in Machias, he had to furnish them with nearly all

their provisions.

He also tried to find them work as

messengers, fearing that ’’otherwise they will certainly go
of/fj."24

The fiction of trade now had been dropped, and

Allan got very little in return for the goods he dispensed.
Failure of the supply line from Boston would almost cer

tainly have led to a mass defection of Indians, and the
British navy was harassing the coast in an attempt to break

that supply line.

Allan assured the government that he was

using all possible economy, but provisions were being used

at an alarming rate.

The Indians, however, had abandoned

their homes and corn fields on the St. John to serve the
American cause, and Allan had to supply them as fully as

possible.

25

The Indians were homesick as well as destitute.
They wanted to return to the St. John.and expecteda colo

nial army to help them.

. 23Ibld.

25

As the summer of 1777 wore on,*
25

24Ibid.

Ibid; Allan’s Journal, weekly entries describing
dispensation of provisions to Indians, in Kidder, Military
Operations, pp. 124-5, 130-1, 134, 136, 138, 140-2, 145,
147, 148-50, 153-4, 156, 158-60; letter, Collier to Germain,
October 11, 1777, Nova Scotia A, XCVII, 512.
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Allan worried about the lack of such an army and had

increasing difficulty making excuses to the tribe.

26

As

seen above, Massachusetts abandoned all preparations to
assault the St. John after the British raid on Machias.
The presence on the St. John of Michael Francklin,

the Nova Scotian Superintendent of Indian Affairs, made it
important for Allan to retain the confidence and goodwill
of the Malecites at Machias.

Had they returned to their

homes, they would have been under strong British influence.
The portion of the tribe on the St. John was unlikely ; to

attack the Americans while another part of the tribe under
their head chief, Ambrose, was encamped at Machias.

s
*
Francklin

efforts on the river were great, but he had

little success because of the schism in the tribe.

Stephen

Smith, the truck master at Machias, wrote that Francklin
was ’’exerting

himself to the utmost, in order to bring

over all the Indians he can meet with, to a sense of what
he calls their duty, but with little success.”

27

Francklin was more successful among the Micmacs.

On August 18, 1777, Allan wrote the government that he had

hoped "to have been among the Micmacs" by that time.

The

British government was attempting to win them over, and

Report, Allan to Mass, govt., August 18, 1777,
Baxter MSS., XV, 177; Allan’s Journal, August 23, 1777,
In Kidder, Military Operations, p. 131 •

27
’Letter, Stephen Smith to Mass. Council, July 31,
1777, Baxter MSS., XV, 3
*
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"every shop in Halifax is open for them to Demand as they
please"

28

If no one opposed him, Francklin would likely

gain the Micmacs to his side, but Allan’s influence among

the Micmacs was shaky, due to their nearness to British
t

I

power and distance from Allan’s base at Machias.

Francklin’s activities and the British military

operations downeast disturbed the General Court, and they
raised a new force of several hundred men to be stationed

at Machias.

The General Court also felt that it would

"greatly promote the Service of the United American. States
to have the same person Commander of the troops to be .

stationed at Machias, that is appointed over the Indians.

co

The General Court, realizing the importance of Allan’s work

among the Indians, also appointed a lieutenant colonel to
I

carry on the details of command.

Allan was to be a roving

commander, and the lieutenant colonel was to obey "such

orders as Z~he7 shall from time to time Receive from Col.
Allan."30
The remainder of 1777 passed without any major

alarms downeast.

*
Francklin
s efforts tended to decrease

28

Report, Allan to Mass, govt., September 22, 1777,
Baxter MSS.. XV, 225.

29

Report of a Committee of the Mass. General Court,
September 16, 1777, resolves of Mass, govt., September 17
and 19, 1777, Baxter MSS.. XV, 214-8.
3°It>id.. p. 217-8.
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in winter, and the British authorities were still not
making a determined Indian effort on the scale and scope

of Mr. Allan’s enterprise.

By the end of 1777, both sides

were so busy heeding imagined threats that neither was en-

gaged in any offense.
Allan still had many of the Indians from the St.

John with him and remained confident of their devotion to
the American cause.

The Micmacs had sent him tokens of

friendship and promised to make no agreement with the

British before they met him.

Allan was awaiting Indian

delegates from Nova Scotia for a conference.

The Penobscots were troublesome.

31

They were often

in Machias ’’making heavy Complaint ■ of Impositions & Extorsions.”<

The supposed British agent on. the upper Penob-

scot, Lunier, was trying to turn them from their loyalty

to Massachusetts and possibly was gaining intelligence
from them, according to Allan’s reports.

Allan legally

could not deal with that tribe; neither the Continental
Congress nor the Massachusetts General Court had given him

authority in regard to them.

embezzlement at
art.investigation.

He had received reports of

the Penobscot truck house and recommended
Whether or not Lowder, the truck master,

was guilty of peculation, Allan felt that he was overly

.
Report, Allan to Mass, govt., September 22, 1777#
Baxter MSS., XV, 223.
32Ibid.
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concerned with profit and was sacrificing influence over

the tribe to get it. 22
Allan had intelligence problems with the Passama-

quoddies as well as with the Penobscots.

That tribe made

frequent trips to Machias and had many contacts with

.British vessels along the coast.

ways through them.

Information flowed both

Allan felt that the colonial cause

could.not bear such an exchange.

He forbade the Passama-

quoddies to come to Machias unless they brought their

families and took up residence.
forcibly detained.

All others would be

When Allan wanted to meet the tribe,

he went to the St. Croix.
As the season progressed, Allan’s problems with
the Indians increased.

Their "fluctuating turn of mind”

and susceptibility to liquor kept them aroused and disor
derly most of the time, and Allan could admit only a few
to town.

During the late summer and fall of Mil, morale

was unsteady.

Allan tried to keep the men busy by sending

them on hunts to help defray his enormous expenses for
maintaining them.

In September, their morale was good;

"they /were7 much elated by the News and the Notice taken

55ibid.; report, Allan to Mass. Board of War,
September 25, 1777, Baxter MSS., XV, 229-31•

^-<Report, Allan to Mass, govt., October 12, 1777.
Baxter MSS., XV, 243.
to Mass, govt., Baxter MSS., XV.

286-7
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of them.”

36

The ’’news” and ’’notice” was a letter from the

Massachusetts Council congratulating them for their part

in the Battle of Machias, reporting new American victories,
and promising new shipments of goods for them.

37

The

promise of more supplies was particularly heartening,
because shortages of goods had been a major cause of
Indian dissatisfaction.^

By November, however, old prob

lems had reappeared, and Allan reported that it was beyond
his power “to keep my Indian Soldiers in Such Regular order
as I would chuse."

39

As winter set in, inactivity bred

boredom, and drunkenness increased.

Allan’s problems with his Indian soldiers sprang
partially from an attempt by the government to put the
Indians under military discipline.

Allan had been author

ized to nomraiasion three captains and six lieutenants among

the Indians.

He had given out some of the commissions,

mostly to natural tribal leaders.

Officers, however, did

not make a tribe into a regiment, and military discipline

did not develop.

The officers refused to take extra pay,

^Report, Allan to Mass, govt., October 12, 1777,

Baxter MSS.. XV, 243.
•^Letter, Mass. Council to Indians at Machias,

September 15, 1777, Baxter MSS.. XV, 205.
^Letter, Colonel Benjamin Poster to Mass. Council,

August 27, 1777, Baxter; MSS., XV, 25-6.

^Letter, Allan to Mass, govt., November 18, 1777,
Baxter MSS.. XV, 286-7.
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and the money was divided among the privates.

The basic

equality of Indian society was not to be so easily overcome.

40
Allan's problems with the Indians sprang from other

sources as well.

In frontier Maine, cheating the Indians

was an old and honored practice
*

Stephen Smith, truck

master at Machias, warned the government about this.
“Avaricious persons,” he wrote, ”gave the Indians liquor,
got them intoxicated and cheated them of their furs,” thus

depriving the state of revenue.The General Court real
ized that good will as well as money was at . stake and

passed a law forbidding the practice.

The new law forbade

any person to ’’give, sell, Truck, Barter or Exchange,”

anything an Indian had in his possession for ’’strong beer,
JQ
cyder, wine, rum, brandy, or any other strong liquor.”^

Penalties were a forty shilling fine or two months in jail.
Allan duly proclaimed the new law, but enforcement was

nearly impossible.
By the end of 1777, Allan’s relationship with the
Continental and Massachusetts authorities had settled into

^Resolve of Mass, govt., September 16, 1777,
report, Allan to Mass, govt., November 18, 1777. Baxter
MSS.. XV, 213, 206-7.
(Skemorial, Stephen Smith to Mass, govt.,

June 7, 1777, Baxter MSS.. XV, 109.
^Resolve of Mass, govt., June 21, 1777, Baxter
MSS.. XV, 131-2.

(
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He was Continental Indian agent in wastern Maine

place.

and Nova Scotia working through the Massachusetts govern
ment.

His funds came from Boston, but Massachusetts ex

pected to be repaid by Congress after the war.

He reported

infrequently to Congress, expecting Massachusetts officials
to keep them informed.

The Continental authorities, who

felt that Massachusetts had the experience and resources
I

to handle any problems with the Indians, seldom interfered.
Allan, conscious of his Continental authority, used the

term ”United States” in several ventures actually bankrolled by Massachusetts.

43

In 1777, the use of trade and supply to hold Indi

an allegiance became well established.

The Americans had

made an early start in the trade but were hampered by
lengthy supply lines and shortages of goods.

The British

and Nova Scotian authorities had somewhat better sources of

trade items and were more inclined to give supplies freely

to the Indians; the Americans took furs in return.

During

the early part of the war the British traded from ships
along the coast, but these appeared irregularly, forcing

the Indians to depend upon the American truck houses.

Sup

ply problems slowly made the truck houses inadequate, how

ever, and British progress into the area lessened Indian

dependence upon

them.

^■^Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, pp. 108-9; Baxter MSS..

XV. 195.

98
The American attitude toward Indian trade changed

as the war progressed.

In 1775, the Massachusetts govern

ment sought trade with the Indians to keep them away from

British influences. . Later, the government lowered the
I

prices on their goods to hold Indian friendship.

By 1777,

the, Americans felt they were merely buying Indian goodwill,
although the fiction of trade was maintained in some areas.
Allan was giving provisions to the Malecites at Machias on

the pretext that they were soldiers.

Letters from downeast

reflected the new American attitude.

One June 6, 1777,

Francis Shaw, an officer at Machias, wrote that he had no
doubt that Indian friendship "must be dearly bought” and
depended upon well-stocked truck houses.
reinforced the American view.

4-4

Indian behavior

Colonel Benjamin Foster

wrote to the Council on August . 27, Mil that ’’the Indians

among us appear dejected and apprehend they shall be
obliged to join the enemy for support.”

the Indians
*

In other words,

hearts might be for the Americans, but they

would join the British if colonial support and supplies
were lacking.
The shortages in eastern Maine made the Indian

attitude seem all.the more mercenary to the colonists.

^Massachusetts, House of Representatives, Journal,
p. 185; Minutes of the Watertown Conference, Baxter MSS.,
XXIV, 175; letter, Shaw to Mass, govt., XIV, 424.

45Baxter MSS.. XV, 25-6.
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Machias was a lumbering center before the war, importing
most of its supplies from the west*
*

British naval activity-

endangered this supply line, and needs of military re

inforcements and Indians increased the demand for supplies.

The result was constant shortage.

The people of Machias

made great sacrifices for the American cause; the Indians
threatened to join the British if they were not constantly

Machias men could hardly be blamed for belittling
46
Indian devotion to the American cause.
supplied.

The shortages in Machias created another problem

for Allan.

He discovered that the Indians were selling the
J

provisions they obtained at the truck house to the settlers.

They then returned to the truck house and demanded more
goods.

With his supply problems, Allan could not provide

them with essentials.

47

46
* For reports on shortages in Machias, see letters
from Stephen Smith, truck master, to Mass, govt., July 4,
and August 28, 1777, also Mass. Council order, October 10,
1777, Baxter MSS*. XV, 154-5, 15, 234-5.
The Indians re
quired substantial quantities of goods. On June 21, 1777,
the government ordered the following to be sent to Machias:
200 gallons ofrum, 200 bushels
of corn, 60 bushels of salt,
200 gallons ofmolasses, 6 barrels of pork, 200 pounds of
hog fat, 1,000 yards of various
cloths, 200 pounds sugar,
one cask of wine, 100 pounds of powder, 400 pounds of balls,
one cask of raisins, 12,000 wampum, 1,000 tobacco pipes and
varying quantities of hats, hatchets, knives, ribbons bind
ing, tin kettles, steel beads and coarse lace thread.
See
Baxter MSS., XV, 130-1.
^Proclamation, Allan to Machias, September 8, 1777,

report, Allan to Mass. Board of War, September 25, 1777,
Baxter MSS.. XV, 195, 231.
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'

The Nova Scotians shared Allan’s problems in com

mercial relations with the Indians
*

Neither side was able

to furnish all the materials the Indians wanted, and

neither side was able to control the Indians through trade
policy as long as alternative sources of supply existed.
As long as the Indians could trade with both sides, they

abandoned neither.

The year of 1777 saw the substantial growth of
British power in eastern Maine and Nova Scotia.

Operating

out of Halifax, the British secured the. disputed territory
i

around the St. John River and gained a foothold from which

they could implement an Indian policy.

The American effort

under John Allan remained strong but was encountering

difficulties as British power grew.

By the end of 1777,

the British had moved to terminate their weakness and were
preparing to take the offensive in eastern Maine and
adjacent parts of Nova Scotia.
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1

Chapter 4
STALEMATE: 1778

The period 1778 and 1779 saw a basic shift of

power in Maine and Nova Scotia.

The British seizure and

retention of Castine against a Massachusetts counterattack
in 1779 put the Americans on the defensive in eastern Maine.
John Allen and his compatriots were now operating from

a

position of weakness, and all their old problems of supply
and lack of troops grew worse.

Surprisingly, however,

their position in the struggle for Indian support did not
I

seriously deteriorate, and the American alliance with

France in 1778 awakened old Indian loyalties.

The Americans

were able to use these loyalties to counter a well-planned
and better supplied British drive for Indian allegiance.

American control did slip as Michael Francklin moved among

the Nova Scotian tribes, but neither side could gain com- •
plete dominance among the Indians.

The passage of several years of fighting had not

altered strategic considerations in Nova Scotia and eastern
Maine.

The Indians remained an important factor in the

situation, and the Battle of Machias showed that they would
fight.

Nova Scotia, although stronger than she had been at

the opening of the war, distrusted the tribes, who seemed

attached to the Americans and capable of doing much damage

102

in Nova Scotia.

The alliance between the rebels and

France, established in.1778, made the situation more vola
tile because of Indian devotion to the French.

cans under Allan also were apprehensive.

The Ameri

Eastern Maine

was very weak, and only the Indians seemed able to defend

it.

Colonel Allan was plagued with shortages and knew

that he could lose their support very quickly.

Both Maine

and Nova Scotia felt threatened by the Indians, therefore,

and strove desperately for the friendship of the tribes.
The relative strengths of the two sides were re

flected in the communications they were having with their
superiors.

On the St.- John River, Major Studholme felt

quite secure in his well-entrenched British fortification.
At the same time, Machias dreaded an attack from Nova

Scotia.

On January 24, 1778, the Machias Committee of

Safety wrote the Massachusetts Executive Council that "our
enemies mean to deprive us of every means of getting our

lively hood in any Quietness^ and if possible make, them
-*
selves masters of this part of the Country."

2

The government of Massachusetts was concerned

about the weakness of eastern Maine and sought to protect
it from the British.

A resolution passed on March 13J778

stated that the retention of Indian friendship to secure

Letter, General Massey to Germain, March 13, 1778,
Nova Scotia A. XCVIII, 48.
^Baxter MS3.. XV, 335.

^Baxter MSS., XV, 363-5.
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the very valuable eastern part of the state was of "the
3
utmost importance.”
After this renewed committment to

defend eastern Maine, in April of 1778 the people of
Machias petitioned the General Court to make Machias the

"frontier,” the most advanced outpost of the American

cause.

The government agreed that Machias was the best

place on the coast to make a stand, and the.town unoffi4
cially became the colony’s first line of defense.

This support from Boston notwithstanding, Colonel
John Allan was in the midst of a difficult.period at the

beginning of 1778.

He was short of men, money and supplies.

The British were endangering his communications with

Boston, and the Indians were complaining as they usually
did when supplies were short.

A British, truck house on the

St. John was complicating his life by making the Indians

even more difficult.
The new year had opened on an auspicious note for

Allan in terms of money.
2300 by the government.

On January 2, he was granted

Ten days later, however, he asked

for 2400 more to meet unexpected demands.

Even this was

not enough for his work, and Allan raised money on his own

credit.

Finally in April, the government repaid 2237 that

Allan had borrowed and granted him 21.200 for his work,

^Baxter MSS., XV, 363-5.

^Baxter MSS.. XVI (1910), 5-7.
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ending his financial plight for a time.

5

Allan was short of supplies as well as of money.
Even when he had money available, he could not always get

what he needed.

Enemy activity and unsettled conditions

had almost halted farming downeast, and. the British navy

was harassing shipments along the coast.

Such a weakened

supply system could not fill the needs of Allan1s estab
lishment.

A government estimate of Allan’s requirements

for three hundred men for six months show the enormity of
the task.

This estimate called for 81,000 pounds of beef,

54,000 pounds of flour and bread, 565 bushels of peas,

5,900 pounds of rice, 618 pounds of soap, 50 pounds of

candles plus war supplies such as ammunition.&

Excluding

the war supplies, this was over 160,000 pounds of rather
bulky material.

Other supplies for the Indians’ would have

increased the tonnage.

Allan’s difficulties in getting

this material from Boston through, the British patrols to
Machias on small ships were immense, and he was often
I

unsuccessful.

The shortages of supplies greatly hampered operation*

^Resolves, Mass, govt., January 2 and April 17»1778,
petitions, Stephen and Ralph Cross to Mass, govt., and
James Avery to Mass, govt., Baxter MSS», XV, 522. 524. 41920, 589-90.

^Letters, Machias Committee of Safety to Mass, govt.,
January 24, 1778, and Stephen Smith to Mass, govt., report
of a committee of the General Court, Baxter MSS., XV, 554-5,
540, 584.
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of the truck house, now primarily a supply depot for the
The older commercial role was much reduced.

Indians.

Allan determined what the-Indians were ”in want of & from
7
time to time Orders Such Things from the Truck House.”
The Indians could also trade their furs for supplies and

thus got a considerable amount of credit for additional

provisions.

Indians around Machias came in weekly for

rations at the beginning of the year.

Truck master Smith

praised Allan for his frugality but still had to borrow
Q
supplies to meet the needs of the Indians.
The limited provisions at Machias had to be-used

The great

for the soldiers as well as for the Indians.

distress among these men forced Allan to take this step.

Many of them did not receive their full rations, and in
April, a number of officers at-Machias petitioned the gov
ernment for a monetary payment for rations not given.
Some men had more than 150 rations due them.

9

^Letter, Stephen Smith to Mass, govt., January 24,
1778, Baxter MSS.. XV. 536,.
o

Allan’s journal, the source of information regard
ing weekly supplies for the Indians around Machias, was not
kept after January of 1778.
There is no reason, however,
to suppose that the practice was discontinued. See Allan’s
journal for January 5 and 10, 1778, in Kidder, Military
Operations, pp. 161-2; letter, Machias Committee of Safety,
to Mass. govt., January 24, 1778, Baxter MSS.. XV, 536-8.

^Letter, Stephen Smith to Mass, govt., and an
account of rations due, April 15, 1778, Baxter MSS.. XV.
533, 412-15.
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Allan found it difficult to solve his supply prob
lems by mail, and in late spring he sought an agent in

Boston,

10

He evidently felt that the bureaucracy was. not

paying sufficient attention to his requests.by letter; a

man on the spot could get some action by harassment of .

appropriate officials, speeding the shipment of supplies.
No agent was permanently appointed, however.
*
Allan
s force at Machias in the late winter and
spring of 1778 was not large, although the supply problems

would seem to indicate otherwise.

Allan, who had the sup

port and approval of the Machias authorities, commanded a
total of 151 men on April 5, 1778.■

Earlier in the year

he had commanded about seventy Indians, but the numbers

dropped as hunting seasons approached.

A fort was under

construction in the area but was not complete.

The

Machias Committee of Safety had requested Continental
troops to protect the area but did not get them.

Massa

chusetts authorities instead authorized the raising of one
I

hundred troops and one hundred Indians.

The extra one

^Petition to Mass, govt., James Avery on behalf

of Allan, May 19, 1778, Baxter MSS.. XVI, 9

^The troops under Allan were one captain, three
lieutenants with the rank of captain, one first lieutenant,
one second lieutenant, one commissary, two Indian chiefs,
one conductor, one sergeant, one corporal, 153 privates,
two fifes and drums and four couriers. See letter, Machias
Committee of Safety to Mass, govt., January 24, 1778, and
return of troops at Machias, April 4, 1778, Baxter MSS.,
XV, 536, 406.
'
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hundred, men were not raised, however, due to the severe

economic depression under whidh most of Maine was

laboring.

12

By May, the rising expense of the truck house at

Machias was too much for Massachusetts, and her government

decided that henceforth the cost was to be paid by the
United States.

Congress was notified, and all Allan
s
*

correspondence and accounts were sent to them withj the hope

that they would provide for future supply.

13

Conditions among the Indians on the Penobscot River
were worse than those at Machias.

The Massachusetts govern

ment liquidated its Indian operation there in January of
1778.

The General Court resolved that there was no need for

a truck house on the river and later ordered Colonel Lowder,

the truck master, to repay the £400 he had been given for
supplies.

The guard force on the river under Andrew Gilman

was also discharged, although Gilman was made government

agent and interpreter among the Penobscot tribe.

Except

for one agent-spy, the whole Indian apparatus.at Penobscot

12

Letter, Machias Committee of Safety to Mass, govt.,
January 24, 1778, resolve of Mass, govt., March 13, 1778,
letter, George Stillman to Mass, govt., August 8, 1778,
Baxter MSS.. XV, 335-8, 351-2, XVI, 46.
^Resolve of Mass, govt., April 17> 1778, Baxter MSS..

XV, 420-1.
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was thus ended.14

By April, the situation, on the river had deterio
rated seriously.

Josiah Brewer wrote Colonel Lowder on

April 12 that less than three weeks supply of corn remained

and that the Indians were approaching desperation.

could predict what they might do.

similar straits.

No one

The settlers were in

They had, been forced to eat their seed

potatoes, and had none for planting.

15

The government. in Boston could not ignore this

situation.

They re-opened their Indian trade and sent

Supplies to the Penobscot, combining for the first time
under Allan’s command the operations there and at Machias.

The government also sent 150 bushels of corn to keep the
Indians going until spring.

16

Aside from the ever present problems of supply, the

early months of 1778 were relatively quiet for Allan and

the Americans.

In January, he commissioned a number of

Indians to establish a post at Passamac[uoddy.

The offi

cers of the force were chosen at a conference on January 5»

The purpose of the new post was to cut off the communi
cation and trade with Nova Scotia.

The post was to seize

Mass• govt•, January 22, March 9, and
April 17, 1778, order of the Mass. Executive Council,
April 27, 1778, Baxter MSS.. XV, 535-4, 380, 587, 418-9,426.

Vfoaxter MSS.. XV, 411-2.
v^Aesolves of Mass, govt.,
Baxter MSS.. XV, 409, 425
*

April 9 and 25, 1778,
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all British vessels and vessels with both British and
American papers.

17

The selling of liquor to the Indians continued to
be a problem, and the government increased the penalty to
1
a fine of £50 or twelve months imprisonment.
Allan had

not been able to enforce the lesser punishment, however,
and the stiffer penalties caused little change.

In May,- discontent among the Penobscots all but
cancelled the effect of the new alliance with France.

Several Penobscots arrived in Allan’s camp and announced
that the Generals Gates and Lafayette wanted to meet some

of the Passamaquoddies.

A conference was held on May 16

with chiefs Ambrose St. Aubin and Pierre Toma in attend
ance.

The Penobscots spoke as if the Indians were to go

and put themselves under the direct command of the French.
Ambrose and Pierre opposed such a move but were outnum

bered.

Allan finally consented although he had a feeling

that something was wrong.

19

Allan’s hunch proved to be right.

In the evening

of the fourteenth of May, he learned from several Indians
that the Penobscots were unhappy with him.

They thought

^Allan’s Journal, entries for January 5 and 5,
1778, in Kidder, Military Operations, pp. 161-2.

1SBesolve of Mass, govt., April 17, 1778, Baxter
MSS., XV, 421.
(JJ^leport, Allan to Mass, govt., May 22, 1778,

Baxter MSS.. XVI, 12-5.
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he was diverting their supplies to Machias for his own use.

They did not understand that the lack of supplies for them
had been the result of the closing of the Penobscot truck

house by the government.

Some of them had, therefore,

decided to return to their old friends, the French, who

were once more in the country and wanted the Passamaquod-

dies and Malecites to go with them.

20

Armed with, this knowledge and aided by an improved

state of mind among the Penobscots, Allan was able to
dissuade the Indians from going en masse.

He promised to

visit the Penobscots as soon as possible to help with their
problems and proposed a compromise in the matter of meeting

the French.

Two Indians would go to Boston to meet French

officers and welcome their old allies.

Two other Indians

would go to Canada by way of the St. John River to spread
the news of the new French-American alliance and find out

how many men in the Canadian tribes would now turn out to

fight the British.

The Indians also hoped that the mission

to Boston might at last,result in the procuring of a priest.

With this result, the. conference broke up amicably, had
Allan thus managed to repair a serious breach between him
self and the Penobscot tribe.

Despite the seeming success of the conference,
Allan was uneasy.

20Ibid.

Many Tories were coming into the area

21 Ibid.. pp. 13-5.

21
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around Passamaquoddy, and he was afraid of the effect of
this on the Indians.

He.also worried about the compara

tively well-stocked British truck house on the St. John

and its impact on his fickle "sauvages."

22

While .Allan struggled with many problems during
early 1778, a much calmer attitude prevailed among the

British and colonial authorities in Nova Scotia.

General

Massey, commander of the forces in the colony, had a bad
moment or two in January when he received the preposterous

news that Colonel Allan had 800 men under his command at
This Report stirred the colony to action, however,

Machias.

and Major Studholme was sent io the mouth of the St. John
with a pre«Rframed blockhouse and a force to hold the river.
By March 15, Massey reported to the Secretary of State,

Lord Germain, that Studholme was well-entrenched and
secure.

23
The British authorities in North America were now

mounting a concerted effort to hold Indian allegiances.

Governor Carleton of Canada reported to Lieutenant Governor
Arbuthnot of Nova Scotia that some of the St. John and
Micmac Indians had been to Canada the previous summer.

They were treated well and directed to apply to the Nova
Scotian authorities for their needs.

Carleton also felt

22Ibid., pp. 14-5.

v

^Letters, Massey to Germain, January 25 and

March 13, 1778, Nova Scotia A. XCVIII, .35-6, 48.
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that the Canadian Indians would have a good effect in
bringing ’’their Brethren below to a proper sense of their

*.'
Duty

Carleton’s actions were effective simply because

he was in Quebec, the former center of the Indians
*

old

French allies.
The Nova Scotian authorities were also taking steps
to procure a priest.

The Indians had been asking for one

since the conflict opened.

Only the British had a supply

of French priests available, but were reluctant to promote
Catholicism among the Indians.

The provincial authorities

were apprehensive about the reaction such a move would
provoke in London and made every attempt to put it in the
most favorable light, stressing the American effort to win

the Indians and Allan
*

success in removing the Malecites

from the St. John to Machias.

A priest among the Indians

would “prevent any further mischief,” according to Lieutenant Governor Arbuthnot.

25

Once the authorities made the decision, obtaining
a priest was no problem.

Arbuthnot sent a letter to

Carleton at Quebec in late December of 1777 asking the
governor to obtain permission from the Bishop for one Father
Bourg to come to Nova Scotia to serve the Indians.

The

priest was sent quickly to Halifax with Carleton’s

^Letter, February 25,1778, Nova Scotia A, XCVIII,
59-60.

^Letter, Arbuthnot to Germain, April 8, 1778,

Nova Scotia A, XCVIII, 56-7.
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recommendations.^

The Nova Scotians wasted no time in taking advan
tage of their new priest.

Even before Bourg arrived, Major

Studholme at Port Howe was inviting the Indians to come to

the fort, get supplies and meet with the priest who was
expected soon.

27

When war with France threatened, the British author

ities were particularly anxious to get a priest.

Arbuthnot

wrote Germain on May 17, 1778 that "In the case of War witlr
France, ... this Province has every Mischief and Hostility
1
28
to apprehend from the Indians and French Acadians.”

Arbuthnot further reported that the Indians had been under
arms against the British at Fort Cumberland and on the St.

John River, and he expected France to attempt to stir them
up again in these areas.

29

Back in Machias, summer and the priest from Quebec

brought more problems for Allan than the French-American
alliance did for Francklin.

The acute lack of supplies

and men, inflation and heavy British sea power were

26ibid.; letter, Carleton to Arbuthnot, February 25,

1778, Nova Scotia A, 58-9.
^Letter, Allan to Mass, govt., May 22, 1778,

Baxter MSS., XVI, 13-4.

28Nova Scotia A, XCVIII, 76.
29Ibid.

■
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critical in eastern Maine.

Allan went into summer in an

increasing desperation that belied the outward calm

affected by the Americans in both Boston and Maine.
Word of the new pact with Prance reached Allan

before May 22, 1778, and he and the Boston authorities
soon took advantage of the effect of the new alliance upon

the Indians.

The Council sent a letter to the Malecite

tribe on June 11 reminding them that their "Bather the

French King" had taken ’’the United States by the hand,”

and made their enemies his own.

30

The French alliance, however, did not save Allan

from severe problems during the summer.

The American

Superintendant of Indian affairs, who had 106 Indians in
service on July 31, 1778, still, had tremendous supply

problems.

On August 4, he wrote an almost hysterical let

ter to the government explaining his problems and seeking

aid.

The goods he had ordered had not arrived, and those

on hand would last no more than five weeks.

Indians

flocked into Machias with many women and children, and none

could be refused without angering them all.

There was so

much coming and going that Allan could never be sure just
whom he was supporting, and the Indians were careless of
the supplies they were given.

They spent much time "in

^Letter enclosed in letter from Lieutenant

Governor Hughes of Nova Scotia to Germhin, January 16,
1779, Nova Scotia A, XCIX, 22r4.

X
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Common recreation Tearing Leggins, Coats Blankets, &

Shirts, in Pieces.”

31

Many

of the goods were poor and

If the Indians were the least bit in '

wore out quickly.

want, their clamor was tremendous, and Allan’s standing
among them fell because they blamed him personally.
^
*

32

Allan had ordered supplies to remedy the situation
and had tried to keep expenses down by giving the Indians
far less than the French had formerly given, but the gov

ernment sent him only one-third of the provisions necessary

to do even this.

The government had further ordered him to

keep no more than one hundred Indians under arms.

To do so,

however, Allan had to support four hundred Indians because

the families of those in service lived at Machias.

These

families gave their rations, to others who were not being
supplied and then demanded more from Allan and the truck
house.

The extra was charged to their accounts, but a

reminder to them

of their debts resulted in “a Speedy

departure," making

the debt uncollectable.

In the absence of supplies, Allan was forced to
hold the Indians by playing upon their emotions.

53Ibid.. pp. 50-2

Once he
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gained their trust, they confided in him and took every
thing he said seriously.

He was able to adjust his allo

cation of the meager provisions accordingly;

if they were

in a bad mood, he gave them more than when they were in a
good mood.

Unfortunately, under this system, the Indians

got more than their share of what came down to Machias, but
Allan feared that otherwise he would lose them.

Allan now had. secured another agent to try to expe

dite matters.

He notified the Council that Francis Shaw,Sr.

was to attempt to handle his business in Boston.

All Allan

himself could do, however, was to threaten the government
with disaster should his needs not be met.

He begged that

the necessary supplies be speeded to him to “prevent those

fatal Consequences which may happen in this part of the

United States of America if Omitted.
Allan was aware of the peculiar problem of infla

tion in the securing of supplies for the Indians.

He told

the government that he realized how much prices had risen
and that it was not for him
articles were purchased.

to determine how the needed

He noted, however, that some

articles were priced at 180% over the cost in sterling, a

^^Under this system, certain goods were more
important than others.
by a lack of hats among
was forced to take hats
the Indians. Hats were
among the Indians.

Allan was hindered, for example,
*
the trade goods from Boston. He
from his friends and give them to
a highly prestigious possession

■Report, Allan to Mass, govt., August 4> 1778,
Baxter MSS., XVI, 52-4.
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fact that "must make every honest Inclined person Shudder

36
who has management of Public business. V-'

Allan tactfully

suggested that he might buy goods to great advantage inNova Scotia.

Such goods would be much cheaper and of much

better quality than the merchandise usually sent from

Boston.

In addition to problems of supply, Allan had to
deal with an active opponent.

In the summer of 1778, he

received rumors of a new British push for Indian support

along with an attack on eastern Maine.

Allan, who got this

news through family connections in Nova Scotia, kept it to

himself but began to take defensive steps.

38

'

The most important of these steps was an Indian
conference at Passamaquoddy at which Allan planned to
gather the Indians and prepare them for war.

He met with

some Indians there during.the first week of July and gave

them provisions and a pep talk.

He then had several

smaller meetings with various groups throughout the month.
The Micmacs sent in a pledge of loyalty with the proviso

that they could not go to war immediately, but they prom
ised to act when called at a later time.

Receiving infor

mation of British activity along the coast, Allan ordered

56Ibid.. p. 49

3‘Ibid.

The government did not accept his

suggestion.

38RepOrt, Allan to Mass, govt., August 9, 1778,

Baxter MSS.. XVI, 60-1.
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all the Indians to Machias, where on the thirtieth of July
a general conference was held with Indians present from all

tribes in eastern Maine and Nova Scotia.

Allan demanded

that the tribes get ready to fight, and they promised to do

so.

A ’.’festival” concluded the conference.

By now many of the Malecites were coming into
Machias in response to Allan’s orders that they cease all

contact with the British in preparation for war.

With

other Indians in the area, they were thoroughly aroused by

the French alliance and called for action.

They had seized

a British vessel out of Nova Scotia and sought further
instructions.

They wanted to attack Fort Howe on the St.

John, but Allan did not have the men or the supplies to

mount such a campaign, much to his regret.
The St. John tribe was not to be denied, however,
and Allan finally sent them to the area around the mouth of

the river to harass the British garrison and destroy their

provisions.

The Indians were not to harm settlers.

felt this a good move.

Allan

It was not expensive but gave the

Indians a sense of participation in the American cause.
The Indian force proceeded to the St. John River

and ordered the garrison to leave or be killed.

^Ibid.. pp. 63-5
*

They were

4Qibjd.. pp. 65-7
*

41 Report, Allan to Mass, govt., August 17, 1778,

Baxter MSS.. XVI, 71-2.
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Americans, the Indians said, and the King of England never
had any rights in their lands.

They now knew that the

American cause was just because the King of France sup- •

ported it.in spite of these brave words, the Indian

force did not seriously harm the British.
While Allan was sending the Indians off to harass
Fort Howe, Nova Scotia was consolidating her position

and preparing an offensive of her own.

The first item on

her agenda was to secure financing for the priest among
the Indians.

The colony had previously been allowed money

for such a purpose from Britain, but this money had ceased
in 1773
*

When the province took Father Bourg into its

service, it found it necessary to

ury.

pay him from the treas

The government now asked the British government to

re-instate the priest’s allowance and assume the burden.

45

Now that Francklin had the assistance of a priest,
he decided that the time had come for a major effort among

the Indians.

He accordingly sent a message to Pierre Toma

and other Indians asking them to come to Fort Howe for a

conference.

In

spite of efforts by Allan to keep them

^^Letter, Indian forces to British officers at
. Fort Howe, drawn up at Machias on August 12, approved by
Indians at Aukpaque on August 18, 1778, Baxter MSS..XVI,
74-5.
^Letter, Hughes to Germain, August 29, 1778,

Nova Scotia A, XCVIII. 151-2; resolve of Nova Scotia
Countil, August 21, 1778, Nova Scotia B, XVII, 143.
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away, a large number gathered for the meeting with the Nova
Scotia representatives.

44.

'

Francklin, Major Studholme, Father Bourg and several
other Nova Scotian officials met the Indians at Menaguashe

near Fort Howe on September 13, 1778 for a week of confer

ences.

The Indians in attendance represented both the

Malecite and Micmac tribes.

The final treaty bound the

British to construct a truck house at the falls of the St.
John, in return for which the Indians took an oath of alle
giance to the King, turning over to Francklin the presents

they had received from General Washington and a copy of the

treaty with Massachusetts signed at Watertown in 1776.

45

The Nova Scotian authorities were very pleased and
relieved when this treaty was concluded.

Lieutenant Gover

nor Hughes wrote Lord Germain that:
we were really fortunate in this business, for these
savages had actually sent in a formal Declaration of
War to Major Studholme, and returned the British
flag to him at Ft. Howe.4

Allan, of course, was very worried by the conference

on the St. John.

He warned Boston that two hundred Micmacs

Maine Rubicon, p. 116.
45ibid.; letter, Hughes to Germain, October 12,
1778, Nova Scotia A. XCVIII, 180-3.

^Letter, October 12, 1778, Nova Scotia A, XCVIII,
180-3.
The declaration of war was the letier the Indians
had drawn up in Machias on August 12, 1778, and the Indians
who sent it in were those that Allan sent from Machias to
harass Fort Howe.
• \
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had gathered there with Francklin and the French priest.

Allan did not know what was happening but knew it would

probably bring trouble for him.

47

Colonel Francklin, something of a hero now, made

his report to the Council on November 6, 1778.

He reported

that he had renewed the treaties of peace and friendship
with the Indian tribes at a meeting on the St. John River

and added at this time that the Male cite tribe was particularly strong in its devotion to these new treaties.

48

Francklin’s popularity in the Council dipped, how
ever, when he laid a bill for the conference before it.

He had previously been granted 33100 in advance to finance

the meetings, but now he came forward with a bill for over
£500 for additional expenses and "keeping a table" during
the festivities surrounding the conference.

The Council

paid the bill, but ordered the colony to apply to the
Secretary of State, Lord Germain, for repayment of the sum
49
from the British treasury. -^

At this same meeting, the Council also confirmed
Indian possession of a grant of land promised them in 1768.

^Report, Allan to Mass, govt., September 21, 1778,
Baxter MSS., XVI, 87.
^^Minutes of the Nova Scotia Council, Nova Scotia B,
XVII, 150-1.
^Minutes of the Nova Scotia Council, August 21 and

November 6, 1778, Nova Scotia B, XVII, 143> 15001.
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As a further conciliatory measure, they appropriated £30 to

build

on the land a log house "for them to resort to
"
*

50

By late summer, Nova Scotia was thus in a favorable
position vis, a vis Massachusetts in matters concerning the

*
Indians

Allan, who had been somewhat short of supplies

all summer, now had to face the winter with little prospect
for improvement.

The situation was not new for him, how

ever, and he dealt with it as well as he could
*

At the beginning of October, Allan's command con
tained eighty Indians and ninety-five soldiers at Machias

and twenty-one Indians on the St
*

*
John

His supply needs

were still very great, and he was fearful of British acti

vity against him on the heels of the great. British confer
ence on the St. John
*

Some of the troops in Machias were

soon to be disbanded, weakening that outpost even more.

51

Allan's major concern was the influence of Francklin

and Bourg among the Indians.

threat.

Father Bourg was a special

Allan expected him to lure the Indians from the

Americans with conferences and religious services and

^Minutes of the Nova Scotia Council, Nova Scotia B.

XVII, 151.
Allan still needed large shipments of supplies
for his reduced forces. For October and November of 1778,
the General Court ordered the following for him: 21,5O5i
pounds of pork, 6,932 pounds of beef, 27
033
*
pounds of
flour, 3
931^
*
pounds of bread,3»722i pounds of rice, 308 .
fallons of molasses,.448 pounds of butter or hogsfat and
6 bushels of peas.
See resolve of Mass, govt., October 2,
1778, reports, James Avery to Mass, govt., Baxter MSS*.
XVI, 52, 97-8, 92.
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introduce them to Francklin
s
*

influence at Fort Howe.

52

To counter Bourg’s activity, Allan sent Lieutenant

Gilman from the Penobscot down-the St. John River to neu
tralize the propaganda moves by the British and their

priest.

This was successful, and they gathered intelli

gence as well. 53

The Americans were crippled, of course,
I

in the new situation, because one expedition of short

duration could not compete with the permanent residence of

a priest whose services were eagerly sought by the Indians.
To keep his rear as secure as possible, Allan also
paid a fall visit to the Penobscot Indians.

If he was

seeking good news among them, he certainly did not get it.
Orono, the Penobscot chief, presented him with a long list
of complaints and made the tribe
s
*

clear.

dissatisfaction very

The promised truck house had not been built,

complained Orono, and no supplies had been sent.

The

whites on the river supplied the Indians with liquor and
took advantage of them, treating them more like enemies
than allies.

The whites continued to settle on Indian

lands, and the Indians wanted assurances that their title
to it would be honored.

Allan reported that the basic5

52Report, Allan to Mass, govt., October 8, 1778,

Baxter MSS., XVI, 111.

'

.

.

.

.

53j{eport, Allan to Mass, govt., Baxter MSS., XVI
126-8.
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Indian demands were just and sought supplies for the
Penobscots.

54

The problems of the Penobscot trip became somewhat

easier to bear, however, when a delegation from the Resti-

gouche Micmacs sought Allan to pledge their support for the

American cause.
French alliance.

Their new devotion was a result of the

Allan sent them along ^o Boston with the

recommendation that no treaty be made with them because the

last treaty with the Micmacs, early in the war, caused much
rr

resentment in the tribe. 5
The Americans were very weak in regard to the Mic

macs.

Allan remarked in his report that these Indians from

Restigouche should be loyal to the British because of their
proximity to Nova Scotian settlements.
pleased that they came.

He was thus very

He also noted that other Micmacs

had started for Machias but had been turned back by Father
Bourg.
The Indians continued to establish contacts with

same report gave an example of Allan’s
fundamental attitude toward the Indians. He did not sym
pathize with their basic aims. When the Indians on the
Penobscot requested guarantees that their lands would be
protected, Allan told the government that “a great pity
would it be not to have such a fine country settled with
Civilized Inhabitants.” He advocated confirming only
Indian hunting rights.
See Baxter'MSS., XVI, 99-105.

5^Report, Allan to Mass, govt., October 8, 1778,
Baxter MSS.. XVI, 110-1.
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the French during late 1778, much to the benefit of the

Americans.

On November 9, 1778, the Independent Ledger

of Boston reported that Indian chiefs and delegates from

the Penobscot River and Nova Scotia had visited Count

D’Estaing and declared their attachment to France.
D’Estaing told them of the French alliance with the Ameri-

cans, gave them gifts and sent them happily away.

57

The visit of the Indians to Boston was the last

major event of 1778 in the struggle between Massachusetts

and Nova Scotia.

Winter usually brought a lull, and the

winter of 1778-1779 was no exception.

Difficulty of com

munication and movement effectively ended most activities
except those concerned with survival.

That year marked

the end of American offensive activities in Maine.

In 1779»

the British would seize the initiative at Majabagaduce,
4

and, for the rest of the war, Allan and Massachusetts would
be reduced to hanging on desperately to Maine and reinforc
ing the wavering allegiance of the people in the threatened

areas.

In spite of American supply shortages and the minis

trations of Nova Scotia
*
8 French priest, Allan maintained

the friendship of the Indians.

If his control had loosened

somewhat, he could at least be sure that the basic sympa
thies of the tribes were with him, and the danger of an
/

Indian attack on the Americans in Maine was slight.

Neither

(^Independent Ledger /Boston7« November 9» 1778,
p. 3.

<
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side, however, was deriving much benefit from the Indians,
on whom they were spending considerable sums of money.
This state of affairs would persist through 1779.
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Chapter 5
A STRIKE BY THE BRITISH: 1779

The year 1779 was a disastrous one for the American
cause downeast.

The British seized Majabaduce and inflicted

a major defeat upon the forces sent to expel them
*

The

British action reduced the Americans to a desperate struggle
to retain their outposts in Maine, where, even as 1779

opened, conditions were severe
*
The new British thrust made the Americans all the
more anxious to retain the friendship and support of the

tribes.

Machias now had enemy forces to her rear and lived

under the constant threat of attack.

Indian troops and

militia constituted the bulk of her defense; defection of
the Indians would nearly destroy her ability to defend her
self.

Furthermore, in the unlikely event that .an American

offensive was attempted, Indians would be needed for any

chance of success.

Allan thus continued to wage a desper

ate campaign for Indian friendship in the full knowledge

that an Indian attack would probably sweep all eastern
Maine into British hands.

Nova Scotia no longer felt endangered by the Indians.

Its garrisons had been reinforced and held the colony se
curely.

The government remained anxious to avoid hostili

ties with the tribes but no longer saw a threat to the
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colony’s existence in an Indian war.

Lord Germain in

London had suggested recruiting Indians to fight the Ameri
cans, and, while the colonial, authorities resisted this,

they felt quite secure behind the shield provided by the

British Empire.
In Machias, the winter had been quiet, as it was
in Nova Scotia.

The lumber industry, the major means of

support around the town, was dead, due to the war and the

British fleet, and on January 22, 1779 the people petitioned
the government for relief.

The problems persisted into

spring; in late April, 1779, Allan was seeking assistance
from Boston because he simply could not get the goods he

needed and which had been promised.
Conditions on the Penobscot were little better.

British cruisers had cut communications, and.the Indians

were in poof shape.

Jonathan Lowder feared that they would

join the British unless more supplies arrived.

No matter

what the Indians did, Lowder was now pessimistically pre-

dieting the fall

of eastern Maine.

2

Allan made a trip to Boston in late April to seek,
with some success, more men and supplies for his command.

1 Petition, people of Machias to Mass, govt., and
letter, Allan to Mass, govt., April 29, 1778, Baxter MSS..
XVI, 161-5, 240-1.
^Letter, Lowder to Mass, govt., March 28, 1779,
Baxter MSS.. XVI, 202-3..

’
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He received authorization to raise one hundred rangers and
three hundred other troops for Machias.

He was also suc

cessful in gaining supplies, some of which were to be bor
rowed from Continental stores.

These were not clear victo

ries, for promised goods were frequently never delivered.

Allan was also forced to seek aid in recruiting the addi
tional troops.

He could not raise them soon enough to meet

the urgency of the situation.
Allan returned to Machias on May 18 and reported

that the men he had. left in charge had held the Indians to

gether in spite of the British.

Other conditions in east

ern Maine were bad, however, and Allan reported that Ameri

can supporters were suffering under depredations of British
4.
vessels and American privateers.
The Indians remained basically pro-American but
were constantly visiting the British posts and received

many supplies from them.

English goods were plentiful in

the province and were easily obtainable by the. Indians.

Francklin and Father Bourg were at work along the eastern
coast, and by now, their efforts seemed to have freed

^Orders of Mass, govt., April 23 and 24, 1779, and
memorial, Allan to Mass, govt., April 25, 1779, Baxter MSB..
XVI, 234-6.
z
..........
^Letter, Allan to Major General Heath, May 18, 1779,

in Kidder, Military Operations, p. 259; report, Allan to
Mass, government, May 18, 1779, Baxter MSS.. XVI, 255-7.

130

Nova Scotians from fear of the Indians.

5

I

s
*
Francklin

work among the Indians had attracted

attention in high places.

Lord Germain wrote to him on

May 3, 1779, informing him that the King was pleased with

the treaty made on the St. John the previous September.
Germain included a slight rebuke with his praise, however;
he cautioned Francklin about writing to him on matters that
did not concern the Indians.

Similar praise (without the

criticism) appeared in a letter written to Lieutenant Gov-

ernor Hughes on the same day.

Germain’s letter to Francklin also, revealed British
policy in regard to Maine and Nova Scotia.for the following

year.

Germain wrote that there was a. good chance. that the

coast of Maine would be invaded, and he was . sure that
*
Francklin
s influence over the Indians would enable him

secure their aid in this assault.

to

As an added inducement,

Germain was asking the Treasury for 33500 for gifts to the
tribes.?

Germain’s prediction of an assault on the Maine

L?letter, John Starr to Allan, May 18, 1779, in
Kidder. Military Operations, p.-, 262.
^Nova Scotia A, XCIX, 74-6. 66-7 •

In the letter

to Hughes, Germain’s lack of exhaustive knowledge of America
was revealed. He refers to the Indians of Nova Scotia as
the ’’Merrimacks," substituting the name of a river in north
ern Massachusetts for the tribal name ’’Micmacs. '*
^Nova Scotia A, XCIX, 75•
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coast could not have been more accurate.

On June 17, 1779,

about seven hundred troops under the command of Brigadier
General Francis Mclean landed at Majabagaduce, present day

Castine, on Penobscot Bay and proceeded to construct forti
fications.

The British thrust was

part of a plan to secure

the Penobscot country for Britain when peace was made. The
British planned to erect a new province here by the name of
New Ireland, and use it as a place of refuge for displaced

loyalists.®
■The establishment of a British post between Machias

and Boston was a devastating blow to Allan and his work.
Already harrassed unmercifully by British cruisers, his
fragile line of supply and communication to Boston was now

even more exposed.

Furthermore, he had no way of knowing

what the. latest British move.might portend for Machias.

... Allan^s first action upon receiving word of the

Brisith landing was to send word to Boston, which he did on

June 25, 1779.

Allan had had intelligence that the British

had sailed in secret from Halifax, but this news came too
late to be of assistance in repelling the invaders.

9

Once he had warned Boston, Allan set out to calm

the downeast settlers and infuse them with a will to resist.

C^Ahlin, Downeast Rubicon, pp. 123-5. For a full
account of the battle for Majabagaduce, see the above,
Chapter XI, pp. 121-36.

^Report, Allan to Mass, govt., June 23, 1779,

Baxter MSS.. XVT, 298.
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One can imagine that this latest British incursion had
greatly alarmed them.

Allan therefore issued a proclam

ation on June 23, promising to do all possible to defend

the area and claiming that there was little danger of an
Indian attack.

Most of the Indians in the area were sup

posed to be sufficiently pro-American to keep them out of

British control.

As further encouragement, Allan added

the dubious information that the St. Francis Indians had
recently.declared against the British.

10

Allan’s report to Boston, sent the same day as his

proclamation was.issued, indicated that the situation was
not so rosy as the general population was told.

He inform

ed the government that the Indians were very uneasy.

The

British on the St. John were supplying them more lavishly
than Allan could ever hope to match.

He had not heard from

the Penobscots since the invasion and did not know what was

going on. among them.

He would have to have more troops and

supplies if he was to hold the Indians to the American
cause.

11

In spite of the initial alarm and continuing uneasi
ness, the British presence on the Penobscot proved to have
little immediate effect upon the American post at Machias.
The people were in bad shape with few provisions but were

(^Continental Journal / Boston7, July 15, 1779,

no page.
Q/June 23, 1779, Baxter MSS. ■ XVI, 300-1.

133

resolved to resist any British assault upon them.

They

were building blockhouses for defense, and Allan was

seeking to bring in as many loyal Indians as possible.
Morale was hard to maintain, however, as supplies were used

and not replaced.

Allan reported on July 16, 1779, that

for the past three weeks, bread rations had been down to ‘

two pounds each.

12

'

The British, however, were not the only significant
new presence in eastern Maine during the summer of 1779
*

Allan had finally secured a priest for the Indians.

At

first he was very pleased with the conduct of Father de la
Motte, who was obtained from the French fleet in American

waters.

He was sent to gather friendly Indians to help

defend Machias and later went among the Penobsfcots who were

upset by the British on the lower river.

In July, Allan

reported that the priest’s "Beheavor & Conduct has given me

much satisfaction.

He is Indefatiguable in the business."

13

Allan’s opinions of the priest changed, however.

By October 27, 1779, Allan wrote that de la Motte had
become a problem.

He was a great expense, and his bad

disposition made him dangerous to the American cause among

the Indians, and "as to Ecclesiastical matters he will be

12

Reports, Allan to Mass, gavt., June 23 and July 16,
1779, Baxter MSS.. 299-300, 363.
13
C<Ahlin, Downeast Rubicon, p.118; reports, Allan
to Mass/govt., June 23 and July 16, 1779, Baxter MSS.. XVI,
300, 362, 365; Lucey, Catholic Church in Maine, pp. 22-3
*
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of no use without a Reformation.”^

De la Mottee’s arrival at Machias and his early
work there encompassed a very confusing period for Allan
and his command.

Allan was anxious to do everything pos

sible to expel the British from the position to his rear
on Penobscot Bay, but his role was limited.

Massachusetts

assembled a fleet to retake the British-held position, but
there seemed to have been few efforts to draw Allan tightly

into the plans.

There was no thought that Allan
s
*

forces

might make a significant attack on the British.
The American colonial authorities were interested

in securing Indian help for the expedition, however.

On

July 2, the Council voted long-sought supplies for the
Penobscot tribe provided they help in the coming struggle
against the British.

On July 12, 1779» Brigadier General

Lovell, who was to command the Penobscot expedition, was'

given similar

orders in regard to these Indian supplies.

15

At Machias, Allan was also making arrangements to

employ the Indians in the operation.

Captain John Preble

(^letter, Allan to unknown person, probably in the

Mass, govt., October 27, 1779, Baxter MSS.» XVII (1913),
409-10.
It was not possible to discover the exact nature
of Allan’s theological problems with de la Motte. Ahlin
(Maine Rubicon) was of no help; he took no notice of this .
problem at ail, simply stating on page 118 that the priest
served until August 5, 1781. This was incorrect, however;
Ahlin confused de la Motte with a later priest who served
the Indians. Father Frederick De Bourger served with
Allan from August, 1780 until August 1781.

^Orders of Mass. Council, July 2, and 12, 1779,
Baxter MSS.. XVI, 322, 385.
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was sent to the Penobscot River to command the Indians if

the American commander on the river approved,. which he did.
Preble and twenty Indians were waiting when the American

fleet arrived in Penobscot Bay.

He wrote the President of

the Council that sixty more Indians from Passamaquoddy were

awaiting orders to join his present force.

the Indians would fight.

Preble was sure

General Lovell, seeking more

Indian support, issued a proclamation noting the friendship

and cooperation of the Indians and hoping that more of them
would come forward to serve.
The auspicious beginnings came to naught, however,
as the Penobscot expedition met a disastrous end.

Unable

to seize the British post, the fleet was driven up the

Penobscot by the surprise arrival of a British fleet and
most of the ships were captured or sunk.

home overland.

The troops marched

17

Preble, Allan’s man on the scene, expressed his
dissatisfaction with the leadership of the attack in a

LL%eport, Allan to Mass, govt., July 16, 1779,
letter, Preble to President Powell of the Mass. Council,
July 24, 1779, orders from headquarters of the Penobscot
expedition, July 26 and 27, proclamation by General Solomon
Lovell, July 26, 1779, Baxter MSS.. XVI, 565, 595-6, 598,
599, 406.
l^There are few records fully describing the role
of Preble and his Indians in the battles, or even to
reveal the tribes to which the participating Indians be
longed. The only scrap of such evidence is noted in the
next paragraph. A conference cited below indicated that
at least some of the Penobscots present were killed or
wounded. For a more complete account of the American
-defeat, see Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, pp. 126-56.
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letter to the Council on August 20, 1779#

In it he ex

pressed the wish that Allan might have been present;

had

he been, Preble felt a better result might have been

achieved.

Preble briefly described his own role as serving

alternately with the Massachusetts troops and the Indians.

He closed the letter with assurances of continuing Indian

friendship, although he had feared that defeat would drive
the tribes into Britain1 s arms.

18

An impromptu piece of Indian diplomacy took place
almost immediately after the American defeat when the com

mander of the troops tried to cushion the impact of his
defeat upon the Penobscots.

The tribe had evidently fled

up the river from their settlement, because General Lovell
apologized for the necessity of flight and promised to

restore their previous condition as soon as possible.

The

chiefs were sympathetic; they knew he had lost everything

and. pledged him their assistance.

They promised not to

join the British, who had hurt their young men.

The chiefs

re-affirmed their adherence to George Washington and the

King of France.
During the meetings with Lovell, the chiefs asked

that no more of their supplies be sent to Machias.

Lovell

was forced to promise a truck house on the Kennebec River
■

H II

»■—...................

.....

1 Baxter MSS,. XVII. 35-6,
4q

Minutes of conference, General Lovell and Penob
scot chiefs, August 8, 1779, Baxter MSS.. XVII, 12-5
*
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when the Indians swore they could not live without it
*
Following this promise, eight Indians escorted the General

overland to the Kennebec and Fort Western for two dollars

a day, hard money.

This route, and that of most of the

other survivors of the defeat, was by way of the Sebasticook River.

20

Colonel Allan was rather isolated from the action

during the battle on the Penobscot.

He had called the

Indians together for the voyage to Castine but found that

they were quarreling among themselves over religion and the
news from the St. John.

Allan was able to gather forty

seven Indians and twenty whites in spite of the disputes
but delayed sailing due to poor weather and reports of an

impending British attack on Machias.

He finally set out on

August 15, 1779, turning back when he learned of the British victory and the scattering of the American forces.

21

Preparations for the attack on Castine were not the
only activities in Nova Scotia during the summer of 1779.

Francklin and Father Bourg were active, and the government

was attempting in every way to cement, the Indians.’ alle
giance.

Land grants to the Indians were made and goods

2©

Ibid; letters, General Lovell to Mass, govt.,
August 28, 1779, F. H. Tarkson to Powell, August 28, 1779,
Baxter MSS., XVII, 62, 57. To Lovell’s credit, he was per
sistent in seeking fulfillment of his promises to the
Penobscots, following up his initial report with a letter
seeking action on the matter. See Baxter MSS.. XVII, 66.
^ieport, Allan to Mass, govt., Baxter MSS.. XVII,
104-8.
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were distributed.

22

Lord Germain had hoped that Francklin could provide
Indians to assist in the Penobscot operation,
lin had refused.

but Franck

The Nova Scotian Indian superintendent

was simply too unsure of his charges to

put them ini;o the

He was not certain that his Indians would fight the

field.

people of New England, for whom they evidently felt some
affection or fear.

He had gotten some cooperation from the

tribes in resisting privateers but could guarantee nothing .
more.

If the Indians could be enlisted, the cost would be

very great; families of the men who went to war. had to be
supported.

Finally, Francklin very much feared the French

influence among them.

If.Nova Scotia, armed the tribes and

organized them into a fighting force, the appearance of a
French vessel or other force might cause them to defect and

do great damage to the thinly populated colony.

In early August of 1779» Francklin also had a new
Although constantly short of money for his activ

problem.

ities, he had been able to supply the Indians rather lav
ishly through his access to the King’s Stores in Halifax.
A new commanding officer of the army had now cut this off.

22

Minutes of the Nova Scotia Council, Nova Scotia B,

XVII, 174.

^Letter, Francklin to Germain, August 3» 1779,
Nova Scotia A, XCIX, 101-3• Lieutenant Governor Hughes
agreed with francklin about the potential dangers of
enlisting Indians.
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Francklin would soon be short of both money and supplies;
he begged Germain to arrange support for him from military

funds and to reopen the stores for the Indians.

If this

were not done, Francklin could not guarantee to hold the

Indians.
Francklin1s reputation in London may have worked

against him as he sought to regain access to the military
Corruption had long reigned in the Nova Scotian

supplies.

government, and Francklin had been at the center of the
group that perpetrated it.

The Board of Trade was ’’uneasy”

about him and had received complaints about his arbitrary

They also suspected him of using his positions for

manner.

his own profit and to aid his friends.The suspicions of
the Board of Trade probably contributed to the appointment
of another to govern Nova Scotia after Legge *
s

dismissal.

Lord Germain was happy to have Francklin18 talents among

the Indians when the Nova Scotian situation was desperate,

but as that colony became more secure,

-the old suspicions

re-emerged, and the Secretary of State took steps to remove

s
*
Francklin

hand from the till.

Francklin’s shortage of supplies was particularly

critical at that time because of the arrival and circu

lation among the tribes of the priest from the French fleet.

24Ibld.. pp. 103-4.

25

226, 259

Brebner, Neutral Yankees of Nova Scotia, pp. 224 >
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The superintendent told Germain of this and said that he
was sending Father Bourg and one of his agents to try to.

hold the Indians and keep them from being used against the
post on the Penobscot.

Francklin himself was not going

among the Indians because they would expect that which he
could not give them.

In spite of his problems, Francklin was increasing

ly confident.

As the news of the American defeat upon the

Penobscot spread, Britain’s stock among the Indians was

sure to rise.

The St. John Indians in contact with Franck

lin, had refused to join the Americans, and Bourg was well-

received among them.

Francklin now had hopes of winning

over the remainder of the tribe that. had.previously sided

with Colonel Allan and the Americans.

Difficulties remained,

however, as many of the most loyal Indians complained that
they were ignored more than they should be under the circum

stances.

General McLean on the Penobscot was also attempting
to win over the Indians of that river.

General Lovell

reported to Boston on September 4, 1779, that McLean had
sent a flag of truce to the Penobscots seeking friendship.

^Letter, Francklin to Germain, August 3, 1779,
Nova Scotia A, XCIX, 104-5.

27
.'Letter, Francklin to Germain, August 8, 1779,
Nova Scotia A, XCIX, 129-31.
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Lovell expected that he would.get a poor reception.

28

In September of 1779. the Nova Scotian authorities
had Indian troubles in a rather strange quarter.

Some

Indians of the Miramichi region (in present-day northeast

New Brunswick) suddenly rose in the rebel cause and plun

dered a number of loyal citizens.
from Allan’s sphere

This was an area far

of influence, but the Indians there

had been in contact with him, expressing sympathy for the
Revolution.

A British warship was in the area, and its

captain went ashore and quickly quelled the disturbance,

killing one Indian and capturing sixteen more, three of
whom were released almost at once.
away.

The rest were carried

Their families were supplied by the British, and

Francklin felt that the loyal Indians of the area would
not take offense.

Father Bourg was well-received in the

region, and there seemed a chance that the disaffected
could be won over in the aftermath of the Penobscot vic-

tory.28
29
The capture of the troublemakers did not end the

affair, however.

They were carried to Quebec in the Viper,

the vessel that had captured them.

The Nova Scotia Council

28

Letter, Lovell to Mass. Council, September 4,
1779. Nova Scotia A. XVII., 84.

29
^Letter, Francklin to Germain, Nova Scotia A, XCIX,
128-50. At Machias, Allan reported the incident to the
authorities in Boston with the hope that it would aid him
in his duties.
See Baxter MSS. VII, 109-10.
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asked General Haldimand, the

governor of Canada, to hold

them until he could decide what should be done
*

In the

meantime, a deputation of the tribe came to Francklin to'
seek more aid for the families of the prisoners, and

Francklin used the occasion to secure a new treaty with the
Indians of the Miramichi.^0
This treaty, if kept, would provide good relations

between the Miramichi Indians and the colonial government.
The Indians promised to behave themselves, to protect the

whites in the region and to seize and hand over any of their
number who molested the settlers.

They also promised to

shun contact with John Allan and all other enemies of Brit
*
ain and to use their influence with other Indians to encour

age them to do the same.

All former treaties were ratified

again, and the government promised to keep its troops and

subjects from interfering in Indian hunting or fishing.
The treaty marked

31

the formal end of the incident

and seemed to be regarded in Halifax as the solution to the
problem.

The Council refused to send troops to protect

further the settlements in the area.

They felt no addition

al force was needed, as the Indians had been ’’brought to

v?yi!Iinutes of the Council, September 11, 1779» Nova
Scotia B, XVII, 195-6; letter, Francklin to Germain,
September 26, 1779» Nova Scotia A, XCIX, 139-40.
Treaty signed by Francklin and the Indian dele
gates from Miramichi, September 22, 1779> enclosed in
letter, Francklin to Germain, September 26, 1779» Nova
Scotia B. XVII, 142-7.
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Peace and good temper,” by Captain Hervey and the Viper.

General Haldimand sent the captive Indians to Halifax in
mid-October, and the Council ordered all but.two released
on October 14.

The two held were the foremost trouble

makers and were to be hostages for the good behavior of the
The rest departed for home in good

rest of;the tribe.

spirits and the incident was over.^

By fall, Francklin
s
*

problems at Miramichi and else

where were minor compared to John Allan’s at Machias.

He

was still coping with the aftermath of the defeat at Penob

scot, which had an unfortunate effect on Indian-American

relations.

The Indians around Machias were sure that the

defense of the region depended upon them and were, making
all manner of threats and demands. Some of them, certain,

that Machias would soon fall,

fled north to. the lakes ?

between the St. John River and Machias, from which Allan

supposed they would join those of their tribe who supported
Nova Scotia.

In spite of all this, Allan did not expect

them to become hostile to the Americans.

They were deeply

divided by religious and other matters, and he was using

every trick he knew to keep them friendly.

^^Minutes

34

of Council, September 28, 1779, Nova

Scotia B, XVII, 199.

^Minutes of the Council, October 14, 1779, Nova
Scotia B. XVII, 201.

^4Report, Allan to Mass, govt., September 10, 1779,
Baxter MSS.. XVII, 109.
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The Penobscot tribe, now in desperate straits, sent

a delegation to Boston to try to get results that they had

failed to get from Allan.. They told the committee that met
with them that they were destitute, having received no sup
plies for two years.

They were devoted to the American

cause and their former French sovereign but had to have .
supplies.

The committee assured the Indians of the contin

uing friendship of France and promised to try to get food

for them.
The Penobscot visit to Boston set off an investiga

tion of the supply effort on the river.

The Board of 'War

was ordered to furnish an account of the supplies they had

delivered for the Eastern Indians.

Allan informed the

government that he had given the Penobscot tribe close to

$2,000, but they had spent most of it for rum, in spite of
efforts to curb the liquor traffic.

36

The committee on the Penobscots
*

demands found no

evidence of wrong-doing and moved to seek solutions rather
than scapegoats.

Their major recommendation was that a

truck house be set up for the Penobscots.

On September 24,

the House and Council adopted their recommendation and
ordered a truck house to be established at Fort Halifax on

'^Conference, Penobscots and Committee of the Mass,

govt., Boston, September 10, 1779, Baxter MSS.. XVII,
119-20.
_
^Hesolve of Mass, govt., September 15, 1779, and
report, Allan to Mass, govt., September 24, 1779, Baxter
MSS.. XVII, 135, 182.
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the Kennebec at the mouth of the Sepasticook River.

Colonel

Josiah Brewer was to be the truck master with £60-a year
He was to have all necessary supplies but could

salary.

give them to none but Indians.

Furs were to be taken in

trade when possible, all profits going to the state.

37

Allan, freed by the Kennebec truck house from the

care of the Penobscots, had plenty of problems to keep him

He was quite successful even now in keeping

occupied.

Indians around Machias, but he lacked the goods to supply

them once they came.

On October 20, 1779# he reported that

the expense in keeping the Indians away from the British on
the St. John was immense and that the priest was less help

than he had supposed.

Furthermore, as a result of his

influence, many Indians were coming in to the camp at

Passamaquoddy and there would be heavy new demands on
already scarce supplies.

A week later he reported that

these new arrivals were eager to fight, but that he dared
not attempt it.

With forty regulars, however, he would

attack Fort Howe on the St. John.^

The supply problem under this new influx of men was
serious enough to cause Allan to threaten to resign if he

did not get some assistance from Boston.

’’The Court may

)
—

.

-

I.

-

-

- —■ -

^Report, Committee on

Penobscot Indians to Mass,

govt., September 17, 1779, and resolve of Mass, govt.,
September 27, 1779, Baxter MSS.. XVII, 121, 247-8.
^Report, Allan to Mass. govt., October 20, 1779,
and letter, Allan to unknown person, October 27, 1779,
Baxter MSS.. XVII, 399, 412.
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suppose many things Comes here,” he wrote, “but there is

seldom more than two thirds & often not more than one half

what they Vote, & that of the most Inferior sort.”

39

By November, Allan felt that he could no longer
handle both command of the garrison at Machias and the work

with the Indians.

He hinted in his letters to Boston that

he would like his military command terminated, and the
Machias Committee of Safety supported him.

Allan felt

weighted down by the cares of the garrison, especially the
’•perpetual Broils” between townspeople and soldiers.

The

government, however, refused to go along and kept him in

command of both departments.

40

Allan’s work among the Indians, no matter how

hemmed in by other considerations, was still tremendously

successful.

In early November, he went east to meet the

Malecites and found them basically favorable to the Ameri

cans, in spite of strong efforts by the British.

Allan now

decided that he must take the Indians back to Machias to

free them from British influence, and, as a measure of his
own influence, was able to

make the move.

persuade 280 of the tribe to

These forty-six wigwams would be added to

I
•^Letter, Allan to unknown person, October 27, 1779,

Baxter MSS.. XVII, 411.
^Report, Allan to Mass, govt., November 15, 1779,

resolve, Machias Committee of Safety, November 6, 1779, and
resolve of Mass, govt., December 18, 1779, Baxter MSS..
XVII, 441-2, 420, 421.

(
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thirty-six already around Machias.^

For Allan, short of supplies as usual, to have
gathered so many Indians so far from their homes was a
considerable triumph and proof of his success with the

Francklin simply did not have the power to com

Indians.

mand Indians on this scale.

Such events point to a contin

ued American influence, at least among the Indians on the
St. John.

Coupled with the recent disturbances at Mira-

michi, in which a number of Indians had risen in the Ameri

can cause, this indicated strong American hold on many of
the Maine and Nova Scotia tribes as late as 1779.

Among the Indians Allan brought back to Machias
was Pierre Toma, the second chief of the Malecites, who

had taken the British side since 1775.

His defection was

a major blow to Nova Scotia’s efforts.

Both chiefs of the

St. John tribe now favored the Americans.

Chief Ambrose

had a been a follower of Allan since the beginning of
Allan’s service at Machias.

Shortly after arrival in Machias, Pierre Toma made
a speech in which he discussed his situation and why he had
come over to the Americans.

He had supported the British

out of fear, he said, but had never been hostile to the

_____ —

/

(Report, Allan to Mass, govt., November 10, 1779,

Baxter MSS., XVII, 428-51.
If 46 wigwams contained 90 men
and 190 other Indians, 56 wigwams would have held approximately 180 Indians, including about 60 men. Allan thus
had between 450 and 500 Indians to support, although only
about 150 were men of fighting age.

■

/

-■

Y".

,
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colonies.

Now he came to fight for the Americans and the

French, "our old Allies."

Toma stressed, however, that the

tribe was now almost totally dependent upon Allan and the
Massachusetts government for supplies.

The Indian old

people and children must be supported or the Malecites
could not remain around Machias.
Allan was fortunate to have the added Indian forces
because he was dependent upon them for defense.

As he went

into winter, the Indians were quiet and peaceful but appre
hensive in regard to spring, when they expected an on-

slaught of Canadians.

43

During the winter, Nova Scotia’s efforts to win the

Indians slackened.

Except for the usual wrangling over

money and supplies, all was quiet.

In December, Francklin

received the rather disturbing news that supplies for his
department had been sent to New York to be forwarded to

Halifax, an occurrence that would give him much trouble.
He also was refused extra funds by Germain, who informed

him

that when he was given a salary of £300 per year, it

was intended that there should be no further expense.

If

the army wanted Indians on its side it would have to pay

^Baxter MSS,, XVII, 32-4.
^Report, Allan to Mass, govt., November 29, 1779,

Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 16.
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for them itself.
The year 1779 thus ended quietly.

It had seen a

major British military victory on the Penobscot and a

sound American triumph in removing most of the St. John
Indians to Machias.

The American agent, John Allan, con

tinued to hold the ‘’hearts and minds” of most of the Indi

ans, although lack of supplies prevented him from cementing
his hold over them.

^Letters, Germain to Francklin, November 4 and
December 4, 1779, Germain to Hughes, December 4, 1779,
Nova Scotia A, XCIX, 177, 213-5• 209-12. According to
an estimate sent to Germain, between June 10, 1773, and
October 20, 1779/ Nova Scotia spent f1543-2s-10£d on the
Indians, for which they now hoped to be reimbursed. (See
Nova Scotia A, XCIX, 169.)
It was this expense that led
Germain to warn the colony not to expect any more money
from Parliament.
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Chapter 6

DECLINING COMPETITION: 1780-1785
$he final three years of the war were relatively

quiet among the Indians of Maine and Nova Scotia.

Lulled

by British confidence that the danger was past, the Nova
Scotian effort among the tribes dwindled, coming to an end
with the death of Francklin in December, 1782.

In Machias

during the same period, the problems that had plagued

Allan throughout the war almost overwhelmed him and severely
restricted his ability to act.

By 1780, both sides had lost much of their fear of

an Indian war.

The tribes now seemed unlikely to partici

pate in an offensive against either side.

The British,

with significant forces in the region, thus became less
concerned with the Indians and cut back their efforts to

keep them content.

Francklin, the Nova Scotian Indian super

intendent, was unhappy with the course of action ordered by
London.

The British government did not err in their judge

ment; Nova Scotia suffered no harm as a result.
The American position was very different from the

British.

American forces in eastern Maine were weak and

nearly surrounded by British outposts.

The British power

that allowed Halifax to curtail its Indian operation was a

real threat to the Americans, and one of the few forces
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they had for defense was the Indians.

Accordingly, Massa

chusetts maintained its Indian effort until very nearly the
end of the war.

Unfortunately, it was no longer within

their power to mount a successful campaign for Indian

friendship.

They could not supply the manufactured goods

and.provisions sought by the tribes, and their support
among the Indians waned.

It may have been only Nova Scotia’s

growing lack of interest in the tribes that kept Massachu
setts from suffering a serious setback in eastern Maine.

During these years of declining activity,, the
government of Nova Scotia and the British Crown spent con
siderable time

quarrelling over the advisability of contin

uing the Indian program, the level at which it should ’be
maintained and the financial responsibilities of its oper

ations.

Halifax wanted a substantial program at little

cost to itself, while London sought to reduce expenses and

halt a suspected boon to the sticky-fingered politicians of
Nova Scotia.

The question of Francklin
s
*

was at the center of the conflict.

access to army stores

These stores had previ

ously yielded up the provisions that Francklin thought nec

essary for the Indians, .but General McLean had closed them
to him.

In March of 1780, Hughes appealed to Lord Germain

for help in re-establishing Francklin
s
*

access to the sup

plies , assuring the Secretary of State that only the most
frugal use would be made of the government’s resources.
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Francklin wrote a similar letter to Germain on May 4, 1780,

and Hughes tried again on May 6, stressing the need for the
supplies and the good use previously made of them.-’

This correspondence came to nothing, however; on
May 18, 1780, Francklin sent Germain a letter in which he
stated that he had learned that there was to be no money or

supplies forthcoming.

Francklin noted that the Indians

were being strongly courted by the Americans, and if sup
plies were not available, such advantages as the mast

harvesting on the St. John and the overland communication
with Canada might be lost.

2

Germain proved adamant, and the supplies remained
under McLean’s control.

Much abuse had arisen in America,

Germain wrote, and must now be stopped.
judge what supplies were necessary.

McLean was to

Rations would be given»

to Indians who were under orders from McLean or the Com-

mander-in-Chief in America or who came into Halifax or the
various posts with legitimate business.

Visits to Halifax

were to be discouraged, and the number of conferences were

to be kept down, as they “Seldom answer any purpose save
that of expense.”

^Nova Scotia A, C, 24-6, 33-4, 34-5, 39-40.

2Nova Scotia A, C, 65—7.
^Letter, Germain to McLean, July 5» 1780, Nova
Scotia A, C, 108-11.
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Germain then told Francklin that there was to be no

more money for Indian expenses in Nova Scotia except his
salary.

He felt that large expenditures were no longer

needed.

The British held the Penobscot, and Machias was

nearly abandoned.The settlers of Nova Scotia thus had
complete security by land, and a small fleet hopefully soon

would protect them by sea.

Germain felt that if they

could not get along with the Indians under these conditions,

it was their own fault.

5

Francklin was dismayed by this letter and accepted

it with ill grace.

He wrote Germain that no further expense

would be incurred unless he had the money in advance.

He

hoped, however, that should an Indian disturbance occur, he
would be held responsible only so far as it had been in his
power to prevent it.

s
*
Francklin

little jab about lack of money brought

a rebuke from Germain, who wrote that, "I do not apprehend

you can have any reason to fear the King
s
*

Affairs will be

allowed to suffer from the want of Provision to enable you

•

^Although conditions were bad, to call Machias

nearly abandoned was an exaggeration.
^Letter, Germain to Francklin, July 7, 1780, Nova

Scotia A, C, 112-4.

^Letter, Francklin to Germain, November 21, 1780,
Nova Scotia A, C, 196-7. The same letter gave an example
of tow the new restrictions might be evaded. Hughes as
Navy Commissioner had paid one part of the Indians expenses,
and Hughes as Lieutenant Governor had paid another.
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to effect any really necessary and important service."

7

Germain further stated that the province should assume all
non-military Indian expenses but recommended that the Treas

ury in London pay those bills currently due because he did
g

not think the province was going to pay them.
When he became aware that there would be little

additional money, Francklin moved to cut expenses.

He had

planned to meet with the Indians on the St. John on May 25,

1780, but cancelled his personal participation to save
Major Studholme went in his
9
successful mission.

money.

place and conducted a

Although the conference was almost a month later
than planned, it was well-attended; more than 900 Indians

were present, including deputies from the Ottawas, Hurons,
Algohkians, Abnakis and other Canadian tribes...

The Canadian

Indians informed the Nova Scotian tribes that they had de
clared war on the Americans and would not tolerate any
further collaboration between Indians and the Americans.

Francklin felt that this warning severely reduced the number

^Letter, Germain to Francklin, Februsry 28, 1781,
Nova Scotia A, CI, 64-5*
8Ibid. As his letter of August 5, 1781, showed
(Nova Scotia A, CI, 154-5), Francklin continued to fear
Indian uprisings, but none occurred.

^Letters, Francklin to Germain, May 4 and May 18,
1780, and Francklin to the Indians, May 18, 1780, Nova
Scotia A, C, 56, 67, 282.
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of Indians frequenting Machias, although he was apprehen

sive about the arrival of a priest and several gentlemen
from the French fleet in Rhode Island.^

In these last lean years of Francklin1s efforts, he

was helped by a fortunate circumstance.

Earlier in the war,

as a reward for loyalty, the King had ordered E500 spent on

gifts for the Indians on the St.John.

The shipment had

been sent to New York to be forwarded to Halifax but was
lost in shipment.

It had arrived in Halifax in 1780, but

the letters with it were missing.

Discovered again by acci

dent late in the fall, it fell into the custody of the

troublesome General McLean.

His successor, General Camp-

bell, finally released it to Francklin in the late summer.

11

Some of the St. John chiefs had been wavering, com

plaining of British neglect, and Francklin wanted to deliv
er the gifts as soon as possible.

The Council awarded him

£100 to defray the costs of delivery and on October 2, 1781,
he met with the Indians about fifty-five miles up the river.

About 380 Indians attended and were very pleased with the

goods.

12

^Letter, Francklin to Germain, August 5, 1781/

Nova Scotia A, C, 194-6•
Letter, Francklin to Germain, August 5, 1781,
Nova Scotia A, CI, 135-4.
/
12

Letters, Francklin to Germain, August 5» 1781,
and November 22, 1781, Nova Scotia A, CI, 134, 265-6;
minutes of Nova Scotia Council, August 9, 1781, Nova Scotia
B, XCIII, 42-3.
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A number of other events occurred at this confer
ence.

Francklin intervened in a dispute over tribal elec

tions, fearing thst the struggle might split the tribe and
send the losers into the American camps.

Sir Andrew Hamond

told the Indians that they were to have a priest once again,
and, in gratitude, the Indians promised to plant corn to
reduce their dependence upon government supplies and to

influence other tribes to abandon the Americans.

Francklin

now felt that the Indians would take up arms for the Crown.

This conference, which received royal approval,
was the last major Nova Scotian action of the war.^

The

King’s interest did not spur any major new grants of money.
By this time, the war seemed to be nearly over, and Indian
affairs were less important.

The only significant action taken after the confer
ence was the appointment of a new priest to replace Bourg.
Oliver Henley, an Irish priest who had been working with

the Cape Breton Indians since 1778, came to the St. John
in the spring of 1782.

It was his imminent arrival that

Francklin announced to the Indians during the last confer
ence.

No money was allowed for his maintenance-, but the

Council ordered that he be paid from the money appropriated

(/^Letter, Francklin to Germain, November 11, 1781,
Nova Scotia A, CI, 265-9•

^Letter, Germain to Francklin, February 28, 1782,

Nflva Scotia A, CII, 16.

13
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for the defense of the sea coast.

15

In his last report, Francklin noted that the Indians
were quiet.

The tribe on the St. John was especially use

ful because they were protecting the harvesting of masts
on that river.

16

Michael Francklin died on December 5, 1782, in
Halifax and was buried with the participation of about two
hundred Indians.

17

A successor was appointed, but

Francklin’s death marked the dissolution of the wartime
Indian effort.

By then, peace was coming, and the prov

ince’s attention was fixed upon other matters.

While Nova Scotia’s Indian effort ended in lack of
funds and official complacency, Massachusetts’ operation
under Allan was foundering under serious problems.

At

Machias, Allan still faced acute, shortages of supplies and

men, was beset with British posts on almost every side and

was harassed by the British navy, whose assaults on his
long and exposed line of communication further complicated

1^Hutton, "Micmac Indians of Nova Scotia,” p. 192;
memorial, Lewis Delesdernier to John Hancock, Governor of
Massachusetts, no date, Baxter MSS.. XX, 26; Minutes of
Nova Scotia Council, March 23, 1782, Nova Scotia B. £VTII,
57.
There is no record of what happened to Father Bourg,
although it is likely that he returned to Canada.
16

Letter, Francklin to Earl of Shelburne, Secretary
of State for the American Department, June 16, 1782, Nova
Scotia A, CII, 52-3.

^Ahlin, Maine Rubicon, p. 110.
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his situation.
Allan’s problems of supply were severe throughout

the last years of the war.

In February of 1780, he report

ed that,he was, "Intirely Distitute of Every Assential to
Defend this Post,

or secure the Interest of the Indians.”

18

He had been supported so far by “kind Providence” but could

expect little more such luck.

The Indian effort depended

upon provisions, and he had none.

This lack was destroying

the influence with the Indians that he had been building

since childhood.
would resign.
effective.

If he could not. have what he needed, he

He refused, to continue unless he could be

19

Even when supplies were sent, however, they did not

ease the situation significantly.

When a shipment arrived

at Machias in June of 1780, it disappeared quickly.

Allan

reported that when each Indian received a small amount, the

whole shipment was gone, and none of the Indians was satis-

18Letter, Allan to General Court, February 25, 1780,
Baxter MSS., XVIII, 106-7.

^Ibid. Allan’s desperate reports on the state of
his supplies were too numerous to be detailed in the text
but can be found in Baxter MSS.« XVIII, 60-1, 115-9, 165-6,
293, XIX, 22, 122-4, 189-90, 285-6, 370-2, 388, 439-40,
XX, 26, 29, 53-4.
Of)

Report, Allan to Powell, President of Mass.
Council, May 25, 1780, Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 265-7. Reports
of supplies or money sent to Allan can be found in Baxter
MSS.. XVIII, 76, 167, 188-9, 190, 412, XIX, 67-8, 153-4,
253.
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The steady flow of provisions that would have been

necessary to maintain the

post at Machias in a proper

manner simply could not be sustained; the Massachusetts

government was plagued with shortages during the whole war.
After 1780, Allan received little or none of the goods the

General Court ordered for him.

The situation hit bottom

in the spring of 1781, when John Hancock, Governor of
Massachusetts, informed the General Court that supplies

recently assigned could not be delivered because the state

simply did not have them.

21
i

When goods were shipped, they often failed to
arrive in Machais.

In the spring of 1780, for example, a

Mr. Parker, on the way to Machias with ,a supply of meat,

was captured and taken into Majabagaduce.
Allan had no meat at all.

As a result,

22

The goods that were obtained and shipped

past the

British were often of such poor quality that the Indians

did not want them.

On at least one occasion the Indians

told Allan they could get better supplies from the British

on the St. John.

23

Report, Allan to Powell, July 12, 1780, order of
Mass Council, April 19, 1781, address, Hancock to General
Court, March 9, 1781, letter, Allan to Richard Devens,
Commissary-General of Mass. August 22, 1782. Baxter MSS,.
XVIII, 547, XIX, 208-9, 181-2, XX, 74-5.
^Report, Allan to Mass. Council, May 28, 1780,
Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 283.
23Ibid.
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In desperation, Allan tried a number of stop-gap

measures.

In the spring of 1780, he petitioned the towns

•west of Camden for provisions.

He hoped that if any ves

sels arrived with such goods, these towns would send them

on to Machias.24

That summer, he put all idle men to fish

ing in an effort to gain more food for the garrison and
Indians.

Allan also borrowed food from, persons in the area,
but even this worked poorly.

Machias was in desperate . .

shape, and eventually Allan found himself using up most of

his shipments from Boston to repay loans.
deeply into debt personally.

He also went

The government paid some of

these debts, but by 1782, there was too little money in the
treasury to pay the rest, and people who lent provisions
were forced to petition Boston for repayment.

26

The supply problem seriously weakened the American

forces east of the Penobscot.

All Allan’s activities were

hampered by it, and his effectiveness was reduced.

After

1780, the situation was critical, for as he reported, any

^Letter, Allan to the several towns west of Camden,
Msrch 5, 1780, Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 123. Allan probably
derived no benefit from this action, because all Maine was
distressed by this time, and some of these towns had already
petitioned the government for help.
^Report, Allan to Mass. Board of War, June 11, 1780,
Baxter MSS., XVIII, 307.

Petition, George Stillman to Governor Hancock,
April 6, 1781, memorial, Allan to Mass, govt., June 20, 1781,
petition, James Avery to Mass, govt., January 18, 1782, re
port, Allan to Hancock, July 1, 1782, Baxter MSS.. XIX,
189-90, 370-2, XX, 55-4.
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British attack upon the area must certainly succeed;
poverty had reduced the country to the point where they

could not defend themselves.

27

The sorry condition of. the country made it impos
sible for Allan to raise troops to strengthen Machias.

In

1780, he had hopes of gaining one hundred more men, and
using them to halt the British lumber trade on the St. John
and to keep the Indians out of the enemy camp.

By fall,

however, he was occupied solely with keeping a garrison

for Machias, as expiring enlistments would soon leave him

with only fifteen men.

28

The government authorized the raising of additional

men on several occasions, but few could be raised under the
conditions prevailing in the area.

By 1781, Allan was

relying more and more on the militia as his regular garri-

29
son shrunk. J

Without supplies or men, Allans reported in early

1780 that he was surrounded with enemies, both British and

Tories.

The Indians were mostly at Passamaquoddy, nearer

27
'Report, Allan to Mass. Board of War, June 11,
1780. Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 307.

28Reports, Allan to Mass, govt., May 15, 1780 and
November 2, 1780, Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 268, XX, 2-9.

2^Mass. Council

Order, January 26, 1780, resolves

of Mass, govt., March 21 and November 28, 1780, report,
Allan to Hancock, May 9, 1781, Baxter MSS., XVIII, 85,
147-52, XIX, 60-1, 111, 256.
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their hunting grounds, and Allan was left dependent upon his
shrinking garrison for defense.
In February he took a number of Indians with him on

a sweep to the west to catch people trading with the British.
A few were caught and held over-night, but Allan did not

have the resources necessary for more permanent action.
Most of the people were friendly but depressed by the pov

erty caused by the war.

The area was almost defenseless,

and Allan feared it would fall once the ice went out in the
spring.-^0

Allan devoted his attention during the spring and

summer of 1780 to a series of Indian .conferences.

He had

called the first of the conferences for Passamaquoddy on

May 25 and asked the Penobscots, Malecites, St. John, Mic
macs, Madawaska and other friends of the Americans to attend.

The Indians remained attentive to Allan at the meeting but
no longer did his bidding.

They demanded supplies that he

did not have and thus maintained considerable independence
of purpose.

Allan was unable to keep them from boarding a

B ritish vessel that arrived in the bay during the confer
ence; they were determined to seek supplies wherever they

31
could be found.-7

^Petition, Alexander Campbell to Mass. Council,

January 20, 1780, reports, Allan to Mass, govt., February
20 and March 5, 1780, Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 7.0-2, 100-5,
116-7.
•^Letter, Allan to Indians, April 2*7, 1780, report,
James Avery to Mass. Council, June 4, 1780, Baxter MSS..
XVIII, 287-8, 292-3.
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Allan’s conference at Passamaquoddy was held just
before a large Nova Scotian meeting on the St. John.

Anxious for news, Allan sent Ambrose St. Aubin to the river

to meet with the gathering Indians.

They assured him of

their continued friendship for the Americans, whom they had
no intention of attacking.-'

This news from the St. John was cheering, but Allan’s
own conference was not entirely successful.

Pierre Toma

told him that the Indians appreciated the huge effort he had

made to support them last winter, but the tribe had become
poor in the American service.

For the good of their souls,

they must now go to see the priest at the Nova Scotian con

ference.

Ambrose brought the same message from the Malecites

on the St. John.

Allan, who feared the British priest’s

influence, could not dissuade them, although he was reas

sured by the words of the St. John Malecites, who told him
that “We are to Assure you, that our Language to. the Britons

is from our Lips only, but when we address the Americans &

French, its from our hearts.”^

Allan’s fears were well-placed.

The priest tried to

persuade the gathered Indians to go to Halifax, promising
them free access to every town in Nova Scotia.

The Indians,

(^Letter, Francklin to Germain, November 21, 1780,
Nova Scotia A. C, 194-5; report, Allan to Board of War,
June 11, 1780, Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 306-7.
Allan’s report on the Indian Conference, July 1,
1780, Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 355-9.
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however, refused, telling the priest that they would remain
friends of the Americans, who would protect them from the
The Indians then withdrew to the lakes north of

British.

Machias•

34
By the summer of 1780, the number of Indians in

American service was greatly reduced.

ick Delesdernier, one of Allan
s
*

the rolls at this time.

According to Freder

aids, there were 187 men on

This was not a coherent force, how

ever, because they were widely scattered•

Fifteen men were

at Passamaquoddy, thirty-one were at Schoodic. on the lakes,

and eighty were Malecites and Passamaquoddies who were not
gathered in any particular place.

Fifty-one were Penobscots

who may or may not have been available to Allan at Machias.

35

Allan and the. American cause received, a new blow in
late summer or fall of 1780 when Ambrose.St.. Aubin.died.

Allan sent the tribe a letter of consolation, and his grief

was real.

36

Ambrose had been a true friend of the Americans.

He had taken their side early in the war and never wavered.
By contrast, the other major chief of the St. John Malecites,
Pierre Toma, showed a distressing tendency to side with the

folbid.. 339-40.

^Return of the Indians in or who have been in United
States Service, Frederick Delesdernier, July 28, 1780, in
Kidder, Military Operations, pp. 284-5* The 187 men support<ed 172 women and 193 children.

^Message, Allan to St. John tribe, no date, enclosed
in letter, Francklin to Germain, November 21, 1780, Nova
Scotia A, C, 200-1.
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British, although he swore that this was for the sake of

expediency.

By late fall and winter of 1780-1781, Allan’s spirits
had picked up, and he was showing new confidence.

Although

their leaders often had contact with the British, most of

the settlers were strong for the American cause.

The Indians

were uneasy over rumors of an attack upon them from Canada
but remained inland north of Passamaquoddy, away from the

British.

Allan met with many of them on January 3> 1781,

and, although he could not deliver promised supplies, he was

in the company of a priest from the French fleet at Newport.

The Indians were very pleased and declared their strong
attachment to the Americans and French.

If he could get

supplies, Allan was sure he could gain their assistance in

“any sort of Business the States may require.”

37

Spring brought conditions to dampen anyone’s feelings,

however.

British ships were roaming the coast and burning

the houses of American sympathizers; several leaders of the
area east of Penobscot were attempting to have the area de

clared neutral,

Allan had been put in command of all the

militia east of Frenchman’s Bay and had orders to act

against the Tories in the area.

He now had no regular troops

and asked permission to move his headquarters east, nearer

^Reports, Allan to Mass, govt., November 2,
and January 26, 1781, Baxter MSS.. XIX. 24-31. 106-9.
visit of the priest is discussed more fully below.

1780

The
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to the Indians, closing the operation at Machias.
In June of 1781, an event occurred that impressed the Indians and cost Allan very little in effort or supplies.

A french frigate, the Marrs, arrived at Machias and cruised
down the coast to Passamaquoddy.

The Indians were thrilled,

as they always were by any major contact with the French.^
Unfortunately for Allan, the Indians needed more
concrete gestures.

Their stomachs were not filled by the

visit of a French frigate. Accordingly, when Allan visited

the Indians at Passamaquoddy later in June, he found them
despondent and surly.They had left their river for the

Americans and expected to be cared for.

They had not hunted,

according to their spokesman, because they were busy defend

ing the country, and now had no furs to trade and little to
eat.

They had expected more from their American friends.

Allan tried to soothe them but with limited success.
The situation was unimproved by the fall of 1781.

Most of the Indians had returned to the lakes, and Allan

dreaded their coming to Machias, because he had no supplies

for them.

He wrote Hancock that his situation was very bad,*
40

^Resolves of Mass, govt., March 10 and May 5» 1781,

reports, Allan to Hancock, March 17 and May 9, 1781, letter,
Francis Shaw to Mass, govt. , May 3, 1781, Baxter: MSS.. XIX,
18>4, 234, 186-7, 256-7, 236-7, 246-9.
(l^keport, Allan to Hancock, June 16, 1781, Baxter
MSS.. XIX,,283-4.

40Ibid.. p. 284.

41 Ibid.,

167

but he was relieved that the season of danger was over and

hoped that the war would soon end.

42

By the fall of 1781, Allan again was seeking permis

sion to move his operation closer to the Indians, who now
seldom came to Machias.

There were no. longer any troops in

Machias except, the militia, and these were under good offi

cers.
ed.

Allan felt that a man of his rank was no longer need
He wanted to move to the St. Croix River where the

Indians were hunting.

He felt that such a move would serve

to hold the area for the United States.

43

Allan got the permission. he needed to move in April
of 1782 but could hot go at once.

Reports of British activ

ity on the St. John kept him in Machias, although.he sent
his sons among the Indians as proof of his good intentions.

He visited Passamaquoddy for a short time, during the sunmer
but was back in Machias in August.

By November, however,-

Allan and his family had permanently moved to Passamaquoddy
where they spent a hard winter.

44

42Report, Allan to Hancock, October 17, 1781,

Baxter MSS., XIX, 355-6.
43ibid.; report, Allan to Hancock, March 28, 1782,
petition, delesdernier to Mass, govt., March 28, 1782,
Baxter MSS., XIX, 437-8, 437-8.

^^Resolve of Mass, govt., April 29, 1782, reports,
Allan to Hancock, June 4, August 22, 1782 and April 16,
1783, representation, inhabitants of Machias to Mass, govt.,
November 12, 1782, Baxter MSS.. XX, 9, 28-9, 78, 218, 135-4.
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Not everyone was pleased with Allan’s move.

The

people of Machias felt that he had taken too many supplies

with him, particularly guns and ammunition.

They felt it

bad to have one man in command of troops and Indians, be

cause the Indians got provisions and the troops did not.
Now that Allan was gone, they sought more such goods and a

captain to command the post; with these and their militia
Machias promised to hold out.

45

Allan’s move to the St. Croix was a good one.

As

early as the spring of 1782, most of the Indians were on the

St. John.

They had gone because of dissatisfaction over the

supply situation the summer before, and the Nova Scotian

authorities were trying to hold them there.

46

Allan met with the Passamaquoddies and some Malecites
in August of 1782 and tried to explain why he was no longer

able to provide for them as he once’had.

surprised and unsympathetic.

The Indians were

All the St. John Indians

present intended to go at once to their old homes.

Some of

the Passamaquoddies were in Canada, and the rest were going

inland to the lakes.

Allan planned to remain nearby to keep

American influence among them.

47

^Representation, inhabitants of Machias to Mass,

govt., November 12, 1782, Baxter MSS., XX. 154-5.

^Report, Allan to Hancock, March 8, 1782, Baxter
MSS.. XIX, 457, 459.

^Report, Allan to Hancock, August 22, 1782, Baxter
MSS.. XX, 76-8.
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During 1780 and 1781, Allan had been assisted by

another priest from the French fleet, Frederick de Bourger,
who replaced Father de la Motte.

Allan had been without a

priest for some time when James Avery went to Rhode Island
in August of 1780 and asked the French Admiral to send a

suitable person to Maine.

The request was granted, and the

Indians were quickly notified; the lack of a priest had been

one of the principle American weaknesses through-out most of
.,
48
the war.
The new priest arrived shortly in Boston, where he

was given provisions and the services of Gideon Delesdernier,
the father of Frederick Delesdernier, one of Allan’s aides.

Although anxious to get to Machias before winter, de Bourger
was delayed by lack of transportation for over a month but
reached Machias in time for Christmas.
elated.

The Indians were

49
Allan was nearly as pleased as the Indians.

The

priest was very good, he reported, and he ’’Appears the Most

Calculated for the Indians then Any U ever saw — either

from the French or the Britains.

The Conduct he pursues

^Letter, James Avery to Governor of Mass., August

18, 1780, Kidder, Military Operations, p. 286; message,
President of the Mass. Council to the Indians, August 23,
1780, Baxter MSS.« XVIII, 376-8; message, Allan to St. John
Indians, no date, enclosed in letter, Francklin to Germain,
November 21, 1780, Nova Scotia A, C, 202-3
*
^Petitions, de Bourger to Mass. Council, August 23

and September 14, 1780, letter, James Avery to Mass. Council,
Au gust 24, 1780, reports, Allan to Hancock, December 15,
1780 and January 26, 1781, Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 378-9, 417,
381, XIX, 65, 106.
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gives the Indians the Greatest Satisfaction."

50

If he

could stay in this area, he would be of great use.

Furthermore, if supplies were sent to supplement the work
of the priest, Allan even hoped to gain military assistance from the tribes.

51

De Bourger moved among the Indians for over six

months and was used by Allan to quiet unhappy Indians.
There was a limit, however, to what de Bourger could do,
and the hardship caused by the lack of supplies cast a

pall over his efforts.

By the time he left in the summer

of 1781, Allan was writing of a "Gloom & Coldness" among

the Indians that even the church could not cure.

52

The British post on the Penobscot at Majabagaduce

isolated Allan from the rest of his command.

He was nomi

nally in charge of efforts to keep the Penobscots friendly
but no longer had much contact with them.

As seen in the

previous chapter, a truck house on the Kennebec River in

Winslow now handled their needs and was virtually an inde
pendent operation controlled from Boston.

51Ibid.. pp. 106-9.

^Rgpoyts, Allan to Hancock, March 17 and June 16,

1781, Baxter MSS.. XIX, 189, 284. De Bourger left Maine
sometime before September 5, 1781. On that date he was in
Boston petitioning for back rations.
See Baxter MSS., XIX,
320.
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This second major Indian agency in Maine, the
operation for the Penobscots, was centered at Fort Halifax.^3

When the British arrived on the Penobscot, this tribe found

itself adjacent to British power, but derived little bene

fit from it at first.

General McLean, the first commander

at Majabagaduce, ignored the Penobscots, thinking them

perfidious and inconsequental.

During the final years of

the war, however, the British became more responsive to the

tribe, realizing the need for their friendship in the

accomplishment of the long-term British plans, the estab-

lishment of a new colony of loyalists.

54

In 1780, the Americans were also increasingly aware

of the semi-displaced Penobscots.

General Wadsworth,com

mander of the American forces in Maine, asked the

•^Massachusetts operated a third Indian agency late

in the war. This agency, on the Androscoggin River, was an
informal one and received little notice in the Massachusetts
records. An agent to the Eastern Indians, one John Lane,
had been appointed in 1775 but remained inactive through
most of the war.
In May of 1782, he was living at Fryeburg
when the thirty-two Indians on the Androscoggin asked him
to send a message to Boston. They expressed of the Canadian
Indians, who were supporting the British, and sought a land
grant upon which they could settle their families in safety
and embark upon a more agricultural existence.
They also
had furs to barter for supplies, which they desperately
needed.
The government in Boston did not respond to their
plea for land but did send supplies to Lane for the tribe.
See petition, John Lane to Mass, govt., May 24, 1782, and
resolve of the Mass, govt., June 10, 1782, Baxter MSS.. XX,
20, 3o-i;
54«a General State of the Country between Falmouth in
Casco Bay and the River St. Croix.”
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Massachusetts Council to take more notice of the tribe and

requested a priest, hopefully to be obtained from the
French at Newport.

Josiah Brewer, the truck master at Fort

Halifax, took six Penobscots to visit the French in Rhode
Island, hoping to impress the tribe with the French alli-

ance.

55

Demand for more attention also came from Chief

The Penobscots had taken part in military actions

Orono.

with the Americans and felt themselves to be in American
service.

Orono reminded the Massachusetts authorities of

this in a petition in October of 1780.

The tribe, he wrote,

had been driven from its home by the British and was in
need.

The Penobscots had four widows of men who had fallen

in battle with the British and they needed special help.

The British were now offering presents and supplies, he con
tinued, but the Indians hoped the promises made by General

Lovell following the defeat at Majabagaduce would be kept
and that the truck house at Winslow would be supplied.

56

Supplies arrived in Winslow in response to Orono’s plea.

57

55
•^ Report, Wadsworth to Mass. Council, October 7,
1790, and report, Brewer to Mass. Council, October 24, 1780,
Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 460, XIX, 1.
^Report of a committee of the Mass, govt., October
31, 1780, and petition, Orono to Mass, govt., October 30,
1780, Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 8-9, 6-7,.

^Resolve of Mass, govt., Baxter MSS.. XVIII, 16.
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The Penobscots were willing to enter American mili
tary service to get what supplies they needed,

Orono made

this offer in 1781 when the tribe found it hard to gather
food with the British in possession of their old settle

ment . 58
The truck house at Port Halifax, which the govern

ment intended to remedy the supply problems of the Penob

scots, was established at the junction of the Kennebec and
Sebasticook Rivers for the convenience of the Indians and

the government
*

The Sebasticook formed part of the ancient

Indian route from the Kennebec to the Penobscot; a truck

house at its mouth was about the closest point to the Penob
*
scots

hunting grounds that could be supplied from Massa

Winslow was the head of navigation on the Kenne

*
chusetts

bec River, and the supplies could be brought to the fort in

small ships.

Port Halifax was therefore the most conven

ient spot for both parties.
The government in

Boston appointed Joshua Brewer

to run the truck house in Winslow.

Brewer, who had pre

viously been active in the Indian operations on the Penob
scot, faced many of the same problems that plagued Allan
at Machias.

He was frequently seeking supplies, often with

little success.

Although the situation was eased when the

Indians returned to their hunting grounds, he occasionally

Baxter Mi

Petition, Orono to Mass, govt., June 7, 1781,
., XIX, 198-9.
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had as many as thirty Indians a day coming in to trade.

59

As seen above, Brewer had not been popular with the

Penobscots when he had been in government service on the

Penobscot, and reports of his dishonesty and of Indian
dislike for him continued to reach Boston throughout the
last years of the war.

Juniper Berthiaume, a French reli

gious instructor with the tribe, sent in a complaint

against Brewer.

The truck master persisted in cheating

the Indians, according to the Frenchman, with dishonest

weights and measures.

He also kept back and sold items

intended by the government as gifts.

Berthiaume further

accused Brewer of trading with the British.

The Indians

were so upset by this that they were driven to the British
at Majabagaduce for their supplies.

Two letters from

William Lithgow, a prominent leader on the Kennebec and
former trader at Fort Halifax, repeated the Indian accu
sations of fraud and suggested that a man whom the Indians

hated was ill-suited to be the government’s chief agent
among them.

Lithgow was careful to point out that he did

not know whether the accusations were true.

Brewer, him

self, however, admitted after the war that he had been

forced to employ sentries to keep the Indians in line when

^Petitions, Brewer

to Mass, govt., November, 1780

and June 22, 1781, resolve of Mass, govt., November 11,
1780, letters, Brewer to Richard Devens, Commissary-General
of Mass., June 6 and October 4, 1782, Baxter MSS., XIX, 37,
292, 293, 43-4, XX, 11, 105-6.
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they otherwise might have rushed the truck house.

60

There

was no record of any investigation in this matter, but the

.

Indians were plainly dissatisfied with Brewer, although

with how much justice is unknown.
The Indians hoped that Brewer would be replaced

with Colonel Ezekial Pattee, a man who evidently had gained

considerable prestige among them.

Lithgow mentioned Pattee

as a possible replacement for Brewer in his letters to

Governor Hancock, and the Indians themselves requested
that he be appointed.

Colonel Pattee had gained this following among the
Indians during the winter of 1780-1781 when approximately
one hundred of the Penobscots had settled in Winslow near

the truck house.

These Indians were frequently at Pattee
s
*

house, where, in. the absence of supplies in the truck house

and to keep the peace of the settlement, he furnished them

He had evidently done so at the request

with provisions.

of Berthiaume, the French Kecollet among the Indians, and

Chief Orono, who later asked the Massachusetts government

to repay him.

Pattee later successfully petitioned the

6°Complaint, Berthiaume to Mass, govt., November 20,

1781, letters, William Lithgow to Hancock, August 13, 1782
and January 25, 1783, letter, Brewer to Hancock, October 17,
1783. Baxter MSS.. XIX. 372-4. XX, 70-1, 157-8, 273-4.
■

^‘Letters, William Lithgow to Hancock, August 13,
1782 and January 25, 1783, Baxter MSS.. XX, 70-1, 157-8.
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government for repayment of the money.
Brewer, faced with Indian distrust and reluctant
competition from Pattee, had yet another problem, the hos

tility of the people of Winslow, who petitioned to have the

truck house moved elsewhere.

When the Indians settled in

Winslow during the winter of 1760-1781, they caused prob
lems.

At first the Penobscots bartered furs for provisions

at the truck house.

Eventually, however, both furs and

supplies ran out, and the town was forced to provide relief

for the Indians, who were very demanding.
disruptive as well as expensive.

The Indians were

Drunkenness was a con

stant problem, and hordes of dogs, to whom

the Indians

were passionately attached, raised havoc among the settlers
livestock.

63

The people of Winslow thought the Indians

would be more contented nearer their hunting grounds, and

their departure would certainly help the town’s state of

mind.

Winslow’s unhappiness with the operation in its
midst, reports of Brewer’s dishonesty, and recommendations

from men like Lithgow that the truck house be closed made

a strong impression in Boston, and in October of 1782, the

62

Petition, Winslow to Mass, govt., January 27,
1781, certificate, inhabitants of Winslow to Mass, govt.,
June 30, 1781, petition, Ezekial Pattee to Mass, govt.,
September 26, 1781, resolves of Mass, govt., July 5, 1781
and March 8, 1782, Baxter MSS., XIX, 113-5, 312, 299-300,
333-9, 300-1, 421-2.
(& Petition, Winslow to Mass, govt., January 27,
1781, Baxter MSS.. XIX, 113-5.
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government ordered the termination of the operation and the
dismissal of Brewer,

The truck house was found to be unnec

essary, although Brewer recently reported that thirty Indians
a day were trading there.

The closing marked the end of the

official American effort among the Penobscots, but the

truck house did not close immediately.

Brewer was unaware

of the government’s decision until March 18, 1783 and kept

the operation going.

He could not have had many supplies

to offer the Indians, but he maintained an American presence
among the Penobscots and reduced the effect of the govern
ment’s action until nearly the end of the war.
Two other individuals were independently active in

the effort to retain Penobscot friendship.

One of these

was Juniper Berthiaume, already mentioned, and the other
was Lieutenant Andrew Gilman.

Gilman lived with the Penobscots during the most of

the war as an interpreter and resident representative of
Massachusetts.

He seems to have filled no major role, and

his influence among the Indians was uncertain.

His honesty

^Letters, William Lithgow to Mass, govt., August
13, 1782, and January 25, 1783, resolve of Mass, govt.,
October 17, 1782, letter Brewer to Richard Devens, October
4, 1782, letter, Brewer to Hancock, October 31, 1783,
Baxter MSS.. XX, 70-1, 157-8, 112, 105-6, 274-5. By the
end.of the war, Brewer was in poor health and almost desti
tute.
The British occupation of the Penobscot ruined him
financially.
In recognition of his efforts for the Ameri
can cause, the government granted his request and allowed
him to remain in a house at Port Halifax for one year after
the war.
See letters, Brewer to Hancock, September 15 and
October 22, 1783, resolve-of Mass, govt., March 2, 1784,
Baxter MSS., XX, 261, 308, 315.
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and loyalty were questioned at times, but nothing was ever

proved, nor, indeed, were any investigations made.

He was

finally dismissed along with Josiah Brewer in October of
1782, when the truck house at Winslow was closed.

65

The other member of the Massachusetts mission to

the Penobscot tribe in the final years of the war was a
French Recollect, Juniper Berthiaume.

Berthiaume was

evidently obtained for the American service by the French
consul in Boston in October, 1780.

of '’Instructor
.
*

He was given the title

’ to the Penobscots, provided with supplies

by the Massachusetts government, and sent northward to meet

the Indians.

He joined Gilman occasionally and worked with

the tribe between the Kennebec and Penobscot Rivers.

As

did practically everyone in government service in Maine, he

had problems getting his rations but usually lived on what
the Indians gave him.

67

Berthiaume’s sense of duty and devotion to the

^petitions, Gilman to Mass, govt., no date, and

June 26, 1781, resolves of Mass, govt., December 4, 1780,
July 2, 1781, and October 17, 1782, memorial, six Penob
scots to Mass, govt., August 27, 1782, Baxter MSS.. XIX,
63-4, 64, 297, 298, XX, 112, 81.

The Recollects were a division of the Observant
Franciscans who followed an especially strict rule.
^Letter, Brewer to Mass. Council, no date, petition,

Brewer to Mass, govt., November, 1780, resolve of Mass. govt.
November 11, 1781, memorial, Berthiaume to Mass, govt.,
July 6, 1781, letter, Brewer to Mass, govt., May 6, 1782,
Baxter MSS.. XIX, 2, 36-7, 43, 291-2, 303, XX, 11.
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Indians landed him in-trouble.

He reported the Indian dis

like and distrust of Brewer to Boston, and Brewer evidently

struck back.

Berthiaume was shortly dismissed by the gov

ernment on charges made by Brewer.
and declared

the charges false.’

The Indians were angry
Berthiaume obtained and

sent to Boston papers showing that Brewer’s witnesses had
drunkenly signed the depositions upon which he based his

case.

68

Berthiaume*
s

dismissal caused great discontent

among the Indians, and documents flowed into Boston in his

behalf.

Four Penobscots sent in a deposition affirming the

Recollect’s innocence, and Ezekial Pattee asserted that the

Frenchman had been a great help to Winslow and that the
Indians were less troublesome after his arrival.

The tribe

asked William Lithgow to write in Berthiaume’s behalf, and
he did, giving his opinion that the Recollect was a good

man who tried to keep good relations between whites and
Indians.

His dismissal was a major grievance among the

Indians, who were devoted to him, according to Lithgow, and

his re-appointment would be of great benefit.

Three other

worthies of the Kennebec region, James Howard, Esq., Lieu
tenant Colonel William Howard and Colonel Joseph North,

added their voices to the chorus.

They felt Berthiaume was

/To

•
Complaint, Berthiaume to Mass, govt., November 20,
1781, memorial, six Penobscots to Mass, govt., August 27,
1782, letter, Berthiaume to Mass, govt., September 30, 1782,
Baxter MSS.. XIX, 372-4, XX, 81, 82-3.
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an honest man, devoted to the United States, who had rend
ered good service and who should be returned to his

post.

Berthiaume himself reminded the government that problems
were likely to arise if he was not re-instated.

69

Faced with such testimony regarding Berthiaume’s
worth, in October of 1782 the government returned him to
his work.

As the Indians demanded, Brewer and Gilman were

dismissed and the truck house was closed at.the same time
that Berthiaume was re-instated.

70

It was unlikely that

,

Brewer’s actions in attempting by shady methods to secure

Berthiaume’s dismissal did his reputation little good in
Boston and was a factor in his own sudden discharge•
Berthiaume evidently resumed his duties with great

zeal and concern for the Penobscots.

He operated out of a

building at the junction of Mile Brook and the Sebasticook
River in Winslow.

The Indians: remained devoted to him and

usually followed his instructions.

He continued his service

officially until June 4, 1783, when he was once again dis
missed by the government, which evidently felt him unneces

sary in peacetime.

He received no notice of his dismissal,

^Deposition by Joshua Brewer, Justice of the Peace,
June 7, 1782, letter, Pattee to Hancock, August 10, 1782,
letter, Lithgow to Hancock, August 13, 1782, letter, Howard,.
Howard and North to Mass, govt., September 30, 1872, Baxter
MSS.. XX, 71, 67-8, 71, 82-3.

^Resolve of Mass, govt., October 17, 1782, memorial,
six Penobscots to Mass, govt., August 27, 1782, Baxter MSS.,
XX, 112, 81*
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however, and continued his work until June of 1784, when
he sought wages for his service from the time of dismissal

until he learned of the action.

He hoped to use the money

to finance continued work among the Indians.

He did con-

tinue his work after the war for an undetermined

period.

71

Colonel John Allan, who was theoretically in charge
of the waning activities of the Indian agencies at Winslow
and throughout Maine, was in Boston when the first rumors

of impending peace reached him.

He had been seeking

per

mission to make the trip since June of 1781 and finally

went in April of 1783.
not feeling well.

The Indians were quiet, and he was

He had thus decided to go to Boston and

settle a number of affairs and report to the government in

person.

72

Francklin was dead by this time, and Britain had

shut off most of the money for Nova Scotian Indians, so the

threat from that quarter was small.

Much of Allan’s influ

ence with the Indians was gone, destroyed by the great lack

of supplies during the past several years.

Thus a relative

Henry D. Kingsbury and Simeon L. Deyo, Illustrated #
History of Kennebec County, Maine (New York: H. W. Blake,
1892), pp. 546, 550; resolve of Mass, govt., June 4, 1783,
petition, Berthiaume to Mass, govt., June, 1784, Baxter MSS.,
XX, 233, 285.
The information from the History of Kennebec
County came from the work of Mrs. Elizabeth Freeman, a
daughter of Ezekial Pattee who evidently wrote down a num
ber of her childhood memories about the early history of
Winslow.

72Reports, Allan to Hancock, June 16 and October 17,
1781, March 8, 1782, and April 12 and 16, 1783» Baxter MSS.,
XIX, 287-8, 356, 436, XX, 217-8, 219.
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calm had settled oyer the tribes of Maine and Nova Scotia.

With peace in the air, Allan was given authority
to settle accounts and to close out his operation.

73

The peace treaty was finally signed in Paris on

September 3, 1783, and the war ended.

The conflict that

had once again made the Indians important thus came to an

end, and with it, the Indians1 prosperity, meager though it
was.

Neither the Massachusetts nor the Nova Scotian author

ities were likely to pay much attention to the Indians un
less the tribes were useful to them in some way.

With the

end of the war, that usefulness ceased.

The Indians east of the Penobscot fared somewhat
better than their brethren on that river, whose truck house

had already been dismantled and whose religious instructor

was dismissed at the end of the war.

After peace came,

Allan laid his accounts before Congress and the Massachu

setts authorities.

Congress, vested with the control of

Indian affairs, put the Indian agency on a peace basis and
kept it in operation.

In January of 1784, however, Massa

chusetts asked the Congress to end its Indian role in
Maine, and Congress complied.

The Indian agency was dis

solved the following March, and the United States govern

ment took no further notice of the tribes.

The government

of Massachusetts did little to replace the former agency,

^Letter, Allan to Hancock, April 25, 1783, petition,
Allan to Mass, govt., June 2, 1784, Baxter MSS., XX, 222,
352.

183

and the Indians, resumed the long slide into poverty and

despair that ha£ been temporarily slowed by the war,^
John Allan, who had been established as a leader

beyond the Penobscot by his wartime activity, continued
to have influence among the settlers and Indians.

In 1784,

he was appointed an agent of the Massachusetts government

to prevent British encroachment upon that state’s land, and
continued to be active in matters concerning the border
for the rest of his life.

His influence among the Indians

remained great and his advice was sought on the many problems they faced.
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Thus the Indian effort in Maine and Nova Scotia
faded and. died.

Fueled by mutual fear, it was dampened

when the British government decided that there was no
longer any need to fear the Americans in Maine.

Supplies,

so necessary to hold the Indians, were virtually cut off
death gave Nova Scotia’s

in Halifax, and Francklin
s'
*
effort the coup de gr^ce.

On the American side, the lack

of supplies reduced John Allan to the exercise of psycho
logical warfare.

Beginning with the closing of the truck

house at Fort Halifax, increased, security caused Massachu

setts to cut back its effort, slowly, until the end of the

^Allan’s report on the Indian Tribes, 1795,

Kidder, Military Operations, pp. 515-5*
\ 5.Xbid.,

pp. 514-6;

Ahlin, Downeast Rubicon,

p. 150; resolve of Mass, govt., July 9. 1784. Baxter MSS.,
XX, 596.
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"war found only Allan’s small Continental agency near
Passamaquoddy still in operation, and it, too, soon closed,

as all sides lost interest in the people "who had once seem
ed so important.
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Chapter 7

CONCLUSION
The War of the American Revolution brought the
Indians of eastern Maine and Nova Scotia into prominence
once again for the first time since the French and Indian
X7\'7

War and for the last time in their history. ' To the govern
ments of rebellious Massachusetts and loyal Nova Scotia,

these tribes of Indians seemed to hold the balance of

in a thinly settled region.
win the whole

power

If the Americans were going to

of British North America, as they hoped, the

Indians in these eastern regions would be most helpful in
the thrust toward Nova Scotia.

To lose their friendship

would lead to the devastation and possible loss of a valu

able part of the state.

On the other side, threatened by

the early American moves to win Indian friendship and com
bat assistance, Nova Scotia was forced to move to keep the
Indians from attacking them.

The leaders of the province

never contemplated leading the Indians into the field
against the Americans because they did not trust the tribes

and feared such a maneuver would backfire.
When the Revolution broke out and the competition
for the Indians began, eastern Maine and Nova Scotia were

very thinly populated.

Furthermore, even the largest

settlements lay between the sea and miles of forest that
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cloaked every Indian activity.

Nova Scotia’s population

was centered around the long coastline of the peninsula.
The wild interior of the colony offered an ideal base for

attacks in every direction.

Using these interior lines of

communication, hostile Indians could strike .many settle

ments before the news of hostility reached Halifax along
the traditional route by sea around the coast.

The small

and weakened tribes of the area were thus in a position to
do much damage, and the two colonial governments were soon

forced to contend for their friendship.

From the start of the war, it was unlikely that the
tribes would actually take to the field against either
group.

Demoralized by earlier.defeats and economically

depressed, the Indians of Maine and Nova Scotia were mainly
concerned with survival and the preservation of what remain
ed of their traditional life style.

The leaders of the

colonial war efforts were not aware of this, however.

They

remembered too well the recent devastating struggles with

the Indians and French and could see no reason why the
tribes would not repeat their earlier performance.

Both

colonies thus believed that the Indians held the balance
of power in the thinly settled area.

Moves by either side

only reinforced this initial impression, and the rivalry

grew by feeding on itself.

From the .heg^nrring of the war, the Americans were

helped by a reservoir of good will among the Indians.
Although it is doubtful that the Indians understood the
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issues of the war, emotionally they seemed to side with

the Americans.

The British had driven out the tribes
*

old

French allies and remained rather distant in their relations
with’.the Indians, who were more familiar with the Massachu

setts colonial officials and such private individuals as

John Allan of Nova Scotia.

When these people became rebels

and were supported in Indian affairs by important men such
as George Washington, the Indians were impressed.

Later in

the war, when the French joined the Americans against the
British, the Indians gave little further thought to any

hostile acts against the friends of their old allies.

The American rapport with the Indians was continued
and expanded under the leadership of John Allan, a long-time

friend of the Micmacs, who became Continental Indian agent

for eastern Maine and Nova Scotia.

Allan’s understanding of

the Indians and their deep respect for him prevented hostil

ities between the Americans and the Indians throughout the

war.

Under the most difficult conditions, often armed only

with the trust and knowledge established over many years,
Allan protected the isolated settlements of eastern Maine

from Indian attack.

Even when the growth of British power

drew the Indians into Nova Scotian forts and conferences,

they constantly assured Allan that their hearts were with

the Americans, whom they would not harm.
Most of the problems Allan faced sprang from the
weakness of the American supply effort.

Tribal friendship

needed a constant flow of provisions into the camps to keep
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it strong.

The Indians had become dependent upon manufac

tured goods and provisions and naturally sought sources of
such supplies.

The Massachusetts truck house system was-

designedto fill these needs and was expanded in the war

The Americans, however, were soon faced with

effort.

severe shortages.

The supply from England dried up, of

course, and native manufacturers could not make up the

As a result, officers such as Allan in the out

deficit.

posts were soon faced with critical shortages in the goods

needed to support the Indians.

The problem worsened as

British sea power disrupted the long American supply lines.
As a result, the Indians were forced to depend at least

partially on Nova Scotian sources of supplies.

The Malecites

for example, whom Allan had successfully isolated

from the

British, slowly began to return to their lands and the

British posts.

The Indian respect for the Americans held

up, however, and kept the tribes from falling under the con

trol of the Nova Scotia authorities.
Michael Francklin, the Indian agent in Nova Scotia,
was aware of the Indian feelings for the Americans and

never seriously considered using the tribes for military

purposes.

Faced with Massachusetts
*

stated intention to

use the Indians militarily, Francklin and the provincial
government labored mightily to
ing Indian hostilities

ince.

prevent Allan from launch

against the sparsely settled prov

They hoped to gain neutrality rather than alliance.

Francklin knew of the Indians
*

fundamental friendship for
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the Americans and was satisfied with the basic peace he

maintained.
Francklin enjoyed several advantages over Allan in

the struggle.

Throughout most of the war, he had access

to the supplies he needed for the Indians.

Late in the

conflict when the British government cut off the. flow of

.

provisions, the American supply effort had almost complete 

ly failed, and Allan reaped no benefit from the British
economy move.

.

Francklin also had access to Roman Catholic

priests, who were in great demand among the Indians.

Heli-

gion was a big factor in the lives of the Indians,.and con
trol of it served the British well.

Priests worked on the

American side only after France entered the war and then

only for short periods.

These advantages were crucial to

Francklin in the battle to overcome the natural American
inclination of the tribes.
The final years of the war and the British incur

sions into Maine demoralized the Americans and bred confid

ence in Nova Scotia.

The failure of the American ability

to act and resist was matched by reduced operations from
Nova Scotia as the government of the United Kingdom attempt

ed to save money in the area they considered secure.

The

war in Maine and Nova Scotia thus dwindled away into peace.
The Indians for whom the opponents fought—Penob

scots, Malecites, Passamaquoddies and Micmacs—did indeed.,
hold the balance of power in Maine and Nova Scotia, but .the

inability of either side to meet the demands of the Indian
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dependence upon manufactured goods did not allow them to
exercise that power.

At no

point in the war could the

tribes survive comfortably on what they could obtain from

one side.

Their needs forced them to remain in peaceful

relations to both sides, and neither Americans nor British
could shake the Indians from this basic neutrality.

The

only winners in the competition were the Indians, who for
a brief period were important once again.
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Appendix 1
THE WENDALL ESTIMATE

Men in
1690

Tribe

Men in
1726

In New Hampshire
Pennacook

90

5

100
50
160
250
150
100
350
100
220

7
4
10
25
3
10
90
5

1,480

184

350
150
100
100
300
300
120
200
150
200
150
220
400

80
20
10
10
30
30
10
20
10
20
15
20
JL2.

Sub-total for Nova Scotia

2,740

320

Total

4,310

506

In Maine

Pequaket
Saco
Androscoggin
Norridgewock
Sheepscot
Pemaquid
Penobscot
Machias
Passamaquoddy

Sub-total for Maine
In Nova Scotia
St. John River (Malecite)
Chignecto
Minas
Annapolis Royal
"Pubenque”
‘’Port La-lore”
La Have
’’Mallagash”
’’Sachpogtogen"
"Sheedoroer”
Island Harbor
Richibucto
”Astegenash”

210

Appendix 2
GYLES’ STATEMENT

Men above
16 years of age

Tribe

"Ersegontegog”
Wowenoc
St. John River
Passamaquoddy
Machias
Penobscot
Norridgewock
Androscoggin
Pequaket

Total

20
50
100
50
10
150
40
5
. 24
589
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Appendix 5

1790 CENSUS

Men of 16 years
or older

Town

Total

Hancock County
61
Barrettstown
64
Belfast
69
Bluehill
Camden
95
54
Canaan
Conduskeeg Plantation
145
175
Deer Isle
'78
Ducktrap
59
Eastern River Twp. No, 2
Eddy Twp.
19
255
Frankfort
Gouldsborough
78
90
Isleborough
191
Mount Desert
55
Orphan Island
Orrington
114
249
Penobscot
144
Sedgwick
Small islands not belonging
19
to any town
126
Sullivan
Trenton (including Twp. No 1,
75
east side of Union River
Twp. No. 1 (Bucksport)
85
Twp. No. 6 (west side of
Union River)
69
..■VI
Vinalhaven

175
245
274
551
152
567
682
278
240
110
891
267
. 582
744
124
477
1,048
569

2,436

9,549

14
229

61
818

18

66

41
16
24

144
54
84

Total

66
504

512
316
259
578

Washington County

Bucks Harbor Neck
Machias
Plantations east of Machias
No. 1 (Perry)
No. 2 (Pembroke,
Dennysville)
No. 4 (Robbinston)
No. 5 (Calais)

'
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Appendix 5 (continued)

Men of 16 years
or older

Town

Ko. 8 (Eastport and
Lubec)
No. 9 (Trescott Twp.)
No. 10 (Edmunds Twp.)
No. 11 (Cutler)
No. 12 (Whiting)
No. 15 (Marion Twp.)
Plantations west of Machias
No.. 4 (Steuben)
No. 5 (Milbridge and
Harrington)
No. 6 (Addison)
No. 11 (Cherryfield)
No. 12 (Columbia)
No. 15 (Columbia and
Columbia Palls)
No. 22 (Jonesport, Jonesboro,
Roque Bluffs and Beals
Island)

Total

Total

75
9
14
8
13
1

244
30
42
37
54
7

71

233

45
56
22
4

177
207
95
8

51

223

754

2,759

o
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Appendix 4

POPULATION OP NOVA SCOTIA
1764

Town or area

Population

Halifax
Chester
Lunenburg
Dublin
Liverpool

3,000
100
1,600
100
500

Barrington
Yarmouth
Annapolis County
Cornwallis
Horton

300
150
1,000
518
670

Falmouth
Newport
Cobequid region
Fort Cumberland County
Northern coast
On the River St. John
Acadians throughout the colony

Total

278
251
400
750
381

400
2,600
13,000

d>

.
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Appendix 5

POPULATION OF NOVA SCOTIA
1784

Town or Area
In and about Halifax
On the coast west of Halifax
District of Shelburne

Population

1,200
800
10,000

County of Annapolis
In and about Windsor
Cumberland and Partridge Island

4,000
800
700

Halifax east to Chedabucto
Chedabucto to Isthmus of
Cumberland

2,000

Total

900

20,400
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Appendix 6
MAP OF MAINE

4
•g
<»

Ph
Pi

MAP OF NOVA SCOTIA
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r
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Appendix 8
MAP OF NORTHERN NEW ENGLAND AND THE MARITIMES

•
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Appendix 9

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Baxter MSS.—Baxter Manuscripts
D. A. B.—Dictionary of American Biography

I.—Island

Ibid.—Ibidem
Mass.—Massachusetts

Mass, govt.—Massachusetts government

No • —Number

NS—New series
ser.—series

Twp.—Township
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